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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Levi Strauss paid nearly $4 billion in cash to its shareholders.
Unusual  in  size,  the freeze-out  fit a standard  profile-it gave cash  and  li-
quidity to most shareholders  while allowing the Haas family to obtain 100%
ownership of the firm.  At the deal's center was  a problem  raised in every
corporate  conflict transaction,2  including  management  buyouts  ("MBOs")
and parent/subsidiary  freeze-outs:  How should minority shares be valued?
If the share value is set too high, then a transaction will not make sense for
continuing shareholders;  if it is set too low, then it will not make sense for
I See Levi  Strauss  Assocs.  Inc., Schedule  13E-3 (Feb.  14,  1996) <http://www.sec.gov/
Archivesledgar/data/778977/0000950130-96-000512.txt>  (visited Feb. 23,  1999) [hereinafter
Levi Strauss, Schedule  13E-3]; Levi  Strauss Assocs.,  Inc. Schedule  13E-3 Amendment (Mar.
13,  1996)  <http:lwww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data1778977/0000950130-96-000831.txt>
(visited Feb. 23,  1999).
2 A "conflict  transaction" is a transaction approved by fiduciaries who have a special  in-
terest in the transaction and thus are said to "stand  on both sides"  of the transaction.  See Wil-
liams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368,  1379 (Del.  1996) (stating in dictum that these transactions  re-
quire  the  approval  of an  independent  body  in  order  to  be  protected  from  shareholder
challenges).  Management buyouts ("MBOs") put the ongoing management in a direct conflict
with the public shareholders because every dollar paid to the shareholders reduces the man-
agement's potential profit  See generally  Deborah  A. DeMott, Puzzles and  Parables: Defin-
ing Good  Faith in the MBO Context, 25  WAKE FOREST L. REv.  15, 15  (1990)  (advocating  a
judicial inquiry using objective and subjective  criteria to examine the good  faith of MBOs);
Louis  Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM.  L. REV. 730, 730 (1985)  (assessing the
merits of MBOs).  Parent/subsidiary freeze-outs  involve a similar conflict between the parent
company and other shareholders of the subsidiary.  See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407
A.2d  1032,  1037 (Del.  1979) (affirming  a denial of a motion to dismiss  a shareholders'  suit
alleging the breach of a fiduciary duty in a "short-form"  merger), overruled  by Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.,  457 A.2d  701  (Del.  1983);  Victor Brudney  & Marvin A.  Chirelstein, A  Restate-
ment of Corporate  Freezeouts,  87 YALE L.J.  1354,  1354 (1978)  (advocating  a rule providing
that a parent owes a fiduciary duty  to the minority stockholders  of its subsidiaries,  and pro-
posing "that this  duty would not be met unless a corporate purpose  for the merger  [between
the two],  other than mere elimination of the minority-held  stock, were supported  by the evi-
dence").
A "freeze-out"  is a transaction  in which public shareholders of Finn A are given cash or
securities of some other firm  in exchange for their stock of Firm A, permitting  a controlling
shareholder (or management) to gain 100%  ownership of  Firm A.  Freeze-outs often follow a
tender offer  in  which  a  third party  obtains  control.  See  1 MARTIN  LIPTON  &  ERICA  H.
STEmnBERGER,  TAKEOVERS  AND FREE  EOuTs  § 9.01,  at 9-3 (1988).  Commentators  also use
the term  "fireeze-out"  in a different manner, to refer  to the tactics used by controlling share-
holders to disadvantage minority shareholders,  for example, by refusing to pay dividends.  See
generally  F.  O'NEAL  &  J.  DERWIN,  EXPULSION  OR  OPPRESSION  OF  MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS  (1961).
Billion dollar conflict transactions have become  a common  feature of the corporate  land-
scape.  In addition to the Levi  Strauss buyout, recent examples include the $2.2 billion con-
trolled merger of Union Bank and BankCal in 1996 and the $1.2  billion freeze-outs of QVC
and National  Gypsum  in  1995.  See Levi  Strauss,  Schedule  13E-3,  supra note  1; National
Gypsum  Co.,  Proxy Statement (Aug. 21,  1995); QVC Programming  Holdings, Inc., Offer to
Purchase (Aug. 11,  1994).
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continuing shareholders;  if it is set too low, then it will not make  sense for
the  shareholders  being  cashed  out.  As  a rule,  huge  deals  produce  huge
value disputes,  and the Levi  Strauss freeze-out  proved no exception.  Levi
Strauss's investment bankers began with an estimated open market value of
$189  per share.  Bankers for dissident shareholders  estimated values  nearly
double that amount, representing  a potential value gap of nearly $2 billion.3
Value disputes often concern facts particular to the target firm-such as
its earnings potential or its hidden  assets and liabilities.  The biggest poten-
tial  issue in the Levi  Strauss value  dispute, however, arises  each time the
minority shares were valued:  Should the value be "discounted"  to reflect
the noncontrolling  status of the minority  shares?  Or, should the value  in-
stead equal a pro rata share of the firm's total value?
Minority discounts-which can range as high as 35% or more--have  a
dramatic impact on the price paid in a conflict transaction.  If Levi Strauss
had included  a discount of 35%  in fixing the price paid to the shareholders
in its recapitalization,  the total  payout would  have been reduced by nearly
$1.5  billion.  In a copycat financial world strongly influenced by trends  and
fashions,5 in which even the marginal  excess returns  on investment can  at-
3  Initially, the controlling shareholders  offered $250 per share, a 40% premium over the
company's public market valuation.  In February  1996, the company raised  its offer to $265
per share, in part to reflect increases in overall stock prices  since the commencement  of the
bid.  Dillon, Read & Co.,  an independent  financial advisor retained by a special committee of
independent  directors  to  represent  the  unaffiliated  shareholders,  found  that  the  $265  offer
price was  within the range of fairness.  In early March, the  dissident block announced  that it
might seek a judicial determination of the "fair value" of their shares in an appraisal proceed-
ing under Delaware law.  In the end, none of the Levi Strauss shareholders  pursued appraisal
rights and, after the death of a principal  dissident shareholder, the  dissident block decided to
tender into the company's offer.  See Levi Strauss, Schedule 13E-3, supra  note 1.
4  See Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D.  Ind.  1983) (upholding
a  combined  minority  and  marketability  discount  of 35%),  afid, 734  F.2d  1283  (7th  Cir.
1984); cf BRADFORD  CORNELL,  CORPORATE  VALUATION 240-49  (1993)  (collecting empiri-
cal data supporting minority discounts ranging from 25%  to 45%  and marketability discounts
ranging from 25% to 60%);  SHANNON P. PRATr ET AL.,  VALUING  A  BusINEss  316-25, 334-
63  (3d ed.  1996) (same);  Laurn  G. Boothman,  Valuing a Business in a Litigation Context,
N.Y. L.J., Feb.  10,  1994, at 5 ("Numerous  studies...  support [the marketability]  discounts of
a wide range, from 0 percent to a high of approximately  80 percent.").
5  See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J.  FIN.  529, 537-38  (1986)  (arguing that people mistake
noise for information and trade on the basis of that noise, causing "unanticipated  shifts in the
entire pattern  of tastes and  technologies  across  sectors");  Oliver J.  Blanchard  & Mark  W.
Watson, Bubbles, Rational  Expectations,  and Financial  Markets, in CRISES  IN  THE ECONOMIc
AND  FINANCIAL  STRUCTURE  295, 295  (Paul Wachtel  ed.,  1982)  ("[C]rowd psychology  be-
comes  an  important  determinant of prices.");  Bruce N.  Lehrnann,  Fads, Martingales,  and
Market Efficiency, 105 Q.J.  EcON. 1, 25 (1990)  ("Mhe suggestion that predictable  variation
in security returns arises ...  from security price overreaction to speculative fads or the cogni-
tive misperceptions of investors in an inefficient market is currently enjoying a resurgence not
seen in two decades.");  Robert J.  Shiller, Fashions,  Fads,  and Bubbles in Financial  Markets,
in KNIGHTS,  RAIDERS,  AND  TARGETS  56 (John C.  Coffee, Jr. et al.  eds.,  1988)  ("[Tihere isMINORITY DISCO  UNTS
tract substantial capital, the law on discounts has a dramatic impact not only
on the price paid in conflict transactions,  but on the extent to which  such
transactions  are pursued at all.
Part I of this Article shows that the law governing  minority discounts is
surprisingly unpredictable  and obscure in spite of the importance of minor-
ity discounts.6  Even within Delaware, the leading corporate jurisdiction,7 a
survey of the fair value cases on discounts  shows that although the Dela-
ware  Supreme  Court  has rejected  minority  discounts  in theory, Delaware
chancery courts have applied them erratically in practice.8
Part II argues that although the law of "fair value" widely is thought to
be a binding,  mandatory  element  of corporate  law,  it is not.9  Companies
and investors need not subject themselves to the currently  unclear and un-
predictable law regarding  discounts.  As with nearly all  rules of corporate
law, firms and investors may contract around the law regarding discounts (a
fact that  has  led Bernard  Black to  ask  whether  corporate  law  should  be
evidence  that fashions,  fads,  or bubbles do importantly  influence  prices of speculative  as-
sets.").
6  Corporate  statutes do not address  discounts  directly.  For a long time, the states have
been split on the propriety of  discounts,  and in approximately 20 states, no published decision
addresses  discounts.  Disclosure regarding  discounts is nearly nonexistent,  and  practitioners
and commentators  are  frequently  unaware of their potential  importance.  See  infra text ac-
comanying notes 173-90.
Corporations organized  under Delaware  law constitute  nearly 60% of the Fortune 500
companies, and one-half of the 30 companies  included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
See generally  LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS  CHOOSE DELAWARE (Prentice Hall
Legal & Fin.  Servs.  1993).  Courts  in other jurisdictions frequently  rely on Delaware  corpo-
rate law. See Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th  Cir. 1983) ("[W]e
discuss Delaware case law as well, because of Delaware's position as a leader in the field of
corporate law.').
8 See infra text accompanying  notes 48-120  (discussing Delaware's  pro rata value  doc-
tin~e.  infra text accompanying  notes  123-40  (demonstrating  that current Delaware  rules
on minority discounts are nonbinding).  A note on terminology:  Legal rules may be divided
into (1) mandatory  rules,  which by their terms apply whether or not the private parties elect to
be covered and (2) default rules,  which by their terms permit the private parties to "opt out" of
the rules.  Mandatory rules may be further  divided  into  (a) avoidable rules, which by their
terms do not permit "opting out," but which may be avoided (or "contracted  around")  by the
private parties through some (legal) action (or contract) and (b) binding  rules, which are im-
possible or too costly to avoid.  Binding rules, finally, may be divided into (i) effective rules,
which are practically enforceable  and in fact enforced and  (ii) hortatory  rules, which are ei-
ther unenforceable or unenforced  in practice, where enforcement may be, in part, a function of
(illegal) acts of evasion  by the private parties.  The  mandatory/default distinction is usually
formal and categorical,  whereas the avoidable/binding and effective/hortatory  distinctions  are
usually practical and gradual;  a rule may be more or less avoidable or binding, or more or less
effective,  depending on the costs associated with its avoidance,  evasion, and/or enforcement.
For convenience, however, I use "nonbinding" and "avoidable"  as synonyms, and I often treat
them as categorical.
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characterized as "trivial").  Companies can contract around background cor-
porate law regarding fair value determinations  by adopting fair price charter
provisions, entering into buy/sell agreements, or issuing redeemable stock.
Together, the legal facts reviewed in Parts I and II present an economic
puzzle.  Ideal  rules  of corporate  law should be  consistent.  A rule barring
discounts might be expected to increase the ex ante share value because in-
vestors would pay to eliminate the risk of conflict transactions at discounted
prices.  Conversely,  one  could  imagine  that a  rule  permitting  discounts
might  increase the ex ante  share  value by facilitating  control transactions.
Yet, with few exceptions, issuing firms generally have not used their ability
to contract  for either rule.  10  In fact, firms rarely  contract around unclear
rules of corporate  law.  In the great majority of instances,  firms passively
accept the default rules  of corporate  law, even when those rules  are as  in-
consistent and unclear as Delaware law on discounts.
Part III considers  three possible answers  to this  puzzle, applying con-
cepts from economic theory:  transaction costs, network and innovation ex-
ternalities, and overpayment by investors."  Each suggested answer remains
tentative and only points the way for future empirical research, but together
these answers suggest that avoidable rules of corporate law may be far from
trivial, even when they are nonmandatory or nonbinding.
Whatever the answer to the discount  puzzle,  a consistent rule  on  dis-
counts would benefit both investors and firms and improve efficiency.  Part
IV attempts to provide such a rule.12  Although good theoretical  arguments
can be made for either rule, a rule that excludes discounts is the better can-
didate for improving social welfare, as well as the private welfare  of inves-
tors and the largest number of firms.  My conclusion  is  supported by  evi-
dence  of actual  bargains  and  theoretical  approaches  for choosing  default
contract rules that take  account of the asymmetric  information  confronting
firms and investors in the securities  markets.  A rule against discounts also
is more likely to reduce transaction costs.  Part IV concludes by arguing that
discount law should remain nonbinding  in the context of initial public of-
ferings.
10  See  infra text accompanying  notes  141-44  (discussing  the  fact that  firms  generally
have not contracted around discount law).
I  See infra  notes 145-93 (discussing possible answers to this puzzle).
12 See infra  text accompanying notes 195-294 (describing what discount law should be).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
I.  DELAWARE DIscouNT LAW IS UNCLEAR
A.  Appraisal  and  Entire  Fairness
Conflict transactions continue to have wide-ranging effects on the con-
trol of public companies  in the United  States.1 3  Valuing minority shares is
at the heart of every  conflict transaction.  Frequently,  the minority  share-
holders have no choice as to whether they will participate in a given conflict
transaction,  such  as  where  the  transaction  is  sponsored  by  a  controlling
shareholder and no voluntary steps are taken to condition the transaction on
approval  by the minority  shareholders  or the independent  directors.  As a
result, the price paid in a conflict transaction often will be neither  the result
of a true ann's-length negotiation nor otherwise reflect the subjective value
placed on the shares by the minority shareholders.14  Minority share value is
set or negotiated by transaction participants in the shadow of corporate law
that  provides  for  two  relevant judicial  proceedings:1 5   (1) appraisal  pro-
ceedings  under  section  262  of the  Delaware  General  Corporation  Law
("DGCL") 16 and (2) "entire  fairness"  cases, in which courts assess whether
13  See HOULHIAN LOKEY HOWARD & ZUKIN, MERGERSTAT  REVIEW 1997 (1997)  [here-
inafter  MERGERSTAT  REVIEW  1997]  (collecting data on mergers  and  acquisitions  involving
U.S. companies, including data on MBOs and freeze-outs).
14  Frequently, firms pursuing conflict transactions will set up a special committee of dis-
interested  directors  charged  with  negotiating  on behalf of the  noncontrolling  shareholders.
See  I LIPTON  & STEINBERGER,  supra  note 2,  § 9.07[2],  at 9-89.  Such "synthetic"  negotia-
tions, however, often fail to impress Delaware courts.  See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communica-
tion Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d  1110,  1117 (Del.  1994) (criticizing the special committee  process).
Also, skeptics doubt whether even the best-intentioned special  committee can substitute  for a
true market check.  See Lowenstein,  supra  note 2,  at 730, 784 (arguing that only  a "rule of
open bidding would allow the marketplace to determine the fairness  issues ...  effectively").
In any event,  special committees  can only negotiate against background  law that establishes
an amount to which the minority shareholders are entitled in ajudicial proceeding.
is  Stock must also be  valued in other corporate  contexts (including  statutorily  or judi-
cially  ordered buyouts) as a remedy  for the alleged oppression of the minority  shareholders,
see, e.g., In re Cristo Bros., Inc., 478 N.E.2d  176,  177 (N.Y.  1985) (discussing the legislative
intent in determining that a holder of  50% of a close corporation may exercise a buyout privi-
lege accorded  to shareholders), and the fashioning of a judicial remedy in cases where "entire
fairness" has not been shown, see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 5642, 1985 WL 11546, at *9
(Del. Ch. Jan. 30,  1985) (ordering that the stockholders should be compensated  even though
no precise damages  could be  calculated).  "Fair value"  also must be determined  outside  of
corporate  law,  in tax  valuations,  loan  applications,  bankruptcy  valuations,  property  settle-
ments in divorce cases, and takings cases.  See PRATT ET  AL., supra  note 4, at 28 (listing other
purposes  for valuation,  and  suggesting  standards  of value  for each);  William  P. Lyons  &
Martin J.  Whitman,  Valuing Closely Held Corporations  and Publicly Traded Securities with
Limited Marketability:  Approaches to Allowable Discounts from Gross Values,  33  Bus.
LAW. 2213, 2213-14 (1978)  (discussing "fair value" in a tax valuation context).
16  See DEL.  CODE ANN.  tit. 8,  § 262 (1991)  (concerning  appraisal rights).  Throughout
this Article, title  8 of the Delaware  Code is sometimes referred to as the  "Delaware  General
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the shareholders  are treated  fairly  in conflict transactions 17 such  as MBOs
and freeze-outs.
Nearly all MBOs and freeze-outs involve either a cash merger, a short-
form merger,  or both, and appraisal rights are triggered in Delaware by all
short-form  mergers  and  all  cash  or  part-cash  mergers.19  Appraisal  pro-
ceedings  were  not created  to  address  conflict transactions,20  nor  are  they
limited to  conflict transactions. 21  Commentators  are  in general  agreement,
however, that the most defensible  rationale  for the continuation  of the ap-
Corporation  Law"  or "DGCL."  DGCL  section  262  is similar  to  the appraisal  provisions
adopted  in other states.  See 3  MODEL Bus.  CORP.  ACT ANN.  §§  13.30-31  (1984  & Supp.
1997) (analyzing appraisal statutes).
I  See Weinberger  v. UOP,  Inc.,  457  A.2d 701,  711-12  (Del.  1983)  (holding that  the
freeze-out  did not meet "any  reasonable  test of fairness");  supra  note 2 (defining  conflict
transactions).
is  A "short-form  merger"  is a parent-subsidiary  merger on which the  subsidiary share-
holders are not entitled to vote.  See DEL. CODE  ANN.  tit. 8, § 253 (detailing the law on merg-
ers of  parent corporations and their subsidiaries).
See id. § 262(b).  Some, but not all, stock mergers trigger appraisal rights.  DGCL sec-
tion  262 contains  a "market  exception"  pursuant to which  a long-form  merger by a public
company generally  does not  trigger appraisal  rights  unless the  stockholders  receive  in the
merger anything  other than stock of a public company (and cash in lieu of fractional shares).
See id. Finally, a company may voluntarily give the shareholders appraisal  rights even when
they  are not otherwise required, as was done in connection with Fleet Financial Group, Inc.'s
acquisition of Fleet Mortgage Group  in  1995.  See Fleet Financial Group,  Inc., Offer to Pur-
chase (Jan. 30,  1995), at 51.
20  See  MELVIN  A.  EISENBERG,  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  CORPORATION:  A  LEGAL
ANALYsIs  78 (1976)  (concluding that the appraisal right arose out of a need to reconcile ten-
sions  between the majority shareholders'  rights  "to make drastic changes in the enterprise to
meet new conditions as they arise, with the need to protect the minority  against being invol-
untarily  dragged  along  into  a  drastically  restructured  enterprise  in which  it has  no confi-
dence");  Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal  Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32
HARv.  J. ON LEGIs.  79,  92-93  (1995)  (positing three possible  origins of the  appraisal  pro-
ceeding, none of which concern conflict transactions).
21  DGCL section 262 is both  over- and underinclusive  from the perspective  of policing
conflict transactions--that  is, DGCL section 262 is triggered by some nonconflict transactions
and is not triggered by  some conflict transactions.  For example,  a long-form stock merger in
which the acquiror is a controlling stockholder of the target or is under common control of the
management of the target will  constitute a conflict  transaction and  yet not trigger appraisal
rights.  Conversely, appraisal rights  are triggered under DGCL  section 262 by some transac-
tions that are not conflict transactions, such as arm's-length long-form cash mergers.  Conflict
transactions that do not trigger appraisal rights  appear, however,  to be relatively  infrequent.
See data from Securities Data Co., Inc. (showing that of 38 parent/subsidiary transactions,  in-
cluding partial and full acquisitions,  announced during  1995,  only seven  involved stock con-
sideration) (on  file  with author).  More  commonly,  nonconflict transactions  that trigger ap-
praisal  rights  usually do  not  produce  litigation,  in  part because  fiduciaries  in  nonconflict
transactions  are not likely to agree to a merger price that represents less than fair value.  See
MERGERSTAT REVIEW  1997, supra  note  13,  at 36-38  (noting that 100 arn's-length, cash  ac-
quisitions of public companies  occurred  in  1995  out of a total of 355,  and  that 85 involved
tender offers, leaving  15 presumably effected by cash mergers).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
praisal  remedy is that it polices such transactions,22 and the appraisal rem-
edy now is invoked most often in that context.23
Not only  do conflict transactions  frequently  give rise to  contested  ap-
praisal proceedings, but Delaware case law holds that such transactions  are
not entitled  to  the  protections  of the  business  judgment  rule.24  Instead,
freeze-outs, MBOs, and other conflict transactions are closely scrutinized by
the  courts  under  an exacting judicially  developed  "entire  fairness"  test.25
That  test  requires  the  transaction  proponent  to  demonstrate  affirmatively
that the transaction both is the product of "fair dealing"  and reflects  a "fair
price."
26
Corporate law thus provides shareholders with two different methods of
obtaining judicial oversight of the price paid in a conflict transaction.  The
22 See,  e.g.,  FRANK  H.  EASTERBROOK  &  DANIEL R.  FIsCHEL,  THE  ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE  OF CORPORATE LAW  145  (1991)  (arguing  that in policing such transactions,  ap-
praisals "increase the welfare of all shareholders");  Robert B. Thompson,  Exit, Liquidity and
Majority Rule:  Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84  GEO.  L.J. 1, 4  (1995)  ("[The  [ap-
praisal] remedy  serves as a check against opportunism  by a majority shareholder in mergers
and other transactions  in which the majority  forces minority shareholders out of the business
and  requires  them  to  accept  cash  for  their  shares.');  cf.  2  PRINCIPLES  OF  CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:  ANALYSIS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  § 7.22(b), at  638 (providing appraisal
rights for nonconflict transactions, but defining "fair  value" as a price approved by the board
of  directors in all transactions other than conflict transactions).
23 Of the appraisal  cases during  the years  1984 to  1994,  "more than eighty percent  in-
volved  cash-outs; only six  arose in transactions  between  independent corporations  in which
shareholders had the opportunity to continue."  Thompson, supra  note 22, at 25-26.
24 Generally speaking, the business judgment rule protects directors making business de-
cisions from being second-guessed by a court.  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 360 (Del.  1994)  (discussing how the rule  "operates  to preclude a court from  imposing
itself unreasonably  on the business and  affairs of a corporation").  See generally DENNIS  J.
BLOCK  ET  AL.,  THE  BUSINESS  JUDGMENT  RULE:  FIDUCIARY  DUTIES  OF  CORPORATE
DIRECTORS 7-8 (4th ed. 1993) (explaining that the business judgment rule "provides directors
the broad discretion they need in formulating dynamic  and effective company policy without
fear ofjudicial second-guessing").
25 See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d  840, 845  (Del. 1987) ("When a major-
ity shareholder stands on both sides of a transaction, the requirement of fairness is  'unflinch-
ing' in  its demand that the controlling stockholder establish  the entire  fairness  of the under-
taking sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.").  Entire fairness litigation
also almost always arises out of conflict transactions.  In Technicolor, the Delaware Supreme
Court stated for the first time that the burden of proving  "entire  fairness"  may arise where fi-
duciaries have breached  their duties  of care.  See  Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 367-71  (finding
that the board of directors breached their duty of care).  Aside from Technicolor,  however, all
other reported  Delaware  decisions  applying  the  "entire  fairness"  standard  involve  conflict
transactions.  See EDWARD  P. WELCH & ANDREW  J.  TUREZYN,  FOLK  ON  THE  DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION  LAW:  FUNDAMENTALS  § 141.2, at 79-190 (1994)  (discussing, prior
to the Technicolor  decision, "entire fairness" solely in terms of conflict transactions).
26  Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 361  ("Under  the entire  fairness standard ...  the defendant
directors must establish to the court's satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both
fair dealing and  fair price."  (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,  1376 (Del. 1993))).
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case law arising out of these two types of judicial proceedings  is the back-
ground  against  which  value  disputes  between  minority  shareholders  and
sponsors of conflict transactions are resolved.  It is to this case law that par-
ticipants in the Levi Strauss transaction turned in deciding whether minority
shareholders were to be paid a discounted price of $2.5  billion or an undis-
counted price of $4 billion.
B. Fair  Value and  Fair  Price
Appraisal  statutes  entitle shareholders  to a cash amount determined  by
reference  to the "fair value"  of the stock.  "Fair value" is determined  by a
court, and is not defined in statutes.z7  Beginning in 1983  with Weinberger
v.  UOP, Inc.,  Delaware courts have developed  an open-ended definition  of
"fair  value"  that  requires  the  appraising  court  to  consider  "tech-
niques ...  generally  considered  accepted  in the  financial  community  and
otherwise admissible  in court, subject only to [the  court's] interpretation  of
[DGCL section  262]. "28 Fair value may thus include  consideration  of the
asset, market, and earnings values;  future prospects; and any other element
affecting "intrinsic value. 2 9
Since  Weinberger, Delaware  courts  have considered various  valuation
methodologies proposed by the parties and their experts.  Neither the Dela-
ware legislature nor the Delaware courts have shaped or restricted valuation
generally; methodological  choices are made by the fact-finder on a case-by-
27  DGCL section 262(h) simply reads:
mhe Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any
element of value  arising from the accomplishment  or expectation  of the merger or
consolidation, together with a fair rate of  interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount
determined to be the fair value.  In determining such fair value, the Court shall take
into account all relevant factors.
DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit. 8, § 262(h)  (1991);  see also MODEL  Bus.  CORP.  ACT ANN.  § 13.01
(1997)  (leaving "fair value" defined as simply "the value of  the shares immediately before the
effectuation of  the corporate  action" at issue, excluding  changes in value "in  anticipation of'
an  appraisal  trigger  "unless  exclusion  would  be  inequitable").  Thirty-eight  states  have
adopted these definitions.  See id
28  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d  701,713 (Del. 1983).
29  Id. "'[Miarket value, asset value, dividends, earnings prospects, the nature of the en-
terprise  and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained  ...  and which
throw any light onffuture prospects of the merged  corporation ...  must be considered ....
Id. (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71,  72 (Del. 1950)).MINORITYDISCOUNTS
case basis.3°  With the prominent exception of discounts and control premi-
ums,
3 1 everything is permitted, nothing forbidden.
32
In entire fairness  cases, corporate  fiduciaries are  required to show that
the  terms  of a  proposed  conflict  transaction  include  a "fair  price,"  and
Delaware courts look to appraisal cases for guidance  in deciding whether a
given price is  fair, even when  a merger does  not trigger  appraisal  rights.
Delaware courts have stated that "fair value" in an appraisal proceeding will
be a "fair price"  in an entire fairness case.33  That is not to say that a price
30 See In re Shell Oil Co.,  607 A.2d  1213, 1219  (Del. 1992) ("The appraisal quest at the
Court of Chancery  level admits of a broad latitude.");  Weinberger,  457 A.2d at 713  ("At the
appellate level,...  we impart a 'high  level of deference'  to that court's  findings."  (quoting-
Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166,  175 (Del. 1991))).
31  See infra text accompanying  notes  48-122  (discussing  Delaware's  approach  to  dis-
counts and control premiums).
32  Or nearly  nothing.  Delaware  courts have recognized  that book value, which is based
on historical accounting methods,  is not a meaningful measure of fair value, which is focused
on  current  and  nonspeculative,  prospective  value.  See  Seagraves  v.  Urstadt Property  Co.,
C.A.  No.  10307,  1996  WL  159626,  at *7  (Del.  Ch.  Apr.  1, 1996)  ("Book value  is not a
meaningful measure of a corporation's  intrinsic or fair value."); David J. Greene  & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc.,  281 A.2d 30, 34 (Del. Ch. 1971)  (noting that "book value is largely ig-
nored by the investor as a guide to fair value," and that "market  price ...  is... the most sig-
nificant element to be taken into consideration  in reaching  a judgment on the overall fairness
of a corporate merger").  Delaware  courts have  also established that  exclusive reliance  on
market value is incorrect, see Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 457 (Del. Ch. 1934) (con-
eluding that a determination of value "founded  solely on market quotations to the exclusion of
all other relevant evidence"  is an insufficient calculation),  and that market prices  should not
be used where  the prices were  not established in an active,  liquid, and efficient  market, see
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. DuPont & Co.,  334 A.2d 216, 221  (Del.  1975) (al-
lowing a valuation based on an industry price-earnings  ratio in the absence of a valid market
price).
33 See Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991)  ("If a par-
ticular merger price would not be 'entirely fair'  in an equitable action claiming breach of fidu-
ciary duty, no different result should obtain  in an  appraisal,  where the issue is whether that
identical merger  price  constitutes  'fair value."'  (quoting  Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart,  Inc.,
C.A. No. 7499,  1989 WL  17438, at *7 (Del.  Ch. Feb. 28,  1989))); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Har-
nett, 564 A.2d 1137,  1144 (Del.  1989) ("The fairness concept has been said to implicate two
considerations:  fair dealing and fair price."); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840,
845 (Del. 1987) (stating that in an entire fairness case, the concept of  fair price "flow[s]  from"
the requirements  of  DGCL section 262);  Weinberger,  457 A.2d at 711-14 (noting without ap-
proval or disapproval that the Chancery  Court below held fair value  and  fair price to be the
same); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., C.A. No. 12339, 1996 WL  145452, at *9-10 & nn.14-17 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 21,  1996) (citing  DGCL section 262 and appraisal  cases and applying  the pro rata
value  doctrine in determining whether the deal price constituted a "fair price"), rev'd  on other
grounds,  694 A.2d 422 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); see also Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals  of
Old Problems:  Reflections on the Delaware  Appraisal  Proceeding,  32 AM.  Bus. L.J. 1, 13
(1994)  (noting the equivalence of fair value  and fair price); Leonard Chazen, Fairnessfirom  a
Financial Point of  View in Acquisitions of  Public  Companies: Is  'Third-Party  Sale Value'the
Appropriate Standard?, 36  BUS.  LAW.  1439,  1444  (1981)  (noting the  equivalence  of fair
value and fair price in pre-Weinberger  cases).
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approved as "fair"  in a given conflict transaction will always precisely equal
fair value as determined in a related appraisal,34 but nothing in the Delaware
case law suggests that "fair  price"  and "fair  value" should  diverge  on the
question of discounts or premiums.
C. Minority Discounts
In  both  appraisal  proceedings  and  entire  fairness  cases,  determining
"fair  value"  necessarily  involves  the  question  whether  or  not to  apply  a
"discount."  As will be seen in Part I.D, the case  law on discounts  reflects
the confusion that stems from the use of undefined  or inconsistent terminol-
ogy.  A brief discussion of what "discounts"  are will be helpful before  re-
viewing and analyzing that case law.
1. Legal Discounts and Financial Discounts
Discounts have roles in both financial markets and judicial proceedings.
In financial markets, otherwise identical stock will change hands at different
prices depending on whether the stock is part of a control block.35  Minority
discounts  are reflected  in nearly  all stock market prices,  since such  prices
generally  reflect  the average  marginal trading  prices for small  amounts  of
stock that do not convey control.36  In addition,  courts must decide whether
34  In fact, they will diverge  for several reasons:  (1) where a fiduciary seeks to avoid "en-
tire fairness"  review by appointing a committee of independent directors  to negotiate on be-
half of the minority shareholders, the committee  is commanded  by Delaware  law to seek the
"best price"  reasonably obtainable,  so long as  that price  is  also  a fair price, see In re First
Boston,  Inc.  Shareholders  Litig.,  Civ.  A. No.  10338,  1990  WL  201388  (Del.  Ch. Dec.  13,
1990) (implying  that the  "best"  deal price  may exceed  the minimum  required to constitute
"fair price"  or "fair value");  (2) a back-end merger price in a two-step takeover  is frequently
set to equal the first-step tender offer price in order to avoid  SEC Rule  13e-3 or as a result of
negotiations, see, e.g.,  INTERNATIONAL  BUSINESS  MACHINES  CORP.,  Supplement  to Offer to
Purchase, at 2 (June 13, 1995); and (3) fiduciaries may also choose to pay more than fair value
for a number of reasons, whether from obligations arising out of  nonlegal norms (as may often
happen in the context of  family- or employee-owned  firms), to minimize the risk of litigation
or criticism,  to enhance  the fiduciaries'  reputations,  or in  exchange  for  some  other extra-
transactional benefit.
35  In  addition to minority  discounts, commentators  have noted other types of discounts
relevant to fair value determinations.  Most prominent is a type of discount variously called a
"marketability  discount,"  a "nonmarketability  discount,"  and an  "illiquidity  discount."  See,
e.g., PRATT ET AL., supra  note 4, at 331-65  (discussing the concept of,  and empirical evidence
for, marketability  discounts in  financial markets).  This type of discount reflects the fact that
buyers are willing to pay more for stock that is more freely salable than for otherwise identical
stock that is less freely salable.
36  See id. at 304-05  (stating that publicly  traded minority share prices  reflect an implicit
minority discount and that most merger and acquisition transaction data and adjusted net asset
values reflect implicit control premiums); see also Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holder-9]MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
or not valuations should be adjusted (for a given legal purpose) to reflect the
characteristics  of the shares,  or the holders of the shares, being valued.  In
general  terms,  a  minority  discount  for  legal  purposes  is  an  adjustment
downward from some reference value, reflecting (at least in part) risks asso-
ciated with a minority position in a corporation.37  Reference values may be
any of a number of other values, depending on the context.38  Frequently,
discounts  are  expressed  as  a percentage  of a reference  value,  and  courts
have upheld discounts from 5% to as high as 35%.39
Courts and commentators sometimes seem confused about whether they
are  using the term  "discount"  in a legal  sense or in a financial  sense,  and
courts sometimes appear (without explanation or even awareness) to impose
(legal) discounts solely because of the existence of discounts in the financial
markets.40  Although there may be reasons  to choose a particular legal dis-
ness, Private  Benefits from Control of  Public  Corporations, 25 J. FIN. EcoN. 371, 372 (1989)
(noting that large share blocks trade at a substantial premium to minority shares).
37 See  J.A.C.  Hetherington & Michael  P. Dooley,  Illiquidity and Exploitation: A  Pro-
posed  Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation  Problem, 63 VA. L. REV.  1, 6
(1977)  ("[L]egal limits on the majority's conduct are generous, and the right of the excluded
faction to obtain  relief is dependent  on  its ability  to prove  that the limits  have been  over-
stepped."); Zenichi Shishido,  The Fair  Value of  Minority Stock in Closely Held Corporations,
62 FORDHAM L. REv. 65, 82-83,  102-03 (1993)  (noting that minority shareholders are subject
to the risks that the corporation will  (1) retain  dividends even where this does not maximize
the share value  and (2) pay "hidden cash flow" benefits to the majority shareholders,  through
excessive compensation or other forms).
38  Reference  values  include  comparable  company  market  value,  market  value,  asset
value, liquidation value, replacement  value, and earnings or going  concern  value.  Different
courts have  found each of  these reference values to be relevant in calculating fair value,  and
these reference values can vary widely.  See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387
N.E.2d  1145,  1148 n.3  (Mass.  1979) (considering  per-share  values ranging from  $26.50  to
$103.16);  Taines v. Gene Barry  One Hour Photo  Process, 474 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365  (Sup.  Ct.
1983) (considering the total amount of reported business valuations, ranging from $71,000 to
$20.7 million); Note,  Valuation of  Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal  Statutes, 79 HARV.  L.
REV.  1453,  1469 (1966)  (collecting values derived by appraisals  using various methodologies
in reported  Delaware  cases from  1947 through  1965, and  noting that in one  case,  per-share
values ranged from nearly $12 to over $46).
39 See Stanton v. Republic Bank, 581 N.E.2d 678, 681-83 (I11.  1991) (upholding a minor-
ity discount of  5%  and a marketability  discount of 5%,  for a total discount of 10%);  Perlman
v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Ind.  1983) (upholding combined minority
and  marketability  discount  of 35%),  afFd, 734 F.2d  1283  (7th  Cir.  1984);  see  also, e.g.,
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 239-67 (collecting empirical studies supporting discounts ranging
from 25% to 80%); PRATr  ET AL.,  supra  note 4, at 316-21,  334-63  (collecting empirical data
supporting minority  discounts that ranged from 25%  to 45% and marketability  discounts that
ranged  from  25%  to  60%); Boothman,  supra note 4,  at 6  ("Numerous  studies ...  support
[marketability] discounts of a wide range, from  0 percent to a high of approximately  80 per-
cent.").
40  See, e.g.,  Perlman, 568 F.  Supp.  at  230-32  (upholding  a minority  discount  on  the
ground that a minority  stake, in fact,  trades  at a discount in  the market, reflecting  a lack of
control); see also CORNELL,  supra  note 4, at 239-67 (tying explicitly the normative legitimacy
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count on the basis of financial  discounts, the two concepts  are nonetheless
distinct.4 1  To illustrate this, note that if lawmakers universally were to  in-
clude discounts  in fair value determinations, then discounts  in the financial
markets would likely increase as a result, because minority shares would be
subject to freeze-outs at fair values reflecting a legal discount.  If, however,
lawmakers  universally  were to  exclude  discounts  in  fair value  determina-
tions, then discounts  in the financial  markets would  likely  decrease  (or re-
main the same) but would continue to exist.  Control shares would continue
to carry different-and overwhelmingly superior-practical and legal rights
42 and  powers  than  minority  shares.  Among  other things,  control  shares
convey the right to decide when to engage in a freeze-out, which  is a deci-
sion minority shareholders  are powerless  to effect.43  Minority  shares  also
lack the ability to  force  a sale  of the firm.  The  legal  question regarding
whether or not discounts are permissible in fair value determinations  is only
one of many ways that the value of minority shares in the financial markets
might diverge from the value of control shares.  The existence of financial
discounts is thus independent of the existence of legal discounts.
2.  Explicit Discounts and Implicit Discounts
A  legal  discount can  be  explicit or  implicit.  An explicit  discount is
straightforward.  A court might, for example, determine  "fair value" by first
deriving a reference  value by balancing various values (the "Delaware block
method,"  for example,  requires  weighting  asset  value,  market  value,  and
earnings value"), and then reducing the reference value by some percentage
of including control premiums and minority discounts  in appraisal proceedings  to their exis-
tence  in financial  markets);  cf.  Rapid-American  Corp.  v. Harris,  603  A.2d 796,  805  (Del.
1992) ("'mhe full value of  the corporate assets to the corporation is not the same as the value
of those assets to the common stockholder because of the factor of  discount.  To fail to recog-
nize this conclusion...  is to fail to face the economic  facts and to commit error."'  (quoting
Tri-Continental v. Bettye, 74 A.2d 71,  76 (Del. 1950))).
41 See, e.g., Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d  167, 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (noting
that the normative legal  validity of a discount was not  linked to the  descriptive  fact of dis-
counts in the financial markets).
42 See supra  text accompanying note 37; infra  text accompanying notes 71-83.
43 See  1 LIPTON  & STEInMERGER,  supra note  2,  §§  9.01-.08.  Recent work by  Lucian
Bebchuk and Marcel  Kahan suggests that such a right is worth more than intuition might sug-
gest.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, The "Lemon's  Effect" in Corporate Freeze-
Outs, at 5 (Jan. 1998) (unpublished working paper, on file with author) ("mhe pre-freeze out
market price  of minority shares  will be substantially  below the expected  'intrinsic'  value  of
the minority shares absent a freeze-out.").
44 Although the Delaware block method  was critiqued in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 713-15 (Del.  1983), and is generally no longer used in Delaware,  it continues to be
used in  other states  and  remains  permissible  even  in  Delaware.  See,  e.g.,  Richardson  v.
Palmer Broad. Co.,  353 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1984)  (defending  and using the Delaware  blockMINORITYDISCOUNTS
(for example,  thirty  percent),  which is  the discount.  An explicit  discount
occurs in what is  sometimes referred to as a "second-stage"  valuation,45 the
first  stage being the  determination  of the  reference  value  and the  second
stage being the explicit application of the discount.
An implicit legal discount occurs when the two valuation stages are per-
formed in a single step.  For example,  a court might determine  "fair value"
on the basis  of actual trading prices  for the  shares  of companies  that  are
comparable to the company being valued.  If, as is typically the case, those
trading prices already  reflect a financial  discount,46 then the fair value pro-
duced by the valuation will include an implicit legal discount.  In this way,
financial discounts quietly can produce legal discounts.  To detect the pres-
ence of an implicit discount,  it is necessary to analyze the valuation meth-
odology  being employed  in  order  to  determine  whether  the methodology
uses values that already reflect discounts in some way.47
method);  Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d  173,  178  (Mass. 1985) (approving of the "Dela-
ware block" method of stock valuation).
45 See,  e.g., Robert  B. Heglar, Note,  Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DUKE  L.J.
258, 266 (arguing against the use of  second-stage adjustments  for minority  discounts); Chris-
topher Vaeth, Propriety  ofApplying Minority Discount  to Value of  Shares Purchased  by Cor-
poration or Its Shareholders  from  Minority Shareholders, 13  A.L.R.  5TH  840,  849,  855
(1995)  (discussing cases that address discounting the value of  minority shares).
See PRATr ET AL., supra  note 4, at 304-05 (stating that publicly traded minority share
prices reflect an implicit minority discount and that most merger  and acquisition  transaction
data and adjusted net asset values reflect control premiums); Rapid-American  Corp. v. Harris,
603 A.2d 796, 804-07 (Del.  1992) (same); infra note 59 (discussing the Harris  case).
Where a company  is  the  subject of takeover speculation,  the minority share  market
prices may rise in anticipation of a sale reflecting  a control premium.  For companies  with no
controlling shareholder, the market prices will be bid up to a level reflecting  an estimate of the
risk that the sale will not occur and the expected time value to closing.  For companies with
controlling shareholders, market prices will also reflect the risk that an acquiror will purchase
control directly from  the controlling shareholder, as well  as the possibility that the new con-
trolling shareholder will deal more or less fairly with the minority  shareholders as compared
to  the current  controlling  shareholder.  See Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk,  Efficient and Inefficient
Sales of Corporate  Control, 109 Q.J.  ECON.  957, 961-64 (1994)  (exploring  certain  control-
shifting  transactions  where the  controlling  interest in a corporation  is sold  from  one  share-
holder party to another).
47  Courts  and commentators  speak of the "intrinsic,"  "fundamental,"  or "true"  value  of
stock.  To the extent that such terms purport to refer to a determinable or Platonic value unre-
lated to a given set of  choices about the measure of value in a given legal  context, such terms
are  misleading at best.  Assessing value  involves judgments  about methodologies, uncertain
financial events, and the business prospects of the  issuing firm.  These are judgments about
which even reasonable people will disagree.  Assessing value also  requires  legal judgments.
"Market value," as often used, may seem to provide an empirical basis for "real"  value, but it,
too, reflects judgments that lawmakers  have made  and  continue to make  about the corpora-
tion.  Financial markets also reflect the costs and effectiveness of  the mechanisms for policing
such judgments.  Corporate  law, for example,  contains numerous vague principles which con-
tinue to develop, and people can be surprised by such  developments, which implies that peo-
ple can be expected to have different views as to the value of stock based on their assessments
1999] 12651266  UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAWREVIEW  [Vol. 147:1251
D. Pro  Rata Value
Delaware law purports  to reject minority discounts  under the so-called
pro rata  value doctrine, which looks to become the leading judicial ration-
ale for rejecting discounts in and out of Delaware.48  In Delaware, the pro
rata value doctrine was laid down in the 1989 appraisal case of Cavalier  Oil
Corp.  v. Harnett. 49
In Cavalier  Oil, the Delaware Supreme Court held that "application  of a
discount  to  a minority shareholder  is contrary  to the  requirement that  the
company be viewed as a 'going concem."'50  Affirming the Vice Chancellor
in Cavalier Oil, the Delaware Supreme  Court held that "the objective  of a
section 262  appraisal  is  'to  value  the corporation itself, as  distinguished
from a specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a par-
ticular shareholder."'51  Accordingly, the court held that the fair value of a
share of stock is equal to a pro rata or "proportionate  interest"  in the value
of the entire  corporation  as a "going  concem," 52  and that no minority dis-
of the  likelihood of such developments.  Notice, for example,  the shocked tones  of the com-
mentary  following the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  See, e.g.,
Daniel  R. Fischel,  The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union  Case, 40 BUS.  LAW.
1437,  1455 (1985)  (describing  Van Gorkom as "one of the worst  decisions in the history of
corporate  law"); Leo Herzel  et al.,  'Smith'  Brings Whip Down on Directors'  Backs, LEGAL
TIMES  WASH.,  May  13,  1985,  at  14  (describing  the  result  as  "dumbfounding");  see also
ROBERTA  ROMANO,  THE  GENius  OF AMERiCAN CORPORATE  LAW (1993)  (collecting  event
studies of  the impact of  corporate law developments on stock market prices).
48  See infra  Appendix A (collecting minority discount cases).
49 564 A.2d  1137 (Del. 1989).
50  Id.  at 1145.
51 Id. at 1144 (quoting Vice Chancellor Jacobs's Chancery Court opinion).
52  Id.  The Cavalier  Oil court claimed that it was  following settled  law, reasoning  that
because it was  long established in Delaware  that an appraisal  properly involved  determining
the value of the corporation as a "going concern," an appraising court was barred  from valuing
particular shares in and ofthemselves.  See id.  at 1144-45 (citing Tri-Continental v. Battye, 74
A.2d 71,  72 (Del.  1950)).  The rule requiring fair value to be determined on  the basis of the
value of the corporation as a "going concern" (first enunciated  in  Tri-Continental),  however,
arose  in response to an entirely different argument.  In  Tri-Continental,  the dissenting  share-
holder argued (and the trial court agreed) that the corporation  should be valued by considering
net asset (or liquidation) value, rather than solely considering its value as an ongoing business.
See  Tri-Continental,  74 A.2d at 75-76 (rejecting an argument that the appraised value  should
equal net asset value on the ground that the shares must reflect "economic reality" and that the
"intrinsic value of [a] share in a going concern" reflects a discount from the net asset value).
The Tri-Continental  case, then, set forth  the basis on which  the  corporation should be  val-
ued-on an ongoing basis, not an asset-by-asset basis.  See id. Once the value of  the corpora-
tion  is  determined,  however,  nothing  in Tri-Continental  prevents  a court from  finding  that
some shares of a corporation  were worth more than other shares.  The  issue in Cavalier Oil
was not raised in Tri-Continental,  nor did Tri-Continental  compel the holding in Cavalier  Oil.MNORITY DISCOUNTS
counts should be applied  in valuing particular  shares to  adjust the pro rata
value to reflect the value of minority shares.53
The Delaware pro rata value  doctrine has a certain surface  procedural
appeal-by shifting fair value analysis away from the shares being valued
and to the company that issued the shares,  it appears to sidestep many diffi-
cult questions,  such as those raised by discounts and premiums.  Because it
imposes  a mandatory,  blanket  rule  against discounts,  the  doctrine  has the
apparent  merit of eliminating  arguments  about the  size  of an  appropriate
discount  and the circumstances  in which  discounts should apply-because
all discounts are forbidden, such arguments are moot.  Not only is the doc-
trine inconsistent with the language of DGCL section 262,54 but, Delaware
courts have given the doctrine little or no policy foundation beyond superfi-
cial tidiness.55  As demonstrated by the subsequent attempts of the Delaware
53  In addition to Tri-Continental,  the Cavalier  Oil  court cited Bell v. Kirby  Lumber Corp.,
413 A.2d 137  (Del. 1980),  as support for its holding.  See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144.
The Kirby Lumber court's rejection  of minority  discounts, however,  was  implicit only, and
did not set up  a formal  doctrine as did the Cavalier  Oil court.  Moreover, the Kirby Lumber
opinion reflects deference to the trier of fact throughout-a "hands off' attitude that could just
as easily have accepted discounts as rejected them.  Finally, Kirby Lumber was decided under
the Delaware  block method, prior to  Weinberger v.  UOP, Inc.,  457 A.2d 701,  711-12 (Del.
1983), which substantially revised the Delaware  law on fair value.  See supra  notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.  For that reason  alone, the Cavalier Oil court  had the opportunity to re-
evaluate its prior decisions regarding discounts.
54 DGCL section 262 does not, as one would expect  from reading Cavalier Oil, direct a
court to appraise the corporation, or even to appraise the dissenting shares on the basis of the
value of the corporation.  Rather, it directs the court to "appraise  the shares,  determining their
fair value."  DEL.  CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)  (1991)  (emphasis added).  This has been true
since the DGCL was adopted  in 1899.  See 21 Del. Laws 273,  § 56 (1899)  (requiring the ap-
praisal of the "value  of the stock" held by the dissenting shareholders).  Throughout DGCL
section 262, the phrase "the shares" is repeated.  Nowhere does DGCL section 262 make ref-
erence to the fair value  of the corporation, "pro rata value,"  or "proportionate"  value.  If any-
thing, the language of DGCL section 262 supports a valuation methodology  that carefully dis-
criminates among different shares,  rather than ignoring those differences.  Cf. 2 PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE:  ANALYSIS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS  § 7.22(a)  (1992)  (pro-
viding expressly that an appraisal should value stock as a "proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration, without any discount for minority status").  On the other hand, the "shares"  language in
DGCL  section  262 may  simply  reflect a  tacit but mistaken  legislative  assumption  that  the
value of shares and the value of the corporation are equal, namely, that discounts do not exist.
55  Beyond  simply enunciating  the pro rata value  doctrine, the Cavalier Oil court  gave
three reasons  for not applying a minority discount:  (1) doing so penalizes minority sharehold-
ers for lack of  control,  (2) doing so "unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap
a windfall ...  by cashing out a dissenting shareholder," and (3) doing so risks injecting undue
"speculation"  into the appraisal process.  Cavalier  Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145.  None of these rea-
sons, however, provide significant support for the pro rata value  doctrine.  The  first two rea-
sons are conclusory and can be restated with equal  force to support discounts.  See infra note
257 (discussing the  application of "fairness"  arguments  to discounts).  The third reason  is a
procedural  rationale for rejecting  discounts,  and is critiqued in Part IV.F, infra.  Whether  or
not procedural concerns about speculation and the lack of "objective  market data" provide a
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courts to  apply Cavalier Oil,
56 the doctrine is indeterminate  and unclear.57
As a result of this indeterminacy, courts have erratically applied discounts in
some  cases,  leaving  practitioners  and  investors  with  little  guidance  on
whether and when minority discounts will be applied.
1.  Shareholder Level Discounts and Corporate Level Discounts
In Cavalier  Oil, the corporate defendant noted that the appraising court
in  Tri-Continental,  an  earlier  Delaware  case,  had  calculated  the net  asset
value  ("NAV") of the  corporation,  which was a  leveraged,  closed-end  in-
vestment  company,  and  then discounted  it by a percentage,  reflecting the
historical  market-to-net-asset-value  discount,  in order to  arrive  at the fair
value.58  The Cavalier  Oil court distinguished the discount approved in Tri-
Continental  as being a "corporate-level"  discount, unlike the "shareholder-
level" discount proposed by the corporation in Cavalier  Oil.59
The court held that shareholder-level  discounts  were  unacceptable be-
cause they  involve  varying  fair value  based  on the  characteristics  of the
good reason to accept or reject discounts, they still have no necessary link to the pro rata value
doctrine.  Similar  concerns  could  be raised  about "corporate  level"  adjustments,  which the
Delaware Supreme Court has viewed as acceptable under the pro rata value doctrine, see infra
text  accompanying  notes  58-69  (explaining  the  court's  differentiation  between  "corporate
level" discounts in  Tri-Continental  and "shareholder level" discounts in Cavalier  Oil), or, in-
deed, about many other elements of methodologies required by a fair value determination.  In
addition, the Cavalier Oil court  did not present any  evidence  regarding why such  concerns
should be heavier in the context of "shareholder level" discounts.
56  See infra  Part I.D.3.
57  In addition, the Cavalier Oil court did not address or even seem to be aware of con-
trary precedent upholding discounts based on the characteristics of  the shares being valued.  In
Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,  159 A.2d 278 (Del.  Ch. 1960),  the~court  accepted  the
court-appointed  appraiser's reduction by 10% of an average price-earnings multiple for com-
parable companies "for certain reasons, such as the lack of marketability of the stock, etc."  Id.
at 285.
58  See Cavalier  Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144-45 (describing the  Tri-Continental  court's method
of  calculating fair value).
59 Id.  This  distinction  was  confirmed  in a subsequent  Delaware  Supreme Court  case,
Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris,  603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).  In that case, the trial court relied
on the market prices of the minority shares of comparable companies  in order to establish the
value of various subsidiaries owned by Rapid-American,  the company whose shares were be-
ing valued.  The Delaware Supreme Court agreed that such prices "are discounted and do not
reflect a control premium,"  and concluded  that the trial court's valuation erroneously "treated
Rapid as a minority shareholder in its wholly-owned subsidiaries" and so reversed.  Id. at 804.
The  court  cited  Tri-Continental  and Cavalier Oil as  authority  for  the  distinction  between
"shareholder  level  adjustments,"  which  are impermissible  under the pro rata value doctrine,
and "corporate  level" adjustments,  which are necessary  to "establish[]  the intrinsic  value of
the enterprise."  Id. at 805-06.  Because  Rapid-American owned 100% of its subsidiaries,  the
court reasoned, it was unrealistic to value  its subsidiaries at anything  less than full firm value,
including a company-level control premium.  See idMINORITY DISCOUNTS
shares  "in  the  hands of a  particular  shareholder,"  rather  than  fixing  fair
value as  a pro rata share  of the firm  value  without reference to particular
shares.  Corporate  level  discounts, on the other hand, were  acceptable  be-
cause they were used to determine the value of the firm as a going concern.
As we will see, however, this distinction is highly problematic.
It is true that the discounts  in Tri-Continental  and Cavalier Oil are fa-
cially  distinguishable.  The  former  discount  was  a  reduction  from  the
NAV,6°  the  latter was  a  reduction  from  a  value  derived  by  capitalizing
earnings.61  Thus, it is fair to say that, contrary to the argument of the corpo-
ration in Cavalier Oil,62 the holding in Tri-Continental  did not require the
inclusion of a "shareholder-level"  minority discount.
The two principal  arguments used  in Tri-Continental  to justify includ-
ing  discounts  at the  "corporate  level,"  however, also  support inclusion  of
discounts  in general.  First, the Tri-Continental  court reasoned  that to  ex-
clude such a discount was "to fail to face the economic facts."63  Second, the
Tri-Continental  court reasoned that "fair value" must equal what the share-
holder "would have received..,  one way or another as long as the company
continued in business," and since a noncontrolling shareholder has no power
to force liquidation, the only way for a shareholder to obtain value is "by the
sale...  on the market," which will necessarily be at a discount.64  Both ar-
guments closely resemble arguments used by courts outside Delaware to de-
fend minority discounts in general.65  It is an "economic  fact" that financial
discounts  exist,  and it  is a legal  and practical  fact that some  shares  have
fewer rights (for example, to force liquidation) than  other shares.  Both ar-
60  See Tri-Continental v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71,  75 (Del. 1950) ("The appraiser then arrived
at the true or intrinsic value of a common share of General by applying the discount to the fair
asset value of $5.44, and arrived at a value of $4.08 per share for the common stock of Gen-
eral.").
See Cavalier  Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145-56  ("In order to arrive at a merger date valuation,
[the expert witness] discounted back his terminal value and his projected net cash flow for the
fiveyear period.").
2 See id. at 1144-45  (arguing that the  Supreme Court of Delaware  "recognized the ap-
propriateness  of discounting a dissenting  shareholder's interest  in an appraisal proceeding  in
Tri-Continental").
63  Tri-Continental,  74 A.2d at 76.
64  Id.  at 76.
65  See, e.g., Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568  F. Supp. 222, 230-32 (N.D.  Ind. 1983)
(considering the  fact that a plaintiff's  shares represent a minority interest, that the shares  lack
marketability,  and that the company is nondiverse  in  finding the fair market value of plain-
tiff's  shares), aff'd, 734 F.2d  1283  (7th Cir.  1984);  Armstrong v.  Marathon  Oil  Co.,  513
N.E.2d 776, 787-91  (Ohio 1987) (taking into account the willing-buyer/willing-seller  price in
addition  to the stock market price in order to determine the  fair value of the dissenting share-
holder's stock); see also infra Part IV.E (discussing the  relative merits of different  discount
rules).
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guments  provide justifications  for imposing a discount  for lack of control,
contrary to the holding in Cavalier  Oil.
66
In essence,  the court in Tri-Continental  equated  fair value with market
value, and because  the market value of a noncontrol share will reflect  a fi-
nancial  discount, such an equation imposes  an implicit discount  in arriving
at fair value.  It is irrelevant that this is done in the process of determining
fair value (at the "corporate  level"),  and not after the value of the corpora-
tion as a "going  concern" has already  been determined  (at the "shareholder
level").  The fair value finally determined  is  lower than both the reference
value from which the discount is taken and the value that would have been
obtained had no such discount been imposed,  and setting fair value equal to
the lower value is only justifiable on grounds implicitly rejected in Cavalier
Oil.  In  other words,  the fact that the discount  in Tri-Continental  was im-
posed at the "corporate  level" did not mean (as it seems at first glance) that
all shares  were valued  equally, as  pro rata claims on a single "going  con-
cern" value, as required by Cavalier  Oil.
To see why, consider a closed-end investment company incorporated in
Delaware with an  NAV of $100  and  five shareholders,  each holding  one
share of common  stock.  Assume that the  company  engages  in  four con-
secutive mergers; at each point, one shareholder dissents and perfects its ap-
praisal rights, and the company's NAV remains the same, except for the ef-
fect  of  paying  for  a  dissenting  shareholder's  shares.67   After  the  first
shareholder  dissents,  each remaining  shareholder holds a 25%  stake;  after
the  second  dissents,  each holds  a 33  1/3%  stake;  after the third  dissents,
each holds a 50% stake; and, after the last transaction, one shareholder holds
all of the outstanding shares.  If the courts, following Tri-Continental,  were
to  impose a "corporate-level"  discount of 25%  to the NAV in order to de-
66  See  Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at  1145  (rejecting  minority  discounts because  they "im-
pose[] a penalty for lack of control").  The "no-discount"  rule required by  the pro rata value
doctrine  is also  at odds  with Delaware  law that permits  the  controlling  shareholders  to sell
their control shares at a premium without sharing that premium with, or "taking along,"  other
shareholders.  See, e.g.,  Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,  535 A.2d 840,  844-45  (Del.  1987)
(holding that the  majority shareholder  has no  duty to sell its holdings merely  because a sale
would profit the minority shareholders).
67  This  assumption  is unrealistic  because  if the NAV  remained  unchanged  after each
merger, then it is hard to see why mergers would be undertaken.  In addition, it is unlikely that
four mergers  would take  place simultaneously;  ordinarily, some  change in  the NAV  would
occur from  normal  market fluctuations  over the time  necessary  to complete  the merger.  It
seems realistic, however,  to make  equivalent assumptions:  (1) with  each merger, the share-
holders continue to hold the same indirect proportionate interest in the pre-merger NAV  be-
cause the new assets obtained balance out the cash paid (or shares issued) in each merger; and
(2) the net present value of any change in the NAV from market fluctuations is either trivial or
not systematically related to the mergers.MINORITYDISCOUNTS
68 termine the fair value in each appraisal,  then the dissenting shareholders
would receive the payments set forth in Table 1.
Table 1.  Effect of Applying "Corporate Level" Discounts in
Successive Appraisals
Fair  Corporate  Shareholders  Pro Rata
Value of  Level Discount  Stake  Value
Firm as a
Going
Concern
Merger 1  $100.00-  25% = $75.00  x 20%  = $15.00
Merger 2  $85.00 - 25% = $63.75  x 25%  = $15.94
Merger 3  $69.06-  25%  = $51.80  x 33%  = $17.27
Merger 4  $51.79-  25% = $38.84  x 50%  = $19.42
Final NAV  $32.37  x 100%  = $32.37
Each successive dissenting shareholder receives an increasing  payment
for shares that (in theory, according to the pro rata value doctrine) represent
identical pro rata claims on the firm's total value prior to the mergers.  In
other words,  each  shareholder's  shares  are valued  differently,  despite  the
fact that the  corporation essentially  remains  unchanged.  The  final  share-
holder retains  100% of a company with an NAV of $32, representing a pre-
mium  of more  than  100%  above the  $15  received  by the  first dissenting
shareholder.  Even net of liquidation costs,  the final shareholder could  ex-
pect to derive a much higher value, compared to the dissenting shareholders,
for the same initial pro rata share of the fair value of the same corporation.
Yet the  $75  total  fair  value  determined  in the  first appraisal  implies that
each share is worth $15,  the value awarded to the first dissenter.  Because a
controlling shareholder could obtain a higher per-share value by liquidating
than by continuing as a going concern, the total firm value is actually equal
to the NAV less the liquidation costs, something substantially above $75.
The  disparate  treatment  embedded  in  the  "corporate-level"  discount
method used in Tri-Continental  demonstrates not only that Cavalier  Oil and
Tri-Continental  are  at odds with  one  another, but, more  importantly, that
there is  no substance  to the pro rata value doctrine.  If the pro  rata value
doctrine  requires  only  that  no  discount  be  imposed  at the  "shareholder
level,"  but permits a discount  to be imposed at the "corporate  level,"  then
controlling shareholders  seeking to obtain more than a pro rata share of the
68  This  was  the discount  to  the NAV  that  was  applied  in  Tri-Continental.  See Tri-
Continental,  74 A.2d at 73.
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corporation's  aggregate value only need to find some way to build  in their
discount  at the  stage  of "corporate-level"  valuation,  as  was  done  in  Tri-
Continental.  Delaware  courts  since  Cavalier Oil have  realized  belatedly
that there  are  many  ways to  do this,  and  if a "no-discount"  rule  is to  be
taken seriously, then a stronger rationale is needed-one that focuses less on
the  "level"  at which discounts  are  imposed  and more  on the working me-
chanics  of the valuation  methodologies  employed  and the  sources  of dis-
counts, particularly on the existence or absence of control.
69
69  See  infra Part I.D.2 (presenting  methods  by which to derive minority  discounts  and
control premiums).  The emptiness of the pro rata value doctrine is also illustrated by the issue
of marketability  discounts.  See supra note 35  (explaining the rationale behind marketability
discounts).  Cavalier Oil and  subsequent  Delaware  cases  have  held  such  discounts  to be
"shareholder  level" discounts that are prohibited by the pro rata value doctrine.  See Cavalier
Oil, 564 A.2d at  1144 (affirming  the Vice Chancellor's rejection of a marketability discount);
see also Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., C.A. No.  11265,  1992 WL 364682, at *4-5 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 7,  1992) (rejecting a marketability discount); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., C.A. No.
7499,  1989 Del.  Ch. LEXIS  50, at *48-50  (Nov. 8,  1989)  (rejecting, without comment,  dis-
counted cash flow ("DCF') analyses to which both the dissenting shareholder's  expert and the
corporation's expert applied marketability  discounts, and adopting a different valuation meth-
odology).  But cf Hintmana v. Fred Weber, Inc., C.A. No. 12839,  1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS  26, at
*9 (Feb.  17,  1998) (accepting a "small stock" premium in the calculation of the discount rate
in a DCF analysis, despite its having the same effect and rationale as marketability discounts);
Le Beau  v. M.G. Bancorporation,  Inc.,  C.A. No. 13414,  1998  WL 44993,  at  *10  (Del.  Ch.
Jan.  29,  1998)  (same);  Charlip v. Lear  Siegler, Inc.,  C.A. No. 5178,  1984 Del.  Ch.  LEXIS
548,  at * 11  (Nov. 27,  1984) (rejecting  a marketability  discount, not on the ground of the pro
rata value doctrine, but because the litigants stipulated to the exclusion of any consideration of
market value in determining fair value); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,  159 A.2d 278,
284 (Del. Ch. 1960) (accepting a marketability discount).
By contrast, New York courts have reasoned that if all outstanding  shares of a corporation
are equally unmarketable,  then it is natural to say that a discount to reflect that unmarketabil-
ity is a "corporate-level"  adjustment to the value of the firm itself, rather than a "shareholder-
level"  adjustment to the value of the shares.  Using this logic, New York courts have held that
such discounts are "corporate-level"  discounts that are consistent with the pro rata value doc-
trine.  See  Friedman  v. Beway  Realty  Corp.,  661  N.E.2d  972, 976  (N.Y.  1995)  ("[C]ourts
should determine the minority shareholder's  proportionate interest in the going concern value
of the corporation as a whole ....  ").  The difficulty with this logic, however, is that frequently
some shares will be unrestricted and freely tradable, whereas others will be restricted and thus
less marketable.  For example, minority shares may be subject to buy/sell restrictions to which
the controlling shareholder's  shares are not.  In such a case, it would be difficult to view mar-
ketability  as a feature of the firm,  rather  than as a  feature of the shares.  Yet, it would  be
equally difficult to justify accepting a marketability discount in a case where  no shares were
freely transferable while rejecting such a discount where some shares were freely transferable.
Such a result would  seem  to reward  a controlling  shareholder  (or punish a minority  share-
holder) for a  feature  of the  controlling shareholder's  shares.  In other words,  the discount
would, in a sense, be  an adjustment  at the "shareholder  level," but perversely  based  on the
features of shares not being valued.MINORITYDISCOUNTS
2.  Minority Discounts and Control Premiums
In  addition  to  producing  an  incoherent distinction  between  firm-level
and  shareholder-level  discounts,  the  pro  rata value  doctrine  has  also  left
Delaware courts  (and the practitioners reading  their opinions)  more than a
little confused  about whether or how to distinguish minority discounts from
control  premiums.70   In the  process  of resisting  control  premiums,  some
courts appear to have applied minority discounts  unintentionally.  As a re-
sult, Delaware  courts may have underestimated  fair value and unintention-
ally  encouraged  conflict transactions.  Before reviewing the  post-Cavalier
Oil cases that demonstrate  this confusion, it is helpful to explore what con-
trol premiums are and how they relate to minority discounts.
a. Control  Premiums
In judicial  fair value determinations,  premiums  generally are  the con-
verse of discounts-an adjustment upwards from a reference value to reflect
a feature of the shares being valued or a feature of their holder.  As with mi-
nority discounts, control premiums exist in the financial markets and repre-
sent the  empirical difference  between (1) prices that  buyers are willing to
pay  for  stock  that  will  give  a  buyer  control  of  a  corporation  ("control
shares") and (2) prices that buyers are willing to pay for stock that does not
convey control  of the corporation ("minority  shares"). 7 1  It is said,  for ex-
ample, that Company X paid a "control premium" of Y% over market to ac-
quire Company Z.  The existence of control  premiums is  well known and
well documented.  Whether measured against very small blocks that trade
70  See Barry M. Wertheimer,  The Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy and How Courts De-
termine Fair Value, 47 DuKE L.J. 613, 648-49 (1998).
Unfortunately,  the courts and litigants have confusingly phrased the issue in terms of
whether the  addition of a control premium  is appropriate.  This  is  unfortunate be-
cause  the real  question  is  not  whether to  add  a control  premium  but  is  instead
whether a market price based valuation should be adjusted upward to correct for the
inherent minority discount reflected therein.
Id.
71  See, e.g.,  CORNELL,  supra note 4, at 243 (discussing the application of control premi-
urns in appraisals).  Cornell notes that
both research  in  finance and common  sense support the proposition that a buyer is
willing  to  pay  more  than  the  market  price  for  a  controlling  interest  in  a  com-
pany...  when  the buyer  believes  that the  fiture  cash  flow of the  company...
can be increased once it is under his or her control.
Id.; see also PRATr  ET AL.,  supra note 4, at 298-326 (collecting  control premium data);  18A
AM.  JUL 2D Corporations  § 795  (1985)  ("[lit is generally recognized that majority  stock is
more valuable than minority stock.").
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on the public  stock  markets  daily  or  against  larger  but  noncontrol  share
blocks, control shares command premium prices.72
Control premiums  can be attributed to a number of sources which vary
depending  on the  acquiror, the target,  the  quality of the target's  manage-
ment, the reasons for the acquisition,  the financial and legal structure of the
acquisition, and general economic and legal factors.73  For discussion, three
sources  of control  premiums  will  be  identified:74   (1)  synergy  value,"
(2) expropriation value, and (3)  pure control value.76
72  For the period from 1981 through  1994, data from the Mergerstat  Review show that the
prices  paid in acquisitions by  negotiated purchase or tender offer of control shares in public
companies exceeded  the market prices for the targets'  outstanding stock by an average of ap-
proximately  38%.  During the same period, average prices paid in the same types of acquisi-
tions of large (>10%) but noncontrolling blocks of shares in public companies also exceeded
market prices  for  the  targets'  outstanding  stock,  but  premiums  for these  noncontrol  share
blocks  averaged  only 34.5%.  See MERGERSTAT  REVIEW  1997, supra note  13  (providing a
year-by-year comparison  of the  average premiums  offered  over the market price);  see also
PRATT  ET AL.,  supra  note  4, at 316-19 (noting studies showing the existence  of median con-
trol premiums ranging from 28% to 35%); Gary Fodor & Edward Mazza, Business Valuation
Fundamentals  for Planners,  5 J.  FIN.  PLAN.  170,  177 (1992)  (stating that control premiums
paid for public companies averaged 30%to 40% from the late 1960s to the late  1980s).
73  See Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 305 (Del. Ch. 1994).
Optimists  see  the  control  premium  as  a  reflection  of the  efficiency  enhancing
changes that the buyer of control  is planning on making to the organization.  Others
tend to see it, at least sometimes, as the price that a prospective wrongdoer is willing
to pay  in order to put himself in the  position to exploit vulnerable others, or simply
as a function of a downward sloping demand curve demonstrating investors'  hetero-
geneous beliefs about the subject stock's value.
Id. (citations omitted); see also RONALD  J. GiLsoN & BERNARD S. BLACK,  THE LAW  AND
FINANCE  OF CORPoRATE ACQUIsrIONs  255-498  (2d ed.  1995)  (giving reasons  for the exis-
tence of control premiums);  PRATT ET AL., supra  note 4, at 30 1-10 (noting the prerogatives of
control and ways in which the rights of  the controlling shareholders of different corporations
may vary,  causing the control  premiums  to vary  in size);  Shishido, supra note 37,  at 86-90
(giving reasons for the existence of control premiums).
SThe discussion in this Article focuses on the possible sources of control premiums that
are consistent with  the semi-strong form  of the efficient  market hypothesis.  Control premi-
ums also have been attributed to market failures.  See, e.g.,  Reinier Kraakman,  Taking Dis-
counts Seriously:  The Implications of "Discounted"  Share Prices  as an Acquisition Motive,
88 COLUM.  L. REV.  891,  897-98 (1988)  (discussing the misinvestment  hypothesis in the con-
text of market discounts); see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price,  Fair  Value, and Corporate  Law, 99 YALE  L.J. 1235,  1244-52  (1990)  (arguing
that investors  heterogeneously value  given shares  and that this  explains tender offer premi-
ums .
See PRATT  ET AL.,  supra  note 4, at 300 (analyzing  control  premiums separately from
synergy value, and referring to the control  premium plus the synergy value as an "acquisition
premium").  In my experience, control  premiums more commonly are thought to include syn-
ergy value; therefore, I do not adopt that terminology, but instead  identify synergy  value as a
distinct element of the control premium.
76  As a negative offset to these sources of value,  control persons that own less than  100%
of a company must deal with  the costs  associated  with controlling  a company with  outsideMINORITYDISCOUNTS
Synergy value arises when two assets are more valuable in combination
than in isolation or, put otherwise, when two assets are more valuable when
controlled by the same firm than when controlled by different firms.  Syner-
gies can  arise on the input and output sides of a firm:  input synergies re-
duce  costs associated  with  production without  causing a proportionate  re-
duction in revenues;  output synergies  increase revenues  without causing a
proportionate increase in costs.  The combination of two firms that control
synergistic assets permits the realization of synergy value.
Expropriation  value arises  from the ability to  expropriate  wealth from
minority  shareholders  through  fraud,  theft,  or breach  of fiduciary  duties,
such as  freeze-outs  at a clearly unfair price or payment of excessive com-
pensation.77  Expropriation value also arises in "gray areas" where behavior
that is currently permitted,  or at least tolerated, likely would be condemned
if it could be policed costlessly.  Some examples  of such behavior  are the
excessive retention of assets;78 excessive distributions;79 payment of above-
investors  ("public company costs").  Public company costs  include the significant costs im-
posed by regulation,  such as  SEC filings, shareholder  reports, shareholder  meetings,  and in-
spection of  records and appraisal  rights.  Public company costs also include the risk of  litiga-
tion (such as  "entire  fairness"  litigation),  negative  press relations,  and "activism"  (such  as
proposals under SEC Rule  14a-8)  from disgruntled minority shareholders.  See Harry DeAn-
gelo et al.,  Going Private:  Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. &  ECON.
367, 371-74 (1984).  Such costs do not rise proportionately  with  corporate assets or equity,
and thus, as a corporation grows in size, they become increasingly  less important relative to
the other sources of  value.
77  Expropriation  value  may be  attributed  to agency  costs:  the  inability of the principal
(shareholders or minority shareholders) to observe perfectly the behavior of the agents (man-
agers or controlling shareholders)  creates the risk that the agent  will not act in the  interest of
(all)  shareholders.  See  Kenneth  J. Arrow,  The Economics of  Agency,  in PRINCIPALS  AND
AGENTS:  THE STRUCTuRE  OF BusiNESS  37, 38-39 (John W.  Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser
eds.,  1991)  (discussing the principal-agent  problem of hidden action).  Professor Coffee also
has distinguished expropriation value  from synergy value in the context of the sale of control
by controlling shareholders.  See John  C. Coffee, Jr.,  Transfers of Control and the Quest  for
Efficiency:  Can Delaware Law Encourage  Efficient Transactions While Chilling  Inefficient
Ones?, 21  DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 412-20 (1996)  (discussing "synergy  gains" as distinct from
"misappropriated business opportunities").
78  See  Shishido, supra note  37,  at  86-90  (noting that  the retention of assets  may not
maximize  firm value because expected  discounted cash flows from those assets are less than
their liquidation value  due to internal  factors such as poor management  or to external factors
such as high  inflation).  But cf id. (noting that the controlling  shareholders may nevertheless
choose to retain such  assets due to (1) the love of position and perquisites,  (2) the reluctance
to harm  the employees, or (3) the hope that the minority will seek to sell out prior to liquida-
tion, thereby increasing returns to the controlling shareholder).
79  Firm value  would be lowered  if the discounted value of cash in  the finn's hands ex-
ceeded the expected return on cash paid out in the hands of  shareholders; yet, control persons
might make such distributions to provide a control  person with liquidity.  Cf PRATT ET AL.,
supra  note 4, at 301-02 (listing the power to pay dividends as one of the powers  of control,
and noting that minority shareholders have no assurance as to liquidity).
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market, but not clearly excessive, amounts for goods or services; or freeze-
outs priced to take advantage of a "blockage" of non-material information.s
Absent perfect enforcement mechanisms, all of these items potentially work
for a controlling  shareholder;  control shares  are worth more  than minority
shares, in part, because they put controlling shareholders in a position to ex-
ploit imperfect policing mechanisms.
81
Expropriation  value arises  whether  or not a control  person  intends to
engage in such behavior.  For example,  control person A,  who is willing to
break the law, will value control shares  $(X+Y)  more than minority shares,
where $X is the value arising from the fact that no other control person can
80  As Victor Brudney notes,  some element  of expropriation  value relates  to the risk of
"systematic impediments to the flow of  information  to the market."  Victor Brudney, Efficient
Markets and Fair  Values in Parent  Subsidiary  Mergers,  4 J. CORP. L. 63, 71 (1978).  A con-
trol person may cause blockages  or distortions  of information  about a subsidiary  in both a
lawful and  an unlawful manner.  Examples of simple, unlawfid  informational  blockages  are
the nondisclosure  of material information required  to be disclosed  in periodic reports under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or misleading disclosure in violation of  Rule  lOb-5.  Ex-
amples of lawful  blockages include the choice of accounting conventions and  the failure to
provide  adequate "color"  to permit a full understanding of mandatory disclosures where the
failure does not rise to the level of a demonstrable  omission of a material  fact necessary to
make  the disclosed  facts not misleading.  It may be argued that the latter types of informa-
tional blockages  are unlawful precisely to the extent that market values would be affected by
the blockages.  In practice, however, many types of informational blockages that do not rise to
the level of  "materiality"  nevertheless affect market prices.  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 542 A.2d  1182,  1187 n.8 (Del.  1988) ("[WJe recognize that the majority may have in-
sight into their company's future based primarily on bits  and pieces of nonmaterial  informa-
tion that have value as a totality.");  ROBERT CHARLES  CLARK,  CORPORATE LAW 507 (1986)
(discussing the harm that occurs when  information  lawfully not communicated  to the market
affects stock prices).
This, it should be noted, is not an argument that the efficient  (capital) market hypothesis
("EMH")  is incorrect  (in the  semi-strong  or weak versions),  see infra notes  177-84  and ac-
companying  text (discussing  the EMH), because market prices  may still, arguendo,  rapidly
reflect all public information.  Rather, it is an argument that, in practice, the existence and en-
forcement of the securities laws do not reliably cause  control persons to disclose publicly all
information that would, if disclosed publicly, influence market prices.
Accounting rules also give managers  considerable discretion as to the timing and content
of accounting charges and recognitions.  Studies of accounting data suggest that firms use that
discretion to "manage"  earnings as a routine part of business.  See Michael  Kinney & Robert
Trezevant,  The  Use  of Special Items  to  Manage  Earnings and Perceptions, J.  FIN.
STATEMENT ANALYsIs,  Fall 1997, at 45, 45-48; Letter from Lynn Turner, Office of the Chief
Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to Thomas Ray, Director, Audit and
Attest Standards, American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants  1-2 (Oct. 9,  1998)  (on
file with  author) (regarding  auditing  and financial  reporting concerns,  noting the "trend"  to-
wards "inappropriate management  of earnings," and describing in detail the "troublesome  ar-
eas involving the use of inappropriate earnings management techniques").
81  As noted in Part IV, infra, few empirical studies have attempted to measure the size of
expropriation value standing alone.  For one such study, see infra  note  93 and accompanying
text  (discussing the difference).  Cf Barclay & Holdemess, supra note 36, at 371  (exploring
the relationship  between expropriation value and minority discounts).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
expropriate value from the firm and $Yis the value arising from A's expec-
tation  of expropriating value  from the  firm.  But, even  control  person B,
who  is unwilling to break  the law, will value the  control  shares  $X more
than B values the minority shares.
Pure control value is whatever residual value  may attach to  manage-
ment, including  such things as the certainty of being  able to direct opera-
tions, obtain further (potential) synergies, freeze out the minority sharehold-
ers,  and  choose  the  time  for  payouts  through  dividends,  liquidation,  or
recapitalization.  Managerial  control has value-over and above expropria-
tion value and  synergy value-because  it stands  on reserve  for  a control
person as a tool.82  That quality of standing reserve has value just as an op-
tion on stock has value, and just as options  can have substantial value even
when "out of the money," pure control  value  may be considerably  higher
than intuition would suggest.
83
Every observed control premium will not reflect all of these items.  For
example,  some transactions  may not be expected to  give rise to  synergies.
If the minority shareholders  are  eliminated  entirely, then the expropriation
value will disappear and the deal  price will not reflect future  opportunities
(although if the deal price is based on historical minority share prices,  then
it will  reflect  past expropriation  value  to that  extent).  Finally,  observed
control premiums will-like any market price-reflect mistakes  in practice.
"Buyers'  hubris,"  the  "winner's  curse,"  and  "unchecked  managerialism"
have all been identified as potential  sources for control premiums  in merg-
ers  and  acquisitions.84  Nevertheless,  a  given  control  premium  at  least
should be analyzed initially as reflecting each of these types of value.
82  See Sugato Bhattacharyya & Rajdeep Singh, The Allocation of  Residual Rights 2 (Dec.
5,  1995)  <http.//www.ssm.com/papers/9812/98122613.pdf>  (noting that the right to design
the procedure  for the sale of a firm  "has value.  ..  over and above  the  rights to cash  flows
arising from the sale" (emphasis omitted)); cf.  Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership
and Market Valuation, 20 J.  FIN.  ECON.  293,  294-95  (1988)  (stating that "[w]ith  effective
control,  the manager may indulge  his preference  for non-value-maximizing  behavior,"  and
finding that Tobin's Q, a proxy for market valuation of the firm's assets, rises as board owner-
ship rises between 0% and 5%, falls as ownership further rises between 5% and 25%, and then
rises more slowly above 25%); Karen Hopper  Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration  and
Firm Value:  Evidence from  Private  Equity Financings,  23  J.  FIN. ECON.  3,  23-24  (1989)
(analyzing  data suggesting  that stock prices  of publicly  held firms  decline  as a controlling
block  is  assembled).  See  generally RICHARD  A.  BREALEY  &  STEWART  C.  MYERS,
PRiNCIPLES  OF CORPORATE  FINANCE 589-616  (5th ed.  1996) (discussing option pricing  the-
ory).
83  See Bebchuk & Kalan, supra  note 43, at 5.
84  See RICHARD THALER,  THE WINNER's CURSE 50-62 (1992)  (explaining the concept of
the "winner's curse"); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN.  L. REV.
597, 624-26 (1989)  (discussing managers'  effects on the valuation of  stock prices).
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b.  Relationship  Between Discounts and  Premiums
The term "minority  discount"  is generally used to mean the difference
between the value of control  shares  and the value of a minority share of a
85 public company.  According to this usage, "minority discounts"  and "con-
trol  premiums"  are  simply  the  inverse  of one  another.8
6  Both  legal  dis-
counts and discounts  in the financial markets  are  likely to  be larger if the
public company has a control person.  Ceteris  paribus, 87 the presence of a
control person will reduce the value of publicly  held minority shares 8  be-
cause (1) control persons increase the risk of expropriation 89 and (2) control
85  See Rapid-American  Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806  (Del.  1992) ("The exclusion
of a  'control  premium'  artificially  and  unrealistically  treated  Rapid  as  a minority  share-
holder.");  Armstrong v. Marathon  Oil  Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 790 (Ohio  1987)  (permitting the
application of a minority  discount on the ground that  '.[t]he  purchase  of stock to gain con-
trolling  interests is  not properly includable in determining the market value of the shares of
stock'  (quoting Foglesong v. Thurston Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 55  P.2d 606,  611 (Okla.  1976)));
see also CORNELL,  supra note 4, at 239 (referring to minority discounts as the "flip  side" of
control premiums); Calio, supra  note 33,  at 23 (stating that minority shareholders are entitled
to a pro rata share of a control premium in an appraisal proceeding); Bate  C. Toms, III, Com-
pensating Shareholders Frozen Out in  Two-Step  Mergers, 78  COLUM.  L. REv.  548,  562
(1978)  (noting that "the  purchase  price  [that  a  noncontrolling  shareholder]  originally  pays
should be at a discount relative to the price of  the controlling shares, a discount reflecting the
value of control").
86  In percentages, the relationship between a control premium and a minority discount, if
each measures the same thing, is expressed as D = 1 - [1  / (I + P)], where P is the premium
and D is the related discount.  Thus, a reference  value of $10  would be increased by a 50%
premium ($5) to produce a control share value of $15; the control share value of $15  would be
decreased by a discount of 1-  (1/  1.5), or .33%  ($5) to produce a minority share value of $10.
87  Of course, all things may not be equal.  The presence of a controlling shareholder may
improve  managerial  monitoring  and thus  reduce  the expropriation value  relative  to a  firm
without a controlling  shareholder.  In  other words,  slack may be  reduced even if looting is
more  common.  I thank Mike Fitts for this point.  In addition, the incentives for controlling
shareholders  to loot a subsidiary are lower than the risk of managers  looting  an uncontrolled
public company, holding constant  the likelihood that such  looting would be discovered  and
punished because controlling shareholders would be looting from themselves to the extent of
their investment in  the subsidiary.  See Morck  et al., supra note  82,  at  311-14 (interpreting
empirical results to suggest that a controlling shareholder has dual effects).
8 See  Lawrence  Hamermesh,  Analysis of Kleinwort  Benson  Ltd.  v. Silgan  Corp.,  14
BANK & CoRp. GOVERNANCE  L. REP.  862, 862  (1995)  (discussing  Professor Lawrence Ha-
mermesh's analysis of Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp. as a "significant step forward  in
substantive valuation analysis");  Alexander Khutorsky,  Note, Coming in from the  Cold:  Re-
forming Shareholders' Appraisal  Rights in Freeze-Out Transactions, 1997  COLM. BUS.  L.
REV.  133,  160 n.169  (1997)  ("The theoretical  existence  of a control  premium suggests  that
[the] price of minority shares held in a company controlled by  a majority shareholder should
be lower than the price of shares held in the same company but with a more dispersed owner-
ship structure.").  For an empirical study demonstrating this effect, see Wruck, supra note 82,
at 20, discussing the effect of purchaser control  on share value.
89  See Brudney, supra note 80, at 69-71  (discussing why the stock of a subsidiary with a
control person will sell at a discount relative to the price at which the stock would sell if there
were no controlling person).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
persons  reduce the  potential of a third-party  sale of all  of the  shares  at a
control  premium  ("third-party  sale  potential").9 0  Still,  whether  or  not a
control person exists, if the "minority discount" is analyzed simply to be the
inverse of a "control premium,"  then a court will  have three choices in de-
termining fair value:  (1) it can include a control premium, (2) it can include
a minority  discount, or (3) it can  split the  difference  and include  some of
each.
Minority  discounts  and  control  premiums  may,  however,  be  distin-
guished.91  For example, "minority discount" may be used to mean the dif-
ference between control share value and synergy value (and/or pure control
value) on the one hand, and minority share value,  on the other hand.92  De-
mhe shadow  cast by  the overhang of the  parent's  control  on  the  current  market
value of  the subsidiary's shares...  may be a function merely of the inability of  new
groups to acquire control on the market, but... may also  be a function of  the likeli-
hood of exploitation  such as an unfair merger, which would be too costly for disar-
rayed minority stockholders to challenge.
Victor Brudney & Marvin A.  Chirelstein, Fair  Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1974).
90  See Chazen,  supra note 33,  at 1466-77  (discussing  the impact that  a statement by a
control person concerning her unwillingness to sell control shares to  a third party would have
on the value  of the minority  shares).  Third-party  sale  potential,  commonly  referred  to as
"market fluff' or "takeover speculation,"  has become  a significant factor potentially affecting
market prices in the wake of  the large number of high-premium merger and acquisition trans-
actions  during  the  1980s.  Despite the relative  fall off in M & A  activity  during the  early
1990s,  expectations that high-premium  M & A activity would  resume appear to have been a
factor buoying stock prices during that period.  These expectations have proven to be reason-
able with  the reemergence  of M & A activity  in the mid-1990s.  See  Geoffrey  Colvin, The
Year of  the Megamerger, FORTUNE,  Jan.  11,  1999,  at 62, 63 (noting that "1998  was the big-
gest year ever  for takeovers").  Agency  costs  associated  with  the  relationship  between  the
managers  and the shareholders of a noncontrolled  public company would not be expected to
reduce  the third-party  sale  potential as much as would the agency  costs associated  with  the
presence of  a controlling shareholder, because MBOs trigger auction duties under Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes  Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173  (Del. 1986).  "Market  forces must be
allowed  to operate  freely  to bring..,  the best price  available."  Id. at 184.  A  controlling
shareholder, however, has no obligation to sell the controlled  company to a third party, even if
the controlling shareholder sells  the control stake,  see Bershad  v. Curtiss-Wright  Corp.,  535
A.2d 840,  845 (Del.  1987) ("Clearly,  a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a
corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder."),  and  even  if the third  party  would pay a
higher price, see Mendel v. Carroll,  651  A.2d 297, 306 (Del. Ch.  1994)  ("[The fact that [a
third party] was willing  to pay  more for all of the shares  does not  [mean  the  first] proposal
was not fair.").
91  See Coffee, supra note 77,  at 412-20 (arguing  for such  a distinction in the  context of
sales of control by controlling shareholders).
92  This type of discount seems to be what is referred to in the recent Delaware Chancery
opinion in Kleinwort  Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No. 11107,  1995 WL 376911,  at *3
(Del. Ch. June  15,  1995)  (quoting  the corporation's valuation expert as stating that "'the pre-
ponderance  of opinion  is  that there  is  some  minority  interest  that's  implicit in  a publicly
traded company's price'  in addition to the portion of  the  control premium that reflects  'po-
tential synergies.').  This type of discount also appears to be the usage adapted by Pratt.  See
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fined this way,  "minority  discount"  represents the  depressive  effect of ex-
propriation value, but excludes any synergy value attributable to a particular
transaction and/or whatever value arises from having control in itself. Such
discounts  are difficult to observe  directly,  because determining such a dis-
count requires deducting (or adding) values that do not reflect public market
transactions93   that is, such discounts require estimating the synergy value,
pure control value, or expropriation  value-none of which,  in isolation,  is
easy to observe directly.
3.  Post-Cavalier  Oil Case Law
A review of post-Cavalier  Oil cases demonstrates two sets of problems
caused  by Delaware's pro  rata value doctrine.  First, courts have failed to
recognize implicit discounts as such, and so have accepted them, even while
purporting to adhere  to the  pro rata value doctrine  (the "implicit  discount
mistake").94  Second,  courts  have  failed to  distinguish  between  discounts
and premiums:  three  courts  rejected  "premiums"  and imposed  discounts,
notwithstanding Cavalier  Oil; 95  one court accepted a premium to eliminate a
minority discount (the "equivalency  mistake").96  Only two Delaware courts
have perceived that control premiums and minority discounts can be distin-
guished.97
PRATr ET AL.,  supra  note 4, at 300-23  (distinguishing control premiums, which exclude syn-
ergy value,  from acquisitions  premiums,  which include synergy value, and equating  control
premiums to minority discounts).
93 A recent study attempts to estimate this sort of discount by examining the relationships
between  controlled  subsidiary  accounting  values  and  parent  and  subsidiary  market  values.
The study concludes that shares in such subsidiaries are valued by the minority investors rela-
tive to the parent companies at a discount ranging  from  13%  (based on subsidiary asset val-
ues) to 33% (based on subsidiary earnings),  an analysis that should exclude the synergy values
but would include the pure control value.  See generally  Roger C. Graham, Jr. & Craig E. Le-
fanowicz, Valuation of  Companies  for the Estate and Gift Tax:  Evidence of  Minority Interest
Discounts,  ADVANCES  IN  TAX'N (forthcoming)  (describing a study that examines the relative
values of controlling and  noncontrolling  interests  in parent-subsidy  corporate pairs).  In any
event,  the existence  of such  discounts  seems to be  certain,  based  on  the  fact that policing
mechanisms for expropriation do not work perfectly.
94 See infra notes 98,  103,  108,  110 and accompanying text (noting that the implicit dis-
count reflects expropriation value, lack of  synergy value, and pure control value).
95 See infra notes  100,  108-10 and  accompanying  text (noting that  the courts rejected
premiums in Salomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., Smith v. Shell Petroleum Inc.,
and In re Radiology  Associates,  Inc. Litigation).
96  See infira text accompanying notes  111-12 (discussing the inclusion of a 30 % "control
premium"  by the court  in Hodas v. Spectrum  Technology, Inc. to adjust for a minority  dis-
count 9'  l'See infra note 118 and accompanying text (suggesting that in addition to minority dis-
counts, control premiums might include  synergy value).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
a.  Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc. and  In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.
The appraisal case arising out of Royal Dutch Petroleum's freeze-out of
Shell  Oil Company illustrates  both of these mistakes.  Shell Oil  had been
70%  owned by Royal Dutch Petroleum since the 1920s, with the remaining
30% held by the public.  In January 1984, with Shell's public shares trading
at $44,98 Royal Dutch announced its plan to freeze  out the minority share-
holders at $55.  After independent  Shell directors rejected the $55  price and
made a counteroffer  of $75,  Shell shares  traded  up to  $58.  Royal Dutch
terminated  discussions  with Shell,  and commenced  a tender offer at $55,
which it subsequently increased to $58.  Shell shares traded up to $60.
In June 1984, Royal Dutch and a class of minority shareholders  settled
fiduciary  duty  claims for  an increase  of $2  for all  of the tendering  share-
holders  and all  of the  shareholders who  waived their appraisal  rights  in a
second-step freeze-out.  Royal Dutch obtained 95% of the outstanding Shell
shares in the tender offer, and in June 1985, after a year of further litigation,
the freeze-out was closed, and Royal Dutch obtained  100% of Shell's stock.
A number of shareholders  dissented and sought to have their shares ap-
praised under DGCL section 262.  In December  1990, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court delivered  its appraisal opinion99 and made two findings relevant
to  premiums  and discounts.  It first held that  the dissenting  shareholders
were  not entitled  to  a control  premium.  The  dissenters'  "basic  premise
that...  stockholders  are entitled to a premium,"  the Shell court wrote, was
flawed. 1 00  The court cited Cavalier  Oil, indicating its belief that the pro rata
98  All prices are per-share amounts; all facts are from Smith v. Shell Petroleum,  Inc., Civ.
A. No. 8395,  1990 WL 84218 (Del. Ch. June  19,  1990), stating that the proposed merger mi-
nority shares would be cashed out at $55 per share, and In re Appraisal of  Shell Oil Co., Civ
A. No. 8080,  1990 WL 201390  (Del.  Ch. Dec.  11,  1990),  aff'd, 607 A.2d  1213  (Del. 1992),
stating that shareholders were cashed out at $58 per share prior to the merger.
9  See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil,  1990 WL 201390, at *1.  In the appraisal case, Royal
Dutch argued that the fair value of  the Shell shares was $55 per share; dissenting shareholders
argued for $89  per share.  After noting that all of the methodologies proposed  by the parties
were flawed, the  court accepted  one of the shareholders'  methodologies  as the most reason-
able and adjusted it down by an arbitrary  20%  to arrive at a fair value of $71.20,  which the
court candidly noted, was "between"  the parties'  proposed values-in fact, it almost exactly
split the  difference.  See id. at *34-35 (discussing  how the  court arrived  at  a fair value  of
$71.20 per share).
100  Id. at * 16.  In re Appraisal of  Shell Oil did not discuss at length the first post-Cavalier
Oil fair value case that applied the pro rata value doctrine-the  appraisal  opinion in Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor,  Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch.  Oct. 19,  1990), where
the court found that DGCL section 262(h) barred valuation relating to the business plans of an
acquiror.  See Technicolor, 1990 WL 161084, at *20 ("[Value added to the corporation by the
implementation..,  of [the  acquiror's]  new  business plan  for the company  is  not value to
which, in an appraisal action, petitioner is entitled to a pro rata share ....  ").  The dissenting
shareholders in Technicolor argued that Weinberger v.  UOP had construed  the exclusion in
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value doctrine prohibited any upward adjustment at the shareholder level of
the corporation's value or any premium on the corporation's value.
In  striking contrast,  however, the  court then  approved  a "limited  op-
tions" discount proposed by Royal Dutch on the theory that minority share-
holders have "limited  options" available for realizing value for their shares
since they  lack  control.101  The  court  reasoned  that  absent a merger  pro-
posal, "'the  trading price  is a more realistic alternative  for the shareholders
than a liquidation value or a merger market value." ' 1 02  Because  minority-
DGCL  section 262 of merger-related  value  to exclude  only  the  "speculative"  value  arising
from a transaction, but the Technicolor  court rejected this as contrary to (1) the plain language
of the statute and (2) the "'basic concept of  value under  [§ 262] ...  that the stockholder is en-
titled to be paid for that which has been taken from him."'  Id. at * 19 (quoting Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d  71,  72 (Del.  1950)).  "Future  value that would not exist but for the
merger  cannot...  be  said  to  have  been  taken  from  a  dissenting  shareholder  ... ,  even
if. . .capable  of being proven  ...  ..  Id.  Subsequently,  the Delaware  Supreme Court over-
turned the Chancery Court opinion in Technicolor  as inconsistent with  Weinberger. See Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296-301  (Del.  1996) (asserting that synergies must
be included  in "fair value"  if, during the  period between  the tender offer and the  freeze-out
merger  in  a two-step  takeover,  the  acquiror takes  sufficient steps  so that the  synergies  are
known and not speculative and are part of the company being valued).
Nor did In re Appraisal of Shell Oil cite earlier Delaware opinions  that could be read to
support the  exclusion of a control premium.  In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d
107,  111 (Del. 1952) and Sporborgv.  City Specialty Stores,  Inc.,  123  A.2d 121,  124 (Del. Ch.
1956), the courts refused to consider the market prices to be distorted by the impact of an ac-
quiror's purchases at a control premium,  and the cases may be read as refusing to consider the
market prices where they may reflect the synergy value  arising from the  appraisal-triggering
transaction itself.  In a subsequent case, In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800,  804-
05 (Del. Ch. 1968),  the court adjusted the market prices downward to eliminate the impact of
such premium purchases,  but also refused to consider post-acquisition market prices because
of the acquiror's announced intention to freeze out the remaining public shares.  See Theodore
N.  Mirvis,  Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal  and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38
Bus.  LAW.  485,  490-95  (1983)  (discussing  pre-Weinberger Delaware  case  law  regarding
control premiums).
101  See In re Appraisal  of  Shell Oil, 1990 WL 201390, at *31  (considering  the "realistic
alternatives"  available to the stockholders  and noting that a sale or liquidation of Shell was
unlikely).
102  Id. (quoting  an argument  made on behalf of Royal  Dutch).  The  court rejected  the
trading (or unaffected  market) price of $44 proposed by Royal Dutch--not as an impermissi-
ble form of discount, but  on the ground that Royal Dutch's expert  had begun with an artifi-
cially low $40 market price from 30 days prior to the merger announcement and did not adjust
it sufficiently to reflect the substantial rise  in the  price of oil stocks.  See id. at  *29-30 (ex-
plaining Royal Dutch's methodology,  and noting that the result was "illogical"  since the pro-
posed  $44  price  represented  "a  zero  percent  change  from  the  $44  per  share  closing
price..,  one day  prior to the.., merger  announcement  ... , not withstanding a  substantial
rise in the market price of oil stocks over the relevant period").  The court asserted that the use
of the stock price 30 days prior to the merger announcement was not necessarily  unlawful, but
that given the circumstances  of the case,  it appeared  to be an attempt to lower the valuation.
See id. at *29 (noting that the use of the "stock price 30  days prior to the merger announce-
ment...  was not improper, as a matter of law").  The clear implication of the opinion is that if
Royal Dutch had started with a pre-announcement market price of $44  and increased  it suffi-MINORITY DISCOUNTS
share  market  prices  generally  reflect  an  implicit minority, discount, 1 03  the
Court of Chancery accepted a minority discount-contrary to the decision in
Cavalier  Oil.
Shell did attempt to distinguish its "limited  options  discount" from the
"minority  discount"  rejected in Cavalier Oil.  The  fair value proposed  by
Morgan Stanley (Royal Dutch's valuation expert) and accepted in Shell was
derived  "by  balancing..,  liquidation,  merger  market  and  trading  value
analyses [in a way that recognized that] it was unlikely that there would be a
sale or liquidation of Shell."'"4  In other words, the discount was an implicit
"corporate  level"  adjustment,  rather  than  an  explicit  "shareholder  level"
adjustment, and was balanced with values that did not reflect the adjustment
so that the ultimate impact of the discount on fair value was mitigated.  To
the extent that fair value reflects such a discount, however, it will be lower
than it would be without it, regardless of whether the discount is implicit or
explicit, shareholder-level or company-level.  As the court asserted:  "'Rec-
ognition of majority control  in this manner and consideration of the way in
which in the long run the stockholder is most likely to have realized on his
investment, is [a]  'relevant  factor'  under  Weinberger  v.  UOP, . . . and con-
sistent with Delaware appraisal law." '1 0 5  The court's attempt to distinguish
its "limited options discount" from a minority discount is unpersuasive.106
ciently to account for the time value of money between the announcement  and the merger, the
court would have accepted the resulting value in its determination of fair value.
103  Market prices  for all minority shares reflect a discount arising from the expropriation
value,  the  lack of synergy value, and the  pure control value.  See supra text accompanying
notes 73-84 (discussing three sources of control premiums).  In the Shell case, market prices
for the  shares being valued were  even lower because  of the  prior existence  of a controlling
shareholder, Royal Dutch Petroleum, which owned over 70% of Shell prior to the appraisal-
triggering transaction.  See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil,  607 A.2d at 1215  (noting that Royal
Dutch controlled over 70% of Shell's outstanding shares).
104  In reAppraisal  ofShell Oil Co., 1990 WL 201390  at "31.
105  Id. (quoting Smith v. Shell Petroleum,  Inc.,  Civ. A. No. 8395,  1990  WL 84218  (Del.
Ch. June  19,  1990)).
106  On appeal, the Delaware  Supreme Court affirmed the Shell appraisal  opinion on the
ground that the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion  in determining  fair value, stating that
the "appraisal  quest at the Court of Chancery  level admits of a broad  latitude ....  We will
reverse [its] findings  only when they  are clearly wrong and  the doing of justice requires us to
do so."  In re Appraisal of Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1219.  In response to an appeal by the corpo-
ration, the Delaware  Supreme Court did attempt to differentiate  the "liquidation  value analy-
sis" proposed by the plaintiffs and adopted by the  Chancellor from the "liquidation  analysis"
rejected  in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d  137  (Del.  1980).  See In re Appraisal  of
Shell Oil,  607 A.2d at  1219-20  (arguing that Royal  Dutch was  "mischaracteriz[ing]  the trial
court's findings" and that "the court's final  figure of $71.20 is..  .not the product of a liqui-
dation analysis  alone").  It is unclear  from the supreme  court  opinion whether or not the dis-
senting shareholders appealed the part of the Chancellor's opinion adopting the implicit "lim-
ited options"  discount.
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b. Other Delaware  Cases
Subsequent to Shell,1 0 7 several Delaware courts have made one or both
of the  mistakes  made  by the  Court  of Chancery  in Shell.  In  Salomon
Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp.,'°  the court rejected an upward ad-
justment  from  average  price-earnings  multiples  (which  reflected  an
implicit  minority  discount  because  the  multiples  were  derived  from
minority  share  market  prices)  on  the  ground  that  such  a  "shareholder-
level"  adjustment  was  contrary  to  the  pro  rata  value  doctrine  es-
tablished  by  Cavalier Oil.1"9  Based  on  the  same  reasoning,  the  court
reached  a  similar  outcome  in  In  re  Radiology  Associates,  Inc.  Liti-
107  In addition to the cases discussed  in the text, Delaware courts have  addressed premi-
ums or discounts in several  other cases post-ShelL  See, e.g.,  Grubb v. Bagley,  Civ. A. No.
13882,  1998  WL 92224, at *I-2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25,  1998) (noting the plaintiffs'  expert's as-
sertion that "marketability and minority  discounts [are]  prohibited by Delaware  law"); Hint-
mann v. Fred Weber, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12839,  1998 WL 83052, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17,  1998)
(acknowledging  that "[t]his  Court has  accepted the addition of small stock premia"  in calcu-
lating  the discount rate); Metropolitan  Life  Ins. Co.  v. Aramark  Corp.,  Civ.  A. No.  16142,
1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS  70, at *6-10 (Feb.  5, 1998) (granting a preliminary  injunction to halt a
freeze-out  based  on the  directors'  use of a "private  company  discount"  in determining  the
freeze-out price); Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc.,  Civ. A. No. 13414,  1998 WL 44993,
at  *4 (Del. Ch. Jan.  29,  1998) (accepting  a "small stock premium"  in the calculation  of the
discount rate in a DCF analysis-despite  its having the same effect and rationale as the mar-
ketability  discounts rejected  in Cavalier Oil-but rejecting  the petitioners'  and  the  respon-
dents' valuations on other grounds).
108  Civ. A. No. 10054,  1992 WL 94367 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992).
109  See id. at *6  ("Mhe adjustment...  is a stockholder  level adjustment.  Thus, to the
extent that it is, in whole or in part, a control premium adjustment, it is inappropriate.").  The
court  was also  discomfited  because dissenting  shareholders  "conceded  that the... concepts
[of control premium and minority discount]  are related" but did not "undertake  any analysis of
the difference  between market values and... 'whole  company'  values in order to determine
an appropriate adjustment."  Id. As the court explained, their expert "simply ...  decided  that
15% was..,  reasonable."  Id.  One might sympathize with the court's discomfort;  however,
"acknowledging  the existence of  the minority discount, but setting it at zero,  is more arbitrary
than endeavoring to find its  true  value."  Kleinwort Benson  Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No.
11107,  1995 WL 376911,  at *4 (Del.  Ch. June  15,  1995).  Finally, the Salomon Bros. court
believed that such upward  adjustments  are not accepted  in the financial  community and thus
should not be accepted under Weinberger. See Salomon Bros., 1992 WL 94367, at *6 ("I am
not satisfied...  that a market value  adjustment  to compensate  for an  implicit minority dis-
count is a valuation method that is generally accepted in the financial community.').
In fact, in my experience,  investment bankers,  who advise special committees that negoti-
ate conflict transactions  frequently,  adjust market prices  upward to reflect some or all of the
elements of a control premium.  It is true that valuations for purely financial  purposes  focus
on (minority share)  market value or a full control premium and will not attempt to arrive  at a
price in between the two.  But, that is because the concepts of fair value  and pro rata value are
legal  and not financial  concepts.  This may suggest that the Delaware  Supreme Court's at-
tempt in  Weinberger  v. UOP,  Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13  (Del.  1983), to point courts to finan-
cial experts for valuation may be unsound, at least for some parts of  a valuation.MINORITY DISCOUNTS
gation. 11 0  In both cases, the courts viewed premiums and discounts as iden-
tical.  In Hodas v. Spectrum Technology, Inc.,"'  the court also  identified
control premiums and minority discounts, but reached the opposite result:  it
included, without comment, a 30% "control premium" to a value based on a
price/cash flow multiple in order "to adjust for the fact that the... multiple
reflects a stock price for a single share on a public stock exchange and, thus,
includes a minority discount."
1 12
As demonstrated  by these  cases,  because the  pro  rata value  doctrine
permits discounts to be built in via the choice of valuation methodology, but
then  prohibits  adjustments  to  correct  for such  discounts,  the  doctrine  not
only permits  inconsistent  outcomes,  but it actually requires them!  Where
available, market prices are considered by the financial community in valu-
ing firms and their stock;11 3 such prices are thus a "relevant factor" required
to be considered by courts under Weinberger.14  Thus, an implicit minority
discount will be reflected in every valuation in which the market prices are
available.  If the pro rata value doctrine prohibits an upward adjustment to
eliminate this implicit discount, as post-Cavalier  Oil cases suggest, then the
fair value will necessarily reflect a minority discount (which perhaps can be
mitigated by averaging the market prices with other values).  Yet,  the oppo-
site result would follow if a valuation consisted solely of a DCF analysis.1
5
Then, pro rata value could not be adjusted downward  to reflect the minority
discount because of the ban on "shareholder level"  adjustments.  Thus,  de-
pending on the choice of valuation methodology, minority discounts may be
compelled or prohibited.
110  611  A.2d  485, 494  (Del. Ch.  1991)  (arguing  that whether the  dissenter "labels  the
[adjustment sought]  as a premium or recompense  for a discount, the [adjustment]  is inappro-
piate"),
p  lCiv. A. No. 11265,  1992 WL 364682 (Del. Ch.  Dec. 8, 1992).
112  Id.  at *2.
113  See, e.g.,  PRATr ET AL., supra note  4,  at 203  ("Actual market transaction  data  can
provide compelling empirical evidence ofvaue...  [,and] publicly traded  corporation capital
market data may provide relevant valuation guidance in many cases.").
114 See supra  text accompanying notes 28-32 (describing "fair value" law after Weinber-
ger); see also Weinberger,  457 A.2d at 713 ("Fair prie ...  requires consideration of all rele-
vant factors involving the value of a company.").
115  This would occur when a company being valued was not a public company, or had a
thin trading market for its shares.  In either case, no reliable market price data would be read-
ily available.
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More recently,  in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., 11 6 one Dela-
ware  court  has  attempted  to  reconcile  this  conflict.117   The Silgan Corp.
court noted  that all  of the  experts in the  case agreed  that minority  shares
"trade  below  [pro  rata]  value"  and  that  control  premiums  might  include
more than  a minority  discount-they  could also  include  synergy value.,
1 8
The defendant's  expert, however, contended that any upward  adjustment to
eliminate  this  implicit  discount  represented  a  control  premium  barred  by
DGCL  section  262.119  The  court  rejected this argument  and held that the
portion  of a control  premium  that  reflects  a  minority  discount  should  be
eliminated by an upwardly adjusted market value.
2 0
The Silgan Corp. court then turned to the question regarding how to fix
the size of the needed adjustment.  Candidly acknowledging that "setting an
exact figure  for the minority discount comes  down to an arbitrary determi-
116  Civ. A. No.  11107,  1995 WL  376911  (Del.  Ch. June  15,  1995).  The Silgan Corp.
case  is also  noteworthy because it represents  the first modem  Delaware  appraisal  action  in
which the court appointed a neutral expert to assist in evaluating the parties'  expert valuations,
taxing the expert's costs to each litigant.  See id. at * 12.  The neutral expert was instructed by
the court to not arrive  at a fair value, but only to provide criticism of the other experts'  valua-
tions.  See id. at *  1.
117  In Cooper  v. Pabst Brewing Co., Civ. A. No. 7244, 1993 WL 208763,  at *9 (Del. Ch.
June 8, 1993), the court also recognized  that control premiums and minority discounts  could
be distinguished, at least in theory.  In Pabst  Brewing, the court reviewed a back-end merger
in a two-step takeover.  To arrive at fair value, it averaged the front-end tender offer price and
the back-end  merger price,  and then reduced that amount  by an arbitrary  10% to correct for
over-optimistic  assumptions.  See id. at *8-10.  The  opinion contains  little reasoning  other
than the  statement  that blended value  in  a two-step  takeover "necessarily  does  not include
much of a control premium."  Id. at *9.
118  See Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911,  at *3 (citations omitted).  This fact alone sufficed
for the Silgan Corp. court to distinguish  Salomon Bros. in  which the  Vice Chancellor  was
"'not satisfied'  that an upward adjustment was "'generally  accepted in the financial commu-
nity."'  Id. (quoting  Salomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries  Corp.,  Civ. A. No. 10054,  1992
WL 94367, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992)).  The fact that all of the experts agreed that market
values reflect an implicit minority discount from a pro rata share of the total furm value does
not mean, however, that they  agreed that adjusting the market values upward to eliminate the
implicit discount is "generally  accepted."  Nor did the court recite any evidence that such  an
adjustment was "generally  accepted" in the financial  community.  As noted above, see supra
note 107 (citing other post-Shell cases in which the Delaware courts have addressed premiums
or discounts),  such an adjustment is, in fact, not part of a normal financial valuation analysis,
except in the context of legal cases.
n9  See Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *2 (arguing that the analysis of the petitioner's
expert was "improper  as a matter of law" because it included a "control premium").
120  See id. at *4; see also Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., No. 12839,  1998  WL 83052, at
*8 (Del.  Ch. Feb.  17,  1998)  (approving a company-level  control  premium  that was  derived
from comparable  transaction data, but reducing it from 45%  to 20% in order to eliminate  the
estimated  synergy value  reflected  in that data);  Moore  v. New Ammest,  Inc., 630  P.2d  167
(Kan.  Ct. App.  1981)  (noting that a "controlling  block usually has  a per share value higher
than its proportionate  interest, and a minority  block, which does not possess  the control  ele-
ment of value, has a lower per share value").MINORITY DISCOUNTS
nation,"  the Silgan Corp. court reasoned that "acknowledging the existence
of the minority  discount, but setting it at zero,  is more  arbitrary than  en-
deavoring to find its true value."'121  The court then fixed an upward adjust-
ment at 12.5%, based on the corporation's expert's  admission at trial that a
reasonable estimate of the minority discount was "around 10-15%. " 122
4.  Summary
So where does Delaware law stand today on discounts  and premiums?
The case law is, to be blunt, a mess.  The pro rata value doctrine,  with its
inherent indeterminacy, has contributed to, rather than alleviated, the confu-
sion.  Distinguishing  between  the  firm value and the  share value may  be
useful, particularly when using a methodology (such as a DCF analysis) that
"looks through" the corporate form to the underlying cash flows.  Yet, other
evidence of value-for example,  minority share market prices or prices paid
in  control acquisitions-necessarily  reflects the  attributes  of the  shares or
the blocks  of shares.  Whenever such techniques are  used, either discounts
will be impounded in the fair values, or "shareholder  level" adjustments will
be necessary.  To that extent, at least, Cavalier  Oil should be modified.
II.  DELAWARE DISCOUNT LAW Is AVOIDABLE
Given that current Delaware rules on minority discounts are incoherent,
unpredictable,  and inconsistent with the appraisal  statute, one might  think
that the  only  reason  corporations  continue  to  subject  themselves  to  such
rules is that they are binding.  Indeed, the general perception is that they are
binding.123  In fact, however, they are effectively avoidable (or nonbinding),
as will be demonstrated in this Part.  Even though Delaware corporate  law
provides for rules to determine what price the minority shareholders should
be paid  in  conflict transactions,  in both  appraisal  proceedings  and  entire
fairness cases, those rules are not effectively binding.
121  Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911,  at *4.
122 Id.
123  See,  e.g.,  Ian  Ayres, Back to  Basics:  Regulating How Corporations  Speak to  the
Market, 77  VA.  L.  REv.  945,  948 n.16 (1991)  (asserting  that  minority  appraisal  rights  are
"immutable");  Bernard  S.  Black, Is Corporate Law  Trivial?:  A  Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV.  542, 571 (1990)  (noting that appraisal rights  are rarely the man-
datory rule, but are not given much weight by investors); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,  The Struc-
ture of  Corporation  Law, 89  COLUM. L. REV.  1461,  1481  (1989) (describing  appraisal rights
under DGCL section 262 as mandatory and asserting a "duty of loyalty...  that cannot be sub-
stantially  altered");  Jeffrey  N.  Gordon,  The  Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law,  89
COLUM.  L. REv.  1549,  1553 n.16 (1989)  (listing appraisal rights under DGCL section 262 as
mandatory).
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Corporations have a simple way of establishing by contract the method
by  which  the  "fair value"  will  be  determined.  By  including  appropriate
provisions  in the terms of its  common  stock set forth  in its  charter (or  in
buy-sell agreements between a corporation and its shareholders), 12 4 a corpo-
ration may provide contractually  for the inclusion (or exclusion) of minority
discounts in determining fair value.
A.  Contracting  to Exclude Discounts
The legitimacy of a charter or contractual  provision  requiring that mi-
nority  shareholders  be  paid  more than  would  otherwise  be  required  by
background  Delaware  law-for  example,  a full  control  premium-would
not appear to raise  any serious  issues.  Corporations  frequently  issue man-
datorily redeemable stock, the terms of which require the corporation to pay
the shareholders a set or formula price after some period of time or upon the
occurrence of some contingency. 12 5  Likewise, a number of companies have
adopted  "fair  price"  charter  provisions  intended  to  ensure  that  in
the  event  of a  hostile  takeover,  the  acquiror  and  its  affiliates  will  pay
minority  shareholders  a  minimum  price.  For  example,  the  charter  of
Unisys Corporation generally provides that in the event any person (together
with Unisys's affiliates)  acquires  more  than 20%  of Unisys's  outstanding
voting stock without obtaining  prior approval  from the board of directors,
the  acquiring  person  may  not  engage  in  any  transaction  with  Unisys
(whether it be a freeze-out,  second-step merger, or other control transaction)
without paying the minority shareholders  a price that is  at least as great as
124  Corporations also retain  the option of negotiating  with shareholders  directly in order
to purchase their shares in individual transactions or of conducting a self-tender for a specified
percentage of shares.  Similarly,  control persons have the  ability to establish  a new corpora-
tion to launch a 100%  "any-and-air tender offer for the fir-st company's shares.  Although the
duty of candor and  federal securities  laws  would govern such  transactions, the transactions
generally  would  not  be  subject  to entire  fairness  review,  nor would they  trigger appraisal
rights. Thus, a company can largely (if  not completely) eliminate  its shareholder base without
judicial  review of the price paid.  Where  such  transactions  involve  paying  for a substantial
number of shares, they almost always occur at prices above the current market clearing price.
See MERGERSTAT  REVIEW  1997, supra  note  13,  at 42  (reporting that the median premium to
market price for going private transactions  from  1987 through  1996 varied  between 8% and
35%).  This would appear to support my analysis, infra, in Part IV that  a rule including dis-
counts is not the optimal rule.
125  See,  e.g.,  JACK S.  LEVIN,  STRUCTURING VENTURE  CAPITAL,  PRIVATE EQUITY AND
ENTREPRENEURIL  TRANSACTIONS  218 (1997)  (listing mandatory  redemption as a "sample
term" of the common venture  capital investment arrangement  and discussing its tax implica-
tions); see also infra note 245 (describing buy/sell agreements which have the  same effect as
mandatory redemption provisions).MINORITYDISCOUNTS
that paid by the  acquiring person in order to  obtain control.
126  A broader
charter provision requiring the payment of a control premium in the event of
a conflict transaction by the management  or a preexisting  controlling share-
holder easily  fits  into this  mold  and would  be undoubtedly  legitimate  in
Delaware.
B.  Contracting  to Include Discounts
Designing charter or contractual  provisions to provide for the inclusion
of minority discounts requires more ingenuity, but it, too, appears feasible.
For example,  a  corporation  could  include  in  its  charter  (or  in  a buy/sell
agreement) a provision that its common stock be redeemable 2 7 at the option
126  See Unisys Corp., SEC Reg. St. No. 333-08933  on Form  S-3 (July 26,  1996) (on file
with author) (describing fair price provision);  see also Minnesota  Power & Light Co.,  SEC
Reg. St. No. 333-02109 on Form S-31A (June  19,  1996) (on file with  author) (same); Roose-
velt Financial Group, Inc., SEC Reg. St.  No. 333-04499 on Form S-4 (June 3,  1996) (on file
with author) (same).
127  To my knowledge,  the only example of common  stock that is redeemable  at the op-
tion of the corporation is the common  stock issued to former  Genentech shareholders  in the
1990 Roche/Genentech  transaction.  See In re Genentech, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11377,  1990 WL
78829, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 6,  1990) (rejecting duty of candor claims  in connection with the
transaction).  The court described the redeemable common stock issued in that transaction as a
"unique form  of equity security that has never before been introduced'  Id at * 12 n.4.  The
new Genentech common stock was redeemable until June 30,  1995, at the election of Roche,
which became the 600/-owner  of Genentech in the transaction.  Redemption prices increased
from $38 to $60 per share in fixed increments,  initially of $1 per quarter  and, after June  30,
1991,  of  $1.25 per quarter.  See id. at *12  n.5.  In  1995, Roche  and an independent  committee
of directors  representing  the public Genentech  shareholders negotiated  (and  the Genentech
shareholders approved) an extension of the redemption right.  Roche was prohibited by a gov-
erance agreement with Genentech  from acquiring the Genentech public shares for six years
at a price less than the stock's redemption price.  See id. at *10; see also Ellingwood v. Wolf's
Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del.  1944) (stating that a charter "may contain any pro-
vision with respect to the stock to be issued by the corporation ...  that is agreed upon by the
stockholders,  provided  that the  provision ...  is not  against public  policy").  While  DGCL
section  151(b)  was  amended  in  1990  to clarify  that Delaware  corporations  could issue re-
deemable  common  stock, a 1969  amendment  to DGCL section  151(e) permitting exchange-
able common stock effectively  allowed for the same result.  Compare DEL.  CODE ANN.  tit. 8,
§ 151(b)  (1998),  with DEL.  CODE ANN.  tit.  8, § 151(e)  (1998).  Delaware  courts have  ap-
proved  redeemable  stock,  exchangeable  stock,  convertible  stock,  stock with  super-voting
rights, lesser voting rights or no voting rights, and stock with  only voting rights (no dividend
or liquidation  rights).  See WELCH & TUREZYN,  supra  note 25, § 151,  at 243-57  (discussing
classes and series of stock, changes in the  statute, rights of stockholders, preferred stock, re-
deemable  shares, directors'  powers, convertible securities, and controlling  stockholders);  see
also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.  § 6.01 (1994)  (permitting redeemable common  stock); id
§ 6.01  cmt. 3c  (justifying  redeemable  common  stock  on the ground  that  consensual  share
transfer restrictions can create essentially the same effect); id. § 6.01  note on statutory com-
parison (Supp.  1997) (stating that 25 states expressly permit redeemable common stock while
eight others allow a limited power of  redemption of  common stock).
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of the corporation. 12  DGCL section  151  (b) expressly  provides that
[t]he  stock  of any class  or series  may  be made subject to  redemption by  the
corporation  at  its  option..,  provided  however,  that  at  the time  of such  re-
demption the corporation shall have outstanding shares of at least  1 class or se-
ries  of stock  with  full voting powers  which shall  not be  subject to redemp-
tion ....  Any stock...  may be redeemed  for cash, property or  rights, ...  at
such time..,  prices ...  or rates,  and with such adjustments,  as shall be stated
in the [charter].
129
In essence, then, any corporation  may retain the right to freeze  out its
shareholders  at any time for cash-at a specific price (or prices) or at a for-
mula price. 1 30  That formula  price  could provide,  for example,  that share-
128  Common stock redeemable  at the option of the corporation  should be distinguished
from common  stock redeemable at the option of the holder, which is typically issued by-in-
deed, is  the defining  characteristic of--open-end  investment companies  (mutual  funds).  See
generally 1 TAMAR  FRANKEL,  THE  REGULATION  OF  MONEY  MANAGERS  (1978  &  Supp.
1998).
129  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 151(b).  Prior to July  1, 1998, DGCL section  151(b) required
that a company have at least one class of nonredeemable voting stock, but this was a negligi-
ble constraint because only one share needed to be authorized,  and it could have been held by
the finn's founder or some neutral bank or trustee.  See  id. Thus, the redeemable  common
stock could have had full voting, dividend,  and liquidation rights, just like ordinary  common
stock.  For all practical  purposes, control and ownership could have resided  in the hands of
holders of the redeemable common  stock.  In addition, a corporation  could have achieved the
same end by issuing common stock exchangeable (under DGCL section  151(e)) at the option
of the corporation  into immediately  redeemable preferred  stock issued under DGCL section
151(b).  See id. § 151(b), (e).  Unlike  DGCL section  151(b), DGCL section  151(e)  does not
contain a proviso  that the corporation maintain  at least one class of nonexchangeable voting
stock at  all times.  By  issuing a single  class of exchangeable  common  stock, a corporation
could then use a two-step process to freeze out common shares at a preset formula price:  first,
common shares would be mandatorily exchanged for redeemable preferred shares; second, the
preferred shares would immediately afterwards be redeemed for cash.  The corporation would
thereby continue to have at least one class of nonredeemable  stock with  full voting rights,  as
required by DGCL section 15 1(b).
The doctrine of independent legal significance  strongly supports the legitimacy of such a
class of stock.  See Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7899,  1985 WL 11534, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Feb.  12,  1985)  (upholding  a reclassification  of common stock partly into common stock
and partly into redeemable  preferred stock that was redeemed  immediately following the re-
classification).
130  Some commentators  have noted an alternative method for corporations in many juris-
dictions to effectively  avoid appraisal  rights through the choice of transaction structure.  See,
e.g.,  Roberta  Romano, Answering the  Wrong Question:  The  Tenuous Case  for Mandatory
Corporate  Laws, 89  COLuM.  L.  REV.  1599,  1600  (1989)  (noting that the  ability  to choose
transaction structure  makes the rule that shareholders  must vote on mergers  "completely  op-
tional").  For example, the sale of substantially  all of a Delaware corporation's assets does not
trigger appraisal  rights,  while  a merger does.  Compared to "fair  price"  charter  provisions,
buy/sell agreements, and redeemable  common stock ("discount contracts"), transaction choice
is  a blunt  weapon.  Discount  contracts  vary  from  traditional  corporate  structures  only  by
specifying how the "fair value" will be determined.  In addition, transaction  choice only per-
mits contracting around appraisal  rights.  Discount contracts permit contracting around  "fairMINORITY DISCO  UNTS
holders receive the market price on a recent trading day, the average bid/ask
prices over the thirty trading days prior to the redemption  date, or the book
value as  adjusted  to  reflect cash  flows  measured  over a specified  period.
Alternatively, a corporation could provide contractually for shareholders  to
receive "fair value" as determined  by a court (or private appraiser131) using
specified  guidelines,  including,  for example,  the specific  requirement  that
the "fair value" of the minority shares be discounted to reflect their minority
status.
Whatever the  specifics,  a  corporation  effectively  could,  by including
such  provisions,  ensure  that  whenever  it  wanted  to  freeze  out  minority
shareholders (on the back end of a two-step takeover or in an MBO, for ex-
ample), it could do so pursuant to the redemption provisions  in its charter,
leaving no stockholders to pursue a judicially determined  or reviewed "fair
value"  determination.  No  stockholders  would  remain to  obtain  or pursue
statutory appraisal  rights.  Such a result is consistent with the limited Dela-
ware precedent.  In an appraisal of  the Ford Holdings Company, Chancellor
Allen based his determination  of the "fair value"  of preferred  stock on the
terms of the certificate  of designations  establishing the terms of the stock,
which expressly  and  clearly provided  for  a contractually  determined  "fair
value" in such circumstances.1
32
Further, as  long as the redemption price was  fixed or was  determined
pursuant to a market-based formula, and as long as the corporation complied
value"  determinations generally.  That is to say, under the entire  fairness doctrine, Delaware
courts will review the price paid in a conflict transaction, regardless of its structure.  Because
conflict transactions  involve  the duty of loyalty,  Delaware  courts still will scrutinize  closely
the price paid in the transaction in order to see if it is a "fair price"-even  in an asset sale that
does not trigger appraisal rights.  See John C. Coffee, Jr.,  The Mandatory/Enabling  Balance in
Corporate Law:  An Essay on the Judicial  Role, 89  CoLuM.  L.  REv.  1618,  1648-52  (1989)
(describing  the  general judicial  unwillingness  to  permit waivers of duty of loyalty  claims
based on conflict transactions).
131  Cf.  Wojdak v.  Greater  Phila. Cablevision  Inc.,  664 A.2d  587,  591  (Pa.  Super.  Ct.
1995)  (upholding the application of the minority and marketability  discounts by an appraiser
of interests in a Delaware limited partnership pursuant to the terms of the limited partnership
agreement), aff'd, 684 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1996), rev'don other  grounds,  707 A.2d 214 (Pa.  1998)
(reversing on the ground of ex parte communications).  "[Blinding  determination  by  a third
party appraiser selected pursuant to a private agreement is basically  the equivalent of arbitra-
tion, and judicial  review thereof is governed by the Delaware  Arbitration Act"  and must be
upheld "as  long as it can rationally  be derived from  the parties'  agreement or submission  to
the arbitrators  and is not completely irrational."  See Wojdak, 707 A.2d at 591.
132  See In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred  Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 974 (Del.
Ch.  1997)  (holding that the amount  determined in  a certificate  of designation of preferred
stock constitutes the "fair value"  of the stock); cf Hintmann  v. Fred Weber, Inc., No. 12839,
1998  WL 83052,  at *10  (Del. Ch.  Feb.  17, 1998)  (declining  to address  a waiver of a "fair
value" determination in an appraisal proceeding because the waiver was in the bylaws, rather
than in the charter, and was not express and clear).
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with its  disclosure  obligations  under the federal  securities  laws during the
relevant  measurement  period,133  it would  be  highly  unlikely  in  most  in-
stances for the minority shareholders to challenge successfully a redemption
in an "entire  fairness"  litigation.134  Because the redemption would be pur-
suant to the express terms of the corporation's  charter (or collateral  agree-
\
133  Failure to disclose  a material  fact during a redemption measurement period based on
market prices  could  be  viewed  as  a violation  of Rule  lob-5.  Compare Jordan  v. Duff &
Phelps,  Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th  Cir. 1987) (holding that the failure of a company to dis-
close its impending merger negotiations, resulting in the buyout of  an employee's stock at the
book value formula price and the forfeiture of  an option on additional  shares, precluded sum-
mary judgment for the  corporation with respect  to a violation of Rule  10b-5),  and Zahn  v.
Transamerica Corp.,  162 F.2d 36,  44 (3d Cir. 1947)  (finding that the redemption of converti-
ble preferred  stock at a time when  the corporation  failed  to disclose  its intent to  dissolve
breached a duty of good faith, which required the full disclosure of facts material to the deci-
sion to convert),  with St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill  Lynch, Pierce,  Fenner & Smith
Inc., 562 F.2d  1040,  1046 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that a buyout at a preagreed formula price
based on the book value did not require the payment of a different price  solely because  the
company went public a  few weeks  later  at a higher price),  and Kerrigan v. Merrill  Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 639, 645 (S.D.N.Y.  1978) (same).
134 See Baron v. Wolf, No.  4972,  1976  WL 2444,  at *2 (Del.  Ch.  Jan.  15,  1976) (up-
holding the redemption of  preferred stock pursuant to a formula because a formula redemption
price is permitted by the DGCL); Corbett v. McClintic-Marshall Corp.,  151 A. 218, 221 (Del.
Ch.  1930) (upholding a certificate  making the preferred  stock redeemable  at the book value
even though the book value was disproportionately  low compared to the market or fair values
because judicial  intervention would improperly usurp the discretion of the directors and  the
freedom of contract of the shareholders);  Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.,  121 N.E.2d  850,
852  (Mass.  1954) (upholding a redeemable  common  stock provision on the  ground that the
buyer had  voted  for or purchased  shares knowing of the redemption provision).  Compare
Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp.,  152 A. 723, 727-28  (Del.  1930) (holding that a corporation
has the power to purchase  its own stock at the formula price with the terms of  the contract of
purchase as fixed in the charter), and Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. National Bd. of Fire Underwriters
Bldg. Corp., 314 N.Y.S.2d  80, 86  (Sup.  Ct. 1970) (holding that the repurchase of shares pur-
suant to a membership agreement between  a corporation  and its shareholders  did not consti-
tute a prohibited form of redemption under the New York Business Corporation Law and was
thus enforceable), affd, 318 N.Y.S.2d  915 (App.  Div.  1971),  with Greene v. E.H. Rollins &
Sons, Inc.,  2 A.2d 249, 252 (Del. Ch.  1938) (refusing to uphold a mandatory formula buyout
provision  in a charter that was triggered by the termination  of employment on the  ground of
public policy because the restriction had no business purpose), and  Starring v. American Hair
& Felt Co.,  191  A. 887,  891 (Del. Ch. 1937) (finding that a corporation could not redeem its
common stock under the statute), affd 2 A.2d 249 (Del. Ch. 1938).  Starring  and Greene were
decided under a predecessor statutory provision, and so are of doubtful ongoing authority.  See
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 562 F.2d at 1046-47 (noting that the DGCL was amended to elimi-
nate  the need  to demonstrate  a "business  purpose"  for restrictions such  as those rejected  in
Greene); Kerrigan, 450 F.  Supp.  at 645  (same);  Mitchell  Assocs.  v. Mitchell,  Civ. A.  No.
6064, 1980 Del. Ch. LEXIS  562, at *8-9,  *11  (Dec. 5,  1980) (upholding a corporation's right
of first refusal under DGCL section  202(c));  WELCH & TURIEZYN,  supra note 25,  § 202, at
303 (noting that DGCL section 202 "may well validate even such  a restriction  as was invali-
dated in Greene").MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
ment), the force of any shareholder claim of surprise or unfairness would be
greatly reduced, if not eliminated altogether.
135
Still,  an  entire  fairness  claim might have force  in two  circumstances.
First, courts might well intervene-for sound policy reasons, as discussed in
Part IV-where, after investors have committed their capital to the corpora-
tion, redemption provisions  are added through a midstream charter amend-
ment, reclassification,  or merger.
136   Second,  Delaware  courts  may  have
some concern where redemption provisions were used to shift control to, or
prevent a shift of control from, management.  In that instance,  an isolated
Delaware Chancery case from the 1970s suggests that the use of redemption
provisions for the primary purpose of affecting  control could be subject to
scrutiny  under  the  entire  fairness  test.
137   Even  that  case  is  of doubtful
authority,  however.
138   More  importantly,  in  a  large  number  of conflict
135  See Grubb v. Bagley, No. Civ. A. No. 13882-NC, 1998 WL 92224, at *1, *3 (Del. Ch.
Feb.  25,  1998)  (noting with  apparent approval  that the "company  had a contractual  right to
buy stock for book value  in specific  circumstances," but holding that a contract  formula was
not applicable  given that the company had pursued a freeze-out merger rather than exercising
its rights under the contract).
136  Cf. B  & H Warehouse,  Inc.  v. Atlas Van  Lines,  Inc., 490  F.2d  818,  823  (5th  Cir.
1974) (invalidating a restraint on alienation by a charter amendment made after a shareholder
purchased  stock); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aramark Corp., Civ. A. No. 16142,  1998 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 70, at *6-7 (Feb.  5,  1998) (enjoining preliminarily  the reclassification  and  cash
freeze-out of  shares where the freeze-out price included a "private company discount").
137 See Petty v. Pentech  Papers,  Inc., 347 A.2d  140,  143  (Del.  Ch. 1975)  (restraining
temporarily the redemption of convertible preferred  stock where the evidence suggested  that
the redemption was primarily for the purpose of  maintaining management's  control in antici-
pation of  the termination of the voting trust).
138  Penntech Papers  was decided on a limited record and an expedited basis, reducing its
value  as precedent.  It has been cited favorably in only one  Delaware Supreme Court opinion,
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 n.10 (Del.  1977), as support for the proposition
that a corporate  control transaction  must be predicated  on a "business  purpose"  other than
simply  to benefit the control persons.  This holding  was overturned  in Weinberger v.  UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983).
Subsequent to Penntech Papers,  the Delaware  Supreme  Court in both  Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum  Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.  1985), and the more recent Unitrin,  Inc. v. American
General  Corp., 651 A.2d  1361 (Del.  1995), reviewed stock buybacks, which are analogous  to
redemptions.  In both cases, management-sponsored  buybacks of common stock,  concededly
designed to maintain the  existing management's  control  of the corporation,  were upheld  as
legitimate uses  of corporate  funds.  See  Unitrin, 651  A.2d  at 1373  (applying  the  business
judgment rule);  Unocal,  491 A.2d at 955-56 (same).  Unitrin,  in fact,  interpreted  Unocal and
its progeny to permit such transactions  whenever they are not "coercive"  or "preclusive"  and
fall within a "range  of reasonableness,"  a standard of review  considerably  more deferential
than the entire fairness doctrine  applied in  Penntech Papers.  Unitrin,  651 A.2d  at 1386-87.
The manner in which a court would interpret the concepts of "coercion"  and  "preclusion"  in
the  context of a  common  stock  redemption  is unclear.  Redemption  provisions,  however,
could be written to make it explicit that no judicial review is desired or expected.  Cf HB Ko-
renvaes Invs.,  L.P. v. Marriott Corp.,  Civ. A. No. 12922,  1993 WL 257422,  at *15  (Del. Ch.
July  1, 1993)  (rejecting the arguments of preferred stockholders that the literal terms of  a pre-
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transactions,  control is already  in the hands of the promoter of the transac-
tion.  For example, an eighty-percent shareholder may seek to freeze out the
minority- shareholders.  In those instances,  Delaware case law does not indi-
cate a judicial inclination to set aside the charter terms and scrutinize a fa-
cially valid redemption.
139
Judicial review  of an analogous type of charter provision buttresses the
conclusion that common  stock redemptions would  not be given strict judi-
cial  scrutiny  outside the context of midstream  changes  or takeover fights.
Many corporations require shareholders to enter into agreements restricting
transfer  of their stock, providing the  corporations  the right to  acquire  the
shares at a formula price upon certain specified events (such as death or the
termination of employment).  DGCL section 202 generally  authorizes such
restrictions, and courts in and outside of Delaware have upheld such restric-
tions as valid.
140
In  summary, corporations  have at their disposal  several means  of con-
tracting around current rules regarding discounts.  Contracts to exclude dis-
counts are straightforward; contracts to include them are a little less so.  As
argued  in Part IV,  neither type of contract appears to  present any  serious
policy issues in the context of initial stock issuances.  At least in the case of
freeze-outs  of  minority  shareholders  by  controlling  shareholders,  and
probably in anticipation of any conflict transaction,  such discount contracts
could permit a corporation to freeze-out  shares at  a price reflecting the in-
ferred stock should be ignored on the ground that parties who contract with respect to one type
of corporate  right will not be  assumed to have intended  their contract to affect another  right
unless their contract otherwise cannot be interpreted meaningfiilly).
139  Delaware  corporations expressly  have  been permitted  to  issue  redeemable  common
stock  only  since  1990,  and  as noted  in the  text,  few  corporations  have  issued  redeemable
common stock.  This explains why there are  no Delaware  cases directly on point.  Preferred
stock has long been redeemable, however,  and corporations have routinely issued redeemable
preferred stock  since the 1920s.  See Paul W. Jones,  Redeemable Corporate  Securities, 5 S.
CAL. L. REV. 83,  83 (1931)  (noting that, since the introduction of redeemable corporate  secu-
rities in  1874, "it has become the accepted practice to insert some form of redemption  clause
in almost every corporate bond").  Penntech Papers,  as discussed in notes 137  and 138, supra,
is the  only reported  case in which a Delaware  court intervened  to regulate  a redemption  of
preferred  stock.  In  addition, notwithstanding  the apparent  lack  of authority  to  include re-
demption provisions in the terms of common  stock of Delaware  corporations prior to 1990, a
number of companies did so, although  for a reason very different  from the  desire to contract
around fair value determinations--to provide shareholders with "put" rights as a form of take-
over defense.  See  Craig B.  Smith, Fair Price  and Redemption Rights:  New Dimensions in
Defense Charter  Provisions,  4  DEL. J. CORP.  L.  1, 22-27, 34-38  (1978)  (discussing the right
of  redemption or "put" provisions, and including an example from the Rubbermaid  Inc. Proxy
Statement (Mar. 24, 1978)).
140  See supra  note  134 (noting that the courts  in St. Louis Union Trust Co. and Kerrigan
upheld such restrictions).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
clusion (or exclusion) of minority discounts, notwithstanding the unpredict-
ability of Delaware's pro rata value doctrine.
III.  THE PUZZLE OF DISCOUNT LAW
A.  Firms  Have Not ContractedAround  Discount  Law
Despite having the ability  to contract  around a judicially defined  "fair
value,"  corporations  have not done  so.  None  of the  fifty largest corpora-
tions on the New York Stock Exchange have done so.  None of the first fifty
companies to undertake  initial public offerings  during  1996 did so.  Many
examples  of transfer  restrictions  of the  sort  discussed  in  Part  II  can  be
found, but only a de minimis number of corporations  have issued common
stock that is redeemable at the option of the corporation. 41  I have found no
companies that attempt to specify discount rules for conflict transactions.  In
short, despite the fact that corporate law already provides a clear method for
avoiding a judicial determination of fair value, market participants have not
used that method and instead have (implicitly) endorsed the current practice
of fair-value determinations.
Together with the analyses in Parts I and II, the empirical fact that firms
have  not contracted  around  rules  regarding minority  discounts  presents  a
puzzle.1 42  Ideally, rules of corporate law should at least be consistent.  With
merger, MBO, and takeover  activity remaining at high  levels, a consistent,
reliable  discount  rule would  permit  better corporate  and  investment plan-
ning.  The meaning  of "fair value"  necessarily  influences the number  and
nature of such transactions, making a predictable and complete understand-
ing of these concepts particularly important to the makers of both corporate
decisions and public policy.  The meaning of "fair value" in conflict trans-
actions  is  particularly  important  because  such  transactions  often  involve
personal financial risk for participants.  Failure to understand correctly and
apply the law of fair value  could,  in theory, lead  a court to undo a conflict
transaction;  to require substantially  increased consideration;143 or to impose
personal liability on the directors,  officers, and agents involved.1 44
141  See supra  note 127 (citing the 1990 Roche/Genentech  transaction as the only example
to the author's knowledge  of common stock that is redeemable  at the option of the corpora-
tion).
142  1 thank Jeff Gordon for this point.
143  See, e.g., Enserch Corp. v. MacLane Gas  Co., No. 29,  1993 WL 541911,  at *5  (Del.
Nov. 18,  1993)  (denying a motion for a rehearing en banc of a decision affirming a judgment
against defendants for failure to consider inflation in fixing the fair value).
144  See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,  893 (Del. 1985)  (holding the directors
personally liable for a breach of  fiduciary duties).
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Thus, parties have an incentive to contract around existing discount law.
As discussed more extensively  in Part IV, whether or not discounts should
be permitted as a general matter is debatable.  A clear rule barring discounts
might be expected to  increase ex ante share value because investors would
pay to eliminate the risk of conflict transactions at discounted prices.  Con-
versely,  one could imagine  that a clear rule permitting  discounts might in-
crease ex ante share value by facilitating control transactions.  Yet, issuing
firms have not used their ability to contract for either rule.
This  Part  considers  three  possible  answers  to  the  discount  puzzle:
(1)  the  transaction  costs  associated  with  contracting  around  existing  dis-
count rules may outweigh potential benefits (the "transaction costs hypothe-
sis"),  (2) firms  may be  constrained  from  contracting  around  existing  dis-
count rules as a result of the types of externalities associated with innovative
departures  from  contractual  norms  (the "externality  hypothesis"),  and  (3)
investors  may mistakenly  take Delaware  discount  law at face  value  (and
think that  no  discounts  are  permitted)  and  "overpay"  for minority  shares
(the "overpayment hypothesis").  These hypotheses are not mutually exclu-
sive.  Externalities  associated with innovation may be understood as a form
of transaction  cost or may  operate  as  a conceptually  distinct, but related,
reason  for not contracting  around  default rules.  Likewise,  some  investors
might mistakenly "overpay" for minority shares, producing a negative offset
to the potential  benefit of a clear rule regarding discounts,  thereby making
that potential  benefit less than  the transaction  costs  associated  with estab-
lishing a clear rule.
B.  Transaction  Costs
One potential explanation of the puzzle presented by minority discounts
is that the transaction  costs  associated  with contracting  around  fair value
determinations  outweigh the potential benefits.  Economic theory identifies
two  underlying features  of contracting: 145  bounded  rationality146 and op-
portunism. 147  In response to these features, private  and public mechanisms
145  See generally  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE  (1996).
146  "Bounded rationality"  is the seemingly straightforward concept that humans are "lim-
ited in knowledge,  foresight, skill, and time" and  are ultimately unable to act with perfect or
"objective" rationality.  HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198-99 (1957).
147  "Opportunism"  captures  the  fact that economic  actors  may attempt  to  further their
own ends through  guile, deception, or breach of promise.  In particular, the risk of opportun-
ism arises from the combination of uncertainty, which may be viewed as a feature of bounded
rationality, and "asset specificity,"  which in general terms is the degree to which an asset can
be "redeployed"  to alternative  uses without loss of value.  See WILLIAMSON,  supra  note 145,
at 59-60.  Asset specificity may present special problems  in the context of close corporations.
See Hetherington & Dooley, supra  note 37, at 3-6 (describing how the dissolution of an asset-MINORITY  DISCO UNTS
(contracts, organizations,  governance structures) have been developed to the
advantage of all participants.  These features also imply that the capacities
of corrective mechanisms are limited.  Judicial determinations  of fair value,
as described in Part I,  as well as potential contracts to fix prospectively rules
for fair value determinations, as described in Part II, may be seen as mecha-
nisms  for coping with (and  are hampered  by) bounded  rationality  and  op-
portunism.
Transaction  cost  theory  suggests  an  answer  to  the  discount  puzzle:
bounded rationality and  opportunism make  it less  costly to  continue to ac-
cept inconsistent fair value determinations  in a public (judicial)  order than
to establish  a consistent rule regarding  discounts  through private  ordering.
The puzzle thus lies  in identifying ways  in which bounded  rationality  and
opportunism  make  it difficult  to  specify  a consistent  rule  regarding  dis-
counts, even accounting for the ways in which a clear rule would ameliorate
the problems presented  by bounded rationality and opportunism.  In  short,
how do the costs of the current default rule compare to the costs of a private
rule?
1. Costs of the Current Rule
First, consider the  costs  of the  current  rule.  Transaction  cost theory
suggests two sources  of costs.  From a firm's perspective, the current  rule
(1) makes planning and executing  conflict transactions more uncertain  and
more costly 14 8  (exacerbating bounded rationality) and (2) increases litigation
and related  liability  risks 149 (exacerbating  opportunism  by  minority  share-
specific close corporation creates opportunities for internal exploitation); Charles R. O'Kelley,
Jr., Filling  Gaps in the Close Corporation  Contract: A Transaction Cost  Analysis, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV.  216, 222-24 (1992)  (describing how the "all-or-nothing  allocation  of risk" that asset
specificity brings may be unattractive to prospective investors).
148  For example,  a firm may view a conflict transaction as profitable  if,  but only if, the
price to be paid is less than $X,  where  $X is based  on the recent market prices  for minority
shares and thus reflects an implicit minority discount.  If the transaction  proceeds on the  as-
sumption that implicit minority  discounts are permitted,  only to have a court  adjust the  fair
value upward  above  $X to eliminate  the implicit discount,  then the firm  ultimately  may be
forced to abandon  the transaction.  Transaction related costs  (for example,  management time
and expense, out-of-pocket expenses, and investment banking, accounting, and legal fees) will
have been wasted.  Alternatively, the firm may decide that, having incurred irretrievable sunk
costs, the second best solution is to proceed with what would have been viewed, ex ante, as an
inefficient use of corporate resources.
149  Fiduciaries under Delaware  corporate  law may not contractually  limit their liability
for breaches of the duty of loyalty, see DEL.  CODE ANN.  tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)  (Supp.  1996) (pro-
hibiting  charter  provisions  that eliminate  or limit  the directors'  liability  for a breach of the
duty of loyalty),  and  fiduciaries  are therefore  exposed  to potential personal  liability for pro-
moting a self-interested transaction that is subsequently viewed as unfair by a court.  Although
the ordinary remedy in a corporate freeze-out or recapitalization is for the transaction terms to
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holders).  From  an investor's  perspective,  the  current  rule  (1)  lowers  in-
vestment returns  by increasing  uncertainty  regarding  future cash  flows  on
investments  (exacerbating  bounded rationality) and (2)  increases the possi-
bility  of conflict  transactions  at  unexpectedly  low  prices1 5 0  (exacerbating
opportunism by controlling shareholders).
Assuming the semi-strong  form of the efficient  market hypothesis,  in-
vestors  would  pass  along  to  the  firm  costs  that would  otherwise  fall  on
them.  Thus, a third potential cost of the current rule for issuing firms is the
indirect  cost of higher capital costs.151  If, as seems likely, investors  cannot
reliably distinguish between firms that are likely to engage in future conflict
transactions  and those  that  are  not, then the  latter firms  would  gain from
precommitting to pay undiscounted prices in conflict transactions.  By doing
so, they would  increase  the expected  future  value of their  stock, and thus
could  command  a higher  initial  offering  price  and  reduce  their  costs  of
capital.
2.  Costs of a New Rule
Turning to a new rule on discounts, which would be established by pri-
vate contract, bounded rationality  implies that two sorts of transaction costs
may confront  firms attempting  to fix their own discount  rules:  (1)  tradi-
tional transaction  costs such  as developing,  marketing,  and enforcing such
rules and (2) a particular form of "signaling" cost that such rules may create..
Three traditional  sources  of transaction costs  can be  expected: 152  (1)
learning how  to set the  new rule  (research  costs);  (2)  negotiating  a clear
contract,  which  in  the  case  of public  companies,  essentially  reduces  to
be revised to reflect an increased price, the entire  cost of the increased price will,  in the case
of MBOs, reduce the equity of the target corporation, producing  almost the same result as im-
posin  personal liability on the individual members of  management.
For a rough estimate  of such costs, see  infra note 236, which estimates  the size  and
frequency of discounts in conflict transactions.
,5' If the semi-strong EMH is correct,  then  all of the costs discussed  in the text will  be
reflected,  in the end, by higher costs of capital,  and thus be borne by firms.  If the  overpay-
ment hypothesis is true, issuing firms in Delaware are already capturing whatever value arises
as  a result of mispricing,  and  thus would not  stand to  gain  from  an improvement  made  to
capital  market pricing by the  establishment of clear discount rules.  See infra Part III.D (ex-
plaining that issuing firms may be benefiting already from the perception  that they are  oper-
ating under  a "no-discount"  regime by  raising capital  with  a lower level  of dilution,  yet re-
ducing  the  amount of cash  needed  at the time  of a  conflict transaction  to  freeze  out  the
minority shareholders).  If the overpayment hypothesis is not correct, or is only partly correct,
however, then issuing firms may be hurt by the current rule.
152  Cf Black, supra note  123,  at 556-57  (listing  forethought,  reincorporation  expenses,
and the  risk of judicial  or legislative  reinstatement of the  avoided rule  as examples  of rule
avoidance costs).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
learning  how  to  effectively  sell  investors  on the  benefits  of the  contract
(marketing  costs);  and (3)  ensuring  that the  contract  will  be  enforceable,
both legally and practically (enforcement costs).
1 53
Research costs are not trivial.  As sketched out in Part II, although set-
ting a discount rule would appear to present  little difficulty  as a matter of
simple drafting,  a firm must also make sure  that other rules  (for example,
tax laws, accounting requirements, regulatory  or licensing rules, and consent
requirements)  do not impose unrelated,  additional costs on a company that
attempts to rely on the new rule.  Such rules may make a theoretically viable
discount  rule  useless.  The  tax, accounting,  and  legal research  needed  to
confirm that a new rule on discounts would work for a particular firm would
be costly.1
54
Turning to marketing costs, consider a firm that seeks to issue common
stock redeemable at the option of the company.  Issuers already have an ef-
fective "call"  on their own stock-they can engage in a freeze-out or buyout
(as did Levi Strauss) in which public shareholders  are required to exchange
their shares for a cash  payment.155  Even though this  implicit call is func-
tionally  no different from  an explicit redemption right, adoption  of an ex-
plicit  redemption  right  would  require  an  investor-by-investor  marketing
program because investors would need to be educated on existing corporate
153  These  categories  loosely  correspond  to those adumbrated  in  OLIVER  HART,  FIRMS,
CONTRACTS  AND  FNANcIAL  STRUCTURE  23  (1995),  identifying the  costs of (1) thinking of
and planning for various contingencies, (2) negotiating about such plans, and (3) writing down
the plans in such  a way  that an outside authority  can understand  and enforce  them.  For the
relationship between these  costs and bounded rationality generally, see  RONALD COASE,  THE
FIRM,  THE  MARKET AND  THE LAW  (1988),  arguing that economics is the science  of human
choice, and OLIVER F. WILLIAMSON,  THE ECONOMIC  INsTrruTIONS  OF CAPITALISM  (1985),
developing  the theory of transaction costs,  specifically  the costs  of planning, adopting,  and
monitoring task completion in our economy.
154  By way  of illustration,  the legal  costs  reflected in the exhibits to registration state-
ments  filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  for unusual  securities  (such  as
LYONS, PERCS, TOPRS,  and MIPS) exceed those reflected in the registration statements for
"plain  vanilla"  securities  (such  as  common  stock,  senior  debt,  and  conventional  preferred
stock) by 400% or more.  Compare Time Warner & Co., Reg. St. No. 33-61579 on Form S-3
(Aug. 4, 1995) (offering $370 million in common stock, and listing the legal fees at $87,500),
with Time  Warner  Co.,  Reg.  St. No.  33-60203  (Aug.  4,  1995)  (offering  $375  million  in
PERCS, and listing the  legal fees at $300,000).  Compare Sears Roebuck & Co., Reg. St. No.
33-41485  (Aug.  1, 1991)  (reporting  a  $1 billion  debt  shelf, and  listing  the  legal  fees  at
$30,000),  with SunAmerica Inc.,  Reg. St. No. 333-14201  (Oct. 31,  1996) (offering $375  mil-
lion in TOPRS, and listing the legal fees at $150,000).
155  At least  this is true for companies where a single shareholder or parent company has
majority  control.  For  companies  that have  no such  controlling  shareholder,  any attempted
MBO or similar conflict transaction would trigger so-called Revlon duties, presenting the pos-
sibility that initiating  such a transaction  could result in an "auction"  and the sale of the com-
pany to a third party.  See  I LIPTON & STEINBERGER,  supra note 2, at  § 1.07[2]  (discussing
the Revlon case).
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law.  Investors rely to a large extent on prevailing market prices for much of
their information about potential  investments. 56  The more  basic and gen-
eral  the feature, the more likely  investors  will rely  on existing markets to
"price"  the feature,157 and current discount law is basic and general.  Thus,
existing law on discounts will need to be explained to investors  in order for
them to evaluate a variation from that law, even for firms that precommit to
a "no-discount"  rule.
158
Marketing costs for novel securities are often underappreciated, and can
be critical.  A typical "road show" for a stock offering is structured  to give
prospective investors  a limited amount of "face"  time with management to
understand the firm's business plan, its industry expectations,  and its mana-
gerial quality.' 59  "Face" time is limited by the need to make  a sales pitch to
a large number of prospective investors, many of whom may  decide not to
participate, and by the opportunity costs confronting investors.  Per investor,
"face"  time  is often limited to as  little as  an hour.  To spend  a substantial
portion of that crucial hour explaining novel discount provisions represents
a large  opportunity cost for the firm.  It will  not suffice  to have  investors
read the prospectus, even if the securities law might permit that, because in-
dustry  custom (and reputational  constraints)  demand that  unusual  features
(such as call provisions) be noted and justified orally.
Finally, attempts to contract for a clear discount rule are not without en-
forcement risks.  As discussed in Part II, although I believe a new discount
rule should be enforceable  under current Delaware law, the question is  not
free from doubt, particularly where the rule would establish a call price that
is  below the "fair price" that would otherwise  obtain in a conflict transac-
tion.  In addition, some possible discount rules (for example, a simple char-
ter provision  proclaiming  "discounts  are  (or are  not) to be  applied  in fair
valuations")  would  not perform  the task  of reducing  the  uncertainty  de-
156  See Ronald J. Gilson &  Reinier H. Kraakman,  The Mechanisms of  Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 574-76  (1984) (explaining the existence  and logic of this  'weak'  learn-
ing from prices").
157 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Freedom of Contract and the Corporation:  An Essay  on
the Mandatory  Role of Corporate  Law 56 (Aug.  1988) (Program in Law and Economics  Dis-
cussion Paper No. 46, Harvard Law School) (on file with author).
158  This is true even if market pricing is perfect, because  in order to price a new variation,
prospective investors would need to understand not only the new rule, but the old rule as well,
in order to separate the price effect of the old rule from the other factors that make up current
market prices.
159  See  FRED  LIPMAN,  GOING  PUBLIC  59  (1997)  ("Road  shows (including  one-on-one
meetings with institutional  investors) are usually hectic.");  id. at 165 (describing Microsoft's
IPO road  show as covering eight cities in ten days,  including  London  and Edinburgh,  with
"every road show meeting attract[ing] a full house").MINORITYDISCOUNTS
scribed above.  Courts would be just as apt to mistakenly apply such rules as
they do current rules.
3.  Signaling Effects
In  addition to traditional  transaction  costs,  a firm  adopting a new  dis-
count term would have to anticipate and counter any indirect "signals" that
the new rule might send to prospective (and existing) investors."6  In tradi-
tional economic theory, agents  engage in "signaling" behavior to counteract
the  problem  of adverse  selection: 161   if principals  cannot  distinguish  be-
tween  good  and  bad  agents  because  of  information  asymmetries,  good
agents  may have an incentive to engage  in certain activities  to signal  their
quality.1
62
Here, however, the signals sent by a new discount rule may be neutral
or perverse.  To see this, divide firms into two categories:  those who con-
tract for a discount rule ("discount firms") and those who contract for a "no-
discount" rule  ("no-discount firms").  Ex ante, investors  would reasonably
infer that insiders of discount firms expect to engage in a freeze-out because
they believe either that (a) the firm will earn  above-market rents or (b) they
can expropriate value from outside investors by manipulating the timing of
the freeze-out.  Even if investors believe that insiders expect above-market
rents, this will be a neutral and not a positive signal because investors will
expect  the  firm  to  engage  in  a freeze-out  at  a discounted  price,  thereby
"capping" the upside on their investment.
163
160  On signaling effects under conditions of uncertainty generally, see LOUIS  PHLIPS, THE
EcoNoMics  OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION (1988),  and Tim S. Campbell & William A. Kra-
caw, Information Production,  Market Signaling, and the Theory of  Financial  Intermediation,
35 J. FIN.  863,  881  (1980),  concluding  that "there will  generally not be  a Rational  Expecta-
tions equilibrium for the asset market and the market for information."
161  See George  A.  Akerlof,  The  Market for "Lemons":  Quality  Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493-95  (1970)  (discussing adverse selection  and the
use of "signals" to combat its occurrence).
162 See id. at 494 (giving the example of "good quality schooling"  as a method of certi-
fying natural talent).
63  Cf Paul Asquith  & David W. Mullins,  Jr., Signaling with Dividends, Stock Repur-
chases and  Equity Issues, 15 FIN. MGMT. 27, 35 & 41-42 (1986) (describing how an increase
or decrease in dividends or an equity issue acts as a signal to the market); Jeffry M. Netter &
Mark L. Mitchell, Stock-Repurchase Announcements and  Insider Transactions  After the Oc-
tober 1987 Stock Market Crash, 18  FIN.  MGMT.  84,  86-92  (1989)  (asserting that  after the
October  19,  1987 stock market crash, a firm's repurchase  announcement, even when not fol-
lowed through, "generated  a positive abnormal return" by signaling that the stock was under-
valued).  One difference between a discount rule and a stock buyback is that a buyback sug-
gests both an expectation of  above-market rents and the controlling person's inability to freeze
out all public shares,  with the result that minority investors can expect to share in the above-
market rents.
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Conversely,  investors  would  reasonably  infer  that  insiders  of  "no-
discount"  firms expect  not to engage  in a freeze-out  because they  believe
that either (a) the firm will not outperform the market (at best it will earn a
risk-adjusted  market rate of return, and at worst it will earn a below-market
rate of return) 164 or (b) even if the firm will earn above-market  returns, in-
siders will not desire  or be able to freeze  out minority shareholders  to cap-
ture  100%  of those returns.  Ex ante, however, investors  are unlikely to be
able to distinguish between firms in category  (a) and firms in category (b),
because  insiders'  expectations about future returns will  often be nonverifi-
able.  Knowing this, firms in category  (b) would likely refrain from adopt-
ing either a discount rule or a no-discount rule.  This would, in turn, assure
that only  category (a) firms-firms  expecting  market  or below-market  re-
turns-would adopt a no-discount rule.  To avoid the predictable increase  in
their capital  costs, such firms would camouflage themselves as category  (b)
firms by adopting no express rule on discounts.  In short, silence is  a pool-
ing equilibrium.
In sum,  an affirmative  choice of either rule (rather than  acceptance  of
background law) could thus reasonably be expected to send negative signals
to prospective  investors.  This signaling analysis  produces an asymmetrical
outcome  in that both rules-a discount rule and a no-discount rule-would
produce negative  or neutral  signals,  rather than the perhaps  more intuitive
result that one rule would produce a positive signal and the other a negative
signal.  This signaling asymmetry results from two underlying asymmetries
that confront  firms  and  investors who  contract  ex  ante  about  freeze-outs.
First, firms and investors have (and reasonably understand the other to have)
different  ("asymmetrical")  and  unverifiable  information  about  the  future
prospects of the firm and the likelihood of a freeze-out.  Second, a freeze-
out can  only  have the direct effect  of reducing minority  shareholders'  re-
turns-that  is, a freeze-out  functions  like a call  option, giving the firm  the
right to force the investor to sell minority shares to the firm, but the absence
of a freeze-out  does  not give  the investor  an  equivalent  ("symmetrical")
"put" option that would allow the investor to force the firm to purchase mi-
164  New equity issues have been interpreted as providing a similar signal.  See, e.g.,  Rob-
ert A. Korajczyk et al.,  The Effect of Information Releases on the Pricing  and Timing of  Eq-
uity Issues, 4 REv.  FIN.  STUD.  685,  688-92 (1992)  (asserting that firms with private positive
information  are more inclined to issue new equity after an information release  rather than to
dilute existing shareholders'  value by selling at a lower price to account  for market informa-
tion asymmetry, but that firms without positive private information always issue without delay
because they can only suffer a loss from information  release); Ronald W. Masulis &  Ashok N.
Korwar, Seasoned Equity Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 91,  99-117  (1986)  (concluding that pri-
mary and combination stock offers generally cause a significant decrease in stock value).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
nority  shares.
165  Finally,  it  should  be noted  that  even  if an issuing  firm
could counteract the signaling effects described above, for example by giv-
ing plausible alternative explanations for its rule choice,  it would incur (tra-
ditional transaction) costs in doing so.
4.  Summary of Transaction Costs
To  review,  one possible  answer to  the discount  puzzle is provided  by
transaction  cost analysis.  A well-marketed  enforceable  rule regarding  dis-
counts could be expected to reduce uncertainty and limit the ability of firms
and investors to engage in opportunistic behavior.  But implementing a clear
discount rule would entail transaction costs that, in the aggregate, may out-
weigh the value of such a rule.
166
C. Externalities
A second potential answer to the discount puzzle is that firms that con-
tract around  discount  rules  would  encounter  "network"  and  "innovation"
externalities. 1 67  Network externalities  are positive externalities that provide
165  As discussed infra, in Part IV, freeze-outs may indirectly  have positive effects on mi-
nority shares (for example, by facilitating a synergy-producing merger), but the direct effects
of a freeze-out  are negative  in the same way  that the existence of a call option  on  a given
share of stock reduces its value.  The issuance of options on a class of stock may increase the
value of the stock as a class by improving liquidity, but individual shares subject to the option
are generally worth less than shares not so encumbered.
The  transaction cost hypothesis may be testable,  at least  in most respects.  It would
seem possible to gather data regarding:  out-of-pocket costs of drafting novel or unusual pro-
visions to corporate charters or newly issued securities, the incidence and costs of  related liti-
gation (as compared to firms without the provisions), the incidence and costs of conflict trans-
actions that must be revised or abandoned  as a result of  unclear discount rules, and the direct,
marginal costs of marketing securities with such provisions.  It may also be possible to gauge
the impact of such provisions on a firm's cost of capital  and investors'  long-term  returns on
such  securities.  More subtle costs may be difficult to measure, such as costs associated with
uncertain enforceability, or the anticipation and  counteraction of  mistaken signals of  unusual
contract terms.
167  See Marcel  Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate  Contracting:
Increasing  Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74  WASH.  U.  L.Q.  347,  353-58
(1996)  (asserting that network externalities  often prompt lawyers to utilize standard terms in
contracts even when they expect that the customized term would be more beneficial;  because
a lawyer's reputation is based on the success of  the contracts he or she drafts, the lawyer act-
ing in a risk averse manner will be inclined to use terms that courts have properly validated or
interpreted);  Marcel Kahan,  The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 565, 598-600  (1995)  (describing how the  innovation externality hampers the de-
velopment of  novel legal terms in bonds, and how whenever lawyers, accountants,  or invest-
ment bankers create new terms to overcome  existing deficiencies,  other companies can  fre-
ride and incorporate the new term in their bonds); Michael Klausner, Corporations,  Corporate
Law, and  Networks of  Contracts,  81 VA. L. REV. 757, 789-825 (1995)  (discussing how a sub-
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users  of standard  contract  terms  with  benefits  over and  above those  that
arise  directly out of the terms themselves.  Such externalities thus lead con-
tracting parties to adopt standard terms  even when they may be suboptimal
for their particular purposes. 68  Innovation  externalities  are a type of posi-
tive externality that provides benefits  to third parties by permitting them to
free-ride  on the efforts of an innovating  firm, and thus preventing an inno-
vating firm  from capturing the full benefits of its efforts.  Each type of ex-
ternality  may  constrain  firms and  prevent them  from  adopting innovative
charter provisions or the like in an effort to contract around default discount
rules.'
69
Network  externalities  depend  upon  future  use  by third  parties  of the
same  standard terms.17   One  way  to look  at network externalities  in the
optimal market equilibrium  may be achieved when network externalities cause  a "disjunction
between  market equilibrium  and social optimality").  Kahan  and Klausner  sketch ideas  for
why standard terms may be suboptimal,  and why firms and  investors perpetuate  such  terms
despite  their  suboptimality,  including  agency  costs  (particularly  arising  out of the  attor-
ney/client relationship),  risk aversion by lawyers, herd behavior caused by asymmetric effects
of innovation on firms, attorneys, and  investors,  and---echoing Melvin  Aron  Eisenberg,  The
Limits of  Cognition and the Limits of  Contract, 47 STAN.  L. REV.  211  (1995)--cognitive  bi-
ases  arising from  observed  systematic irrational patterns  in human  behavior.  See generally
Kahan & Klausner, supra  (discussing the factors leading to standardization  of contract terms).
Although, as Kahan and Klausner note, these ideas remain in need of empirical testing, many
ring true from a practitioner's perspective.  For a survey of the psychological and experimen-
tal economic research on biases and heuristics, see generally John Conlisk,  Why Bounded Ra-
tionality?, 34 J. ECON. LrrERATuRE 669  (1996).
168  Kahan  and Klausner identify  a third type of externality-learning  externalities-that
may explain  the survival  of suboptimal standard  contract  terms.  Learning  externalities  are
essentially the past aspect of network externalities:  externalities  generated by past users of a
contract  term  and enjoyed by future users.  See Kahan  & Klausner, supra note  167,  at 351.
The difference between network externalities  and learning externalities would not appear sig-
nificant  in  analyzing  discount rules  because  existing discount  rules  provide  an  essentially
identical set of externalities from past and probably ongoing use.
169  In addition to the evidence  collected by the articles cited supra  note 167, the network
externalities  hypothesis  is  supported by recent  market experience  for firms with  dual-class
capitalizations.  Traditionally,  such capital  structures resulted in a significant pricing penalty,
a result that could be explained by the  comparative  absence of network externalities.  More
recently,  as the  number of companies  with  such  structures has grown, the market  for dual-
class stocks has improved markedly, consistent with the network externalities hypothesis.  See
Stephen  I. Glover & Doretha M.  VanSlyke, Raising Capital and  Retaining Control: Initial
Public Offerings by  Companies with Dual Class Common  Stock,  10  INSIGHTS  18  (1996),
available in WESTLAW,  10 No. 6 Insights  18; E.S. Browning, As Hot New Issues Increase
So Does Supervoting Stock, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,  1996, at CI (describing the recent trend of
companies issuing dual-class  stocks in an effort to raise money without sharing power).
In addition to the examples given in the text, Kahan and Klausner identify avoidance
of formulation  errors and ease  in drafting  as  additional  types of learning  externalities.  See
Kahan & Klausner, supra  note  167, at 350.  For the difference  between learning externalities
and network externalities,  see Akerlof, supra  note  161.  For current discount rules, neither ofMINORITY DISCOUNTS
context  of  discount  rules  is  to  consider  an  important  set  of marketing
costs-transaction  costs that  result  from  contracting  around  existing  dis-
count rules.  If only  one firm were  to issue  redeemable  common stock, it
would bear all of the marketing costs associated  with the stock, from edu-
cating investors about current rules to anticipating and counteracting poten-
tial signals that investors  might mistakenly take away from the novel secu-
rity.  By contrast, if the issuing firm were part of a network of firms, all of
which issued redeemable  common  stock, it would benefit  from  all  of the
firms'  respective efforts to "spread  the word" about the merits of the secu-
rity.  This will create more investors who are familiar with the security and
who are less likely to be daunted by the fact that it varies from existing law.
Lawyers will be more familiar with the new security and will provide better
advice regarding potential  securities  law issues, at a lower cost, to issuing
firms and investors alike.  Enforcement costs will be lower, as more courts
will produce more decisions establishing the legality of such provisions.  In
short, network externalities make standard terms more attractive than novel
terms.
Network externalities  run from  other users  to the  users of a standard
term, enhancing the value of the standard term.  Innovation externalities, by
contrast, run  from the user of a new  term to other,  later users of the new
term, and so decrease the (potential) value of the new term to the first user.
Contractual terms-such as those in innovative securities-generally  do not
enjoy copyright or trademark protection, nor can they be kept confidential
by public firms.  Thus, innovators cannot capture the full benefits provided
by such terms.  Third parties can free-ride on the costly efforts of earlier in-
novators.171  For example,  if an  issuer were  able  to  raise  a greater-than-
expected  amount  of capital  by  including  a  commitment  to  pay  a  non-
discounted  fair price  in all  conflict transactions,  that  issuer would  not re-
ceive  compensation  from  subsequent  issuers  that  used  identical  commit-
ments to enhance their stock offerings.  Moreover, subsequent issuers would
benefit also from the first issuer's marketing and enforcement efforts.
These two types of externalities may help explain why few firms have
attempted  to  contract around  existing discount  rules,  despite their  lack of
clarity and their unpredictability.  Firms that attempted to issue redeemable
common stock would not enjoy the positive externalities provided to firms
that adhere to existing discount law and also yet would fail to enjoy the full
benefits of their efforts to overcome the transaction costs associated with the
these externalities would appear to be particularly important because current discount rules are
not explicitly drafted, but rather have emerged from case law.
'7F See supra  note 154 (suggesting that even legal costs alone can be a significant cost for
a first-mover developing an innovative security).
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novel issuance.  Although one would expect the impact of these externalities
to  be  marginal-after  all,  innovation  does occur  in the  financial  markets
with  some  regularity, 17 2  despite  the presumptive  effect  of these  external-
ities--even a marginal  impact could be decisive where the transaction cost
calculus  is otherwise close.
D. Overpayment  by Investors
A  final  explanation for  the discount  puzzle  is  that firms may  already
enjoy the benefits that would  be associated  with  an express discount  rule.
This result  could  occur because  investors  may mistakenly  take Delaware
discount  law,  as  enunciated  in  Cavalier Oil Corp. v.  Harnett, 1 73  at  face
value-that is, that no discounts are  permitted-without  realizing that dis-
counts in fact have been permitted in a number of Delaware cases.174  How
could  investors  systematically  overpay  for  minority  shares?  Suppose  a
share of stock were worth $X under a regime  in which minority discounts
were  always prohibited  (a "no-discount  regime").  An otherwise  identical
share of stock would be worth $X less $Y under a regime in which minority
discounts were always permitted (a "discount regime"), where $Yrepresents
the present value of the potential discount appropriately discounted for time
and the possibility that a transaction at a discount never occurs.  If investors
believed that they were investing  under a no-discount  regime, but were  in
fact investing  in a discount  regime (a "pseudo-no-discount  regime"),  they
would  systematically  overpay  for  minority  shares.  Because  the  leading
Delaware case  on point, Cavalier Oil, holds  on  its face that  discounts are
not required  in fair value  determinations, 1 75  investors easily  could perceive
Delaware to be a no-discount regime, even though subsequent cases such as
In re Appraisal  of  Shell Oil Co.176 and Salomon Bros. v. Interstate Bakeries
Corp.,77 permit discounts to be included.
If the overpayment  hypothesis is true, corporate issuers and their  con-
trolling persons could  benefit from incorporating  in a state with  a pseudo-
172  See,  e.g.,  John  D.  Finnerty,  An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation, 4 J.
APPLIED  CORP.  FIN. 23,  23 (1992)  (discussing "the  rapid pace of securities  innovation over
the past two decades");  Tom Pratt, Goldman Stages Comeback in Hot "Trust Mips"  Sector,
INvESTMENT  DEALERs'  DIG., July 24,  1995,  at 9 (describing rapid  imitation of monthly  in-
come preferred shares ("Mips"), an innovative securities product).
17  564 A.2d  1137 (Del. 1989).
174  See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text for Delaware cases that have permitted
discounts.
175  See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at  1144 ("In [fair value] determination[s]  the Court... is
not required to apply ...  discounts.").
176  607 A.2d  1213 (Del. 1992).
177  Civ. A. No. 10054, 1992 WL 94367 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992).MINORITYDISCOUNTS
no-discount rule regime.  Companies would benefit from the misperception
of operating  under a no-discount  regime when raising  equity capital.  To
raise  requisite capital, companies  in such a regime could  sell shares at $X,
thereby issuing fewer shares than would be the case under a discount regime
in which they  could  only  sell  shares  at $X-$Y.  Reducing  the  number  of
shares issued would reduce dilution to controlling shareholders.  At the time
of a conflict transaction,  however, companies  and controlling shareholders
would be able to effect the transaction at a price reflecting a discount, thus
reducing the amount of cash needed to freeze out minority shareholders.
The  overpayment  hypothesis  is  in tension with the EMH.  The  semi-
strong EMH posits that market prices reflect all public information.17 8  If  the
overpayment  hypothesis is true, market prices of companies  in pseudo-no-
discount  regimes  would be systematically  higher than they would  be if in-
vestors correctly understood relevant law on discounts.  In that case, market
prices could not be said to reflect currently available information.
True, the underlying Delaware cases analyzed in Part I are available and
public. 179  What is  not so  clear, however,  is whether the  case  law or the
analysis itself should be viewed as "public information"  in the sense used in
the semi-strong  form  of the EMH-in  other words,  is the  analysis  or the
case  law reflected  in particular  stock  prices?  That Delaware  courts  have
permitted implicit  minority discounts to  be applied  in some cases  is not a
novel observation, is° but, as discussed below, neither does  it appear to  be
generally known.181  One aspect of the EMH that has not been well analyzed
(at least in legal literature)  is how such quasi-public  facts should be under-
stood in relation to market prices.
Part of what seems to be missing is a model of how  new facts are as-
similated by market participants.  Conventional  discourse  generally  seems
to assume an accretive, item-by-item  informational model in which the full
implications of a new  fact, for example,  a new case  decision,  are quickly
recognized and reflected in market prices.  Yet this model seems at odds not
only with  intuitive understandings about how people understand the world,
but also with decision  cost theory.8 2  It is more plausible that diffusion of
178  See William  K.S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341,  341-42 (1986)  (explaining that under the semi-strong EMH, "prices
'filly reflect'  all publicly available information" (citations omitted)).
79  See cases discussed supra  notes 28-34.
180  See, e.g., Hamermesh,  supra note 88, at. 862.
181  See infra note 190 and accompanying  text (discussing the absence of reported  cases
on discounts).
182 See,  e.g.,  Andrd  De  Palma et  al.,  Rational Choice  Under an Imperfect Ability  to
Choose, 84 AM.  ECON.  REV. 419, 421-34 (1994)  (discussing  the details  and deficiencies  of
the ways in which people process information  in making choices); George  W. Evans & Garey
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complex information and its incorporation  into stock prices are often grad-
ual  processes. 8 3  As with  case  law generally, inconsistencies  in Delaware
discount  law  are  revealed  slowly:  the  authoritative  Delaware  Supreme
Court speaks  on  an issue  once a decade  and the Chancery  Courts once a
year or so.  Furthermore, inconsistencies  are veiled by judicial reluctance to
appear to be violating the principle of stare decisis, a reluctance anticipated
and enabled by shrewd litigants.  Inconsistencies  are also veiled by subop-
timal  litigation  strategies  of less-than-shrewd  litigants  and  by  the  fact-
intensive nature of valuation disputes.  Given this slow revelation process,  it
seems at least possible, a priori, that complex legal facts  such as the exis-
tence of pseudo-no-discount  regimes may fall  into  the former, but not the
latter, category.  In that case, the overpayment hypothesis may be consistent
with a more nuanced version of the semi-strong EMH, at least as a historical
matter.
For some,  the possibility  that  the overpayment  hypothesis  is at  odds
with semi-strong EMH may be enough to eliminate it as a persuasive expla-
nation for the discount puzzle. 84  For others, the overpayment  hypothesis
may ring true precisely because it would be another example why the semi-
strong EMH itself is unpersuasive.1 85  Without attempting to resolve the de-
Ramey, Expectation Calculation  and Macroeconomic Dynamics, 82  AM.  ECON.  REV.  207,
207 (1992) (discussing the research and time costs of calculations).
183  Cf. SARAH  FISHER ELLISON & WALLACE P. MULLIN,  GRADUAL INCORPORATION  OF
INFORMATION  INTO STOCK  PRICES:  EMPIRICAL  STRATEGIES,  Abstract (National  Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6218,  1997) (noting the possibility of gradual diffusion of
information as successive  disclosures about the same  "event"  reduces  uncertainty,  and also
noting the possibility of  the gradual  incorporation into prices of information  disclosed to mul-
tiple  traders  given  liquidity  constraints);  Craig  W.  Holden  &  Avanidhar  Subrahmanyam,
Long-Lived Private  Information  and  Imperfect Competition, 47 J. FIN. 247 (1992)  (discussing
the gradual incorporation into prices of  private information disclosed to multiple traders given
heterogeneous  signals or risk-aversion);  Albert  S.  Kyle,  Continuous Auctions and Insider
Trading,  53 ECONOMETRICA  1315 (1985)  (discussing the gradual incorporation into prices of
private information  disclosed to a single informed trader).
184  Commentators  who  affirmn  the semi-strong  EMH  include  Brealey  &  Myers, supra
note  82, who discuss  the validity of the EMH; Daniel  R. Fischel,  Efficient Capital  Market
Theory, the Market  for Corporate  Control,  and  the Regulation of  Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX.
L. REV.  1 (1978),  who discusses the growing support for the efficient  capital market theory;
and Joel Seligman, Reappraising  the Appraisal  Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 837-38
(1984),  who acknowledges  the "widely  recognized validity  of the semi-strong  form" of the
efficient market hypothesis.
185  The semi-strong EMH is not a consensus  view.  See Jeffrey N.  Gordon &  Lewis A.
Konihauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60  N.Y.U.  L.
REV.  761,  786-97  (1985)  (reviewing finance  literature  and  suggesting  that  capital  markets
may not be "semi-strong"  efficient); Donald  L. Langevoort,  Theories,  Assumptions, and  Se-
curities Regulation:  Market Efficiency Revisited, 140  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  851,  912-20  (1992)
(concluding that the efficiency of capital  markets is unresolved);  Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient
Capital  Markets and Martingales,  27 J. ECON. LITERATURE  1583  (1989) (collecting  studiesMINORITYDISCOUNTS
bate over the semi-strong EMH,
186 1 will note simply that the overpayment
hypothesis is supported by two sets of evidence:  (1) the lack of adequate
disclosure regarding  discount law and (2) the failure  of the courts  or com-
mentators to analyze discount law adequately.
Disclosure regarding minority discounts--even in jurisdictions in which
discounts  are or may be legal-is almost nonexistent.  Many  prospectuses
altogether omit  discussion regarding  how fair value will  be determined  in
appraisal  and  entire-fairness  cases.
187  Although the  SEC appears  to  have
showing that market prices are frequently imperfect);  Wang, supra  note  178, at 375 (offering
evidence that capital markets are not efficient).
186  The overpayment hypothesis might be testable.  The overpayment hypothesis  would
imply that,  ceteris paribus, minority  shares  of firms in pseudo-no-discount  regimes  would
underperform  shares of  stocks  in both discount regimes and  no-discount regimes.  Assume a
fixed  no-discount  fair value at T1  of  V per share,  and  that a minority  discount (if legal)
would be DVper share (where O<D<I). In a conflict transaction at T=I, minority  investors
would receive  (1-D)Vin both discount and pseudo-no-discount regimes, and receive  Vin no-
discount regimes.  To determine the initial required payment to issuing finns at  T=O, apply a
discount factor to payments at T=I by an amount equal to k (where O<k<l),  which is a com-
posite of time value, firm risk, and market risk, none of which are  affected by rules on  dis-
counts.  In a no-discount regime, total return would be R, = V - kV and return  on investment
would be ROl, = R, / kVor V/kV-  1; in a discount regime, R2 = (1-D)  V-  (1-D)kV and ROI2 =
R2 I (I-D)kV; and in a pseudo-no-discount regime, R3  = (1-D) V-  kVand ROI3 = RJ  / (1-D)kV.
Substituting for R, R01 and RO2 both equal Ilk - 1, but ROI  =  l/k - I -Dk. In other words,
regardless of Vor D, and holding k constant across regimes, the total return on investment in a
pseudo-discount-regime  will, ceterisparibus,  be less than in either a discount regime or a no-
discount regime.
This result depends upon two assumptions:  first, that minority discounts as applied would
be the same in both pseudo-no-discount  regimes and discount regimes;  and second,  that the
required  return on investment  (but for the  type of discount regime)  would be  unaffected  by
which type of  discount regime is chosen.  If these two assumptions hold, the overpayment hy-
pothesis-which,  as noted above, proposes that market prices do not reflect the true nature of
discount  rules in  a pseudo-no-discount  regime-would  imply that  investors  could  achieve
excess returns by shorting the stocks of firms in such regimes and hedging those shorts with
stocks of comparable firms  in discount and/or no-discount regimes.  Designing a study to test
the overpayment hypothesis may be difficult, however, because of the limited number of  ju-
risdictions with clear discount rules of  any sort, and because there may be confounding factors
(such as other rules of  corporate law) that vary with discount rules.
187  Each of the principal forms established by the SEC  for the registration of securities
under the Securities Act of 1933 (Forms S-I, S-2, and S-3) requires the registration statement
and prospectus  to include (or incorporate by reference) the description specified in Item 202
of Regulation S-K of the securities being registered.  Item 202 of Regulation S-K requires dis-
closure of a number of specific  characteristics  of capital stock, including "any restriction on
alienability  of the securities  to be registered"  and "any provision discriminating against any
existing or prospective holder of such securities as a result of such security holder owning a
substantial amount of  securities."  17 C.F.R. § 229.202(a)(1)  (1998).  Neither provision would
appear to require a description of basic corporate law providing for (or prohibiting)  discounts
in fair value  determinations which could not be fairly described as a "restriction  on alienabil-
ity"  and do not discriminate  against substantial  security  holders,  but against  small security
holders.
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included a general comment requesting  disclosure of how fair value will be
determined  (or how fair value might relate to the merger consideration)  on
its checklist of targeted disclosure regarding fair value, even in connection
with appraisal-triggering  transactions reviews  of stock merger proxy state-
ments/prospectuses, l88  disclosure remains  spotty  and vague.  Furthermore,
discussion of discounts is absent altogether.
189
The  absence  of reported  cases  on  discounts  in  over  a  third  of the
states, 19 0  coupled  with the fact that discounts  can  have a major impact  on
fair value, suggests  that the  issue  remains  completely  unknown to a large
segment  of the bar and (because  the bar is an essential  link between law-
Thus, prospectuses  for public offerings of common  stock generally  omit discussions  of
appraisal rights entirely.  See, e.g., Keebler Foods Co.,  Common Stock Prospectus 1 (Jan. 29,
1998) (omitting a discussion of appraisal rights); VeriSign  Inc., Common Stock Prospectus 1
(Jan. 29,  1998) (omitting a description of appraisal rights  in descriptive common stock); Lu-
cent Technologies  Inc., Common Stock Prospectus 89 (Apr. 4, 1996) (omitting a discussion of
appraisal rights in the description of  common stock).  Similarly, descriptions of common stock
filed  on  Form 8-K  under the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 also omit discussions  of ap-
praisal rights. See, e.g., Norwest Corp., Form 8-K 2 (Apr. 30,  1996).
188  See SEC Staff Comment Letters  1-3 (on file with author) (requesting disclosure of the
law  on how  fair value  will  be  determined  in  appraisal  in the  section  of a proxy  state-
ment/prospectus  comparing merging companies'  shareholder  rights); cf SEC  Staff Comment
Letters 4-10  (on file with author) (falling to request a disclosure of the law on how fair value
will  be  determined  in  appraisal  in  the section of a  proxy statement/prospectus  comparing
meting companies'  shareholder rights).
See, e.g.,  Syntellect, Inc., Proxy  Statement/Prospectus  41-43  (Feb.  9,  1996)  (on file
with  author) (omitting a  discussion of discounts  in  a description  of appraisal  rights under
Georgia law, the Georgia courts having ruled that discounts must be included in determining
fair  value);  Larizza  Industries,  Inc.,  Proxy  Statement  23-24  (Dec.  1,  1995)  (on  file  with
author) (omitting a discussion of discounts in the description of appraisal  rights  under Ohio
law, the Ohio courts having ruled that discounts must be included in determining fair value);
First Union/First  Fidelity,  Joint Proxy  Statement/Prospectus  53-54  (Sept.  5,  1995)  (on  file
with author) (omitting a discussion of discounts in the  description  of appraisal  rights under
New Jersey law, the courts of New Jersey not having ruled on discounts).
190  The question of discounts is not a new one.  The first reported  decision in which the
issue was litigated appears  to be Felder  v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278, 285 (Del.
Ch.  1960), accepting  a marketability discount  in the  calculation  of a multiplier.  The  issue,
however, has gone unlitigated in approximately  20 states, including Alabama, Alaska, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho,  Louisiana, Michigan,  Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,  North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,  South Dakota, Texas, Utah,  Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.  See infra Appendix A.  In some of these states (such as New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania,  and  South  Carolina),  there  are  a significant  number of appraisal  and  entire  fairness
cases.  See, e.g., Berger v. Berger, 592 A.2d 321,  327 (N.J. Super. Ct Ch. Div.  1991)  (decid-
ing an appraisal case under New Jersey law);  Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Corp.,  180
A.2d 535,  541  (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.  1962) (same); In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 555  A.2d
129,  129 (Pa.  Super. Ct. 1989)  (deciding  an appraisal  case  under Pennsylvania  law);  In re
Jones  & Laughlin  Steel  Corp., 477 A.2d  527, 527  (Pa.  Super. Ct  1984)  (same);  Defender
Properties,  Inc. v. Doby, 415  S.E.2d  383, 384 (S.C.  1992)  (deciding an appraisal  case under
South  Carolina  law); Hite v. Thomas  & Howard  Co., 409  S.E.2d  340, 343-44  (S.C.  1991)
(same), overruled  in part  by Huntley v. Young,  462 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. 1995).MINORITYDISCOUNTS
makers and the financial markets) to the investing public.  Corporate practi-
tioners and academics are often unaware of the topic, and generally unaware
of specific state rules regarding minority discounts, except in the area of tax
law.19'  Leading finance texts do not even address the possibility of a wedge
between the value of control shares and minority shares.
192  Shareholder ex-
pectations can only be confused by the split among the states on the topic.
193
E. Summary-Discount  Puzzle
In summary, the overpayment hypothesis, the transaction cost hypothe-
sis, and the externality hypothesis are possible answers to the discount puz-
zle.  Each suggested  answer is tentative  and  in need  of empirical testing.
Collectively,  however, they  provide plausible  reasons  for why  firms may
not have been spurred to contract around current discount rules, even though
they are objectionably  obscure.  At the minimum, they  suggest that current
discount rules need a second look, and that courts and commentators should
attempt to provide  a more  predictable,  policy-driven  framework  for firms
and investors.  Part IV begins that task.
IV.  WHAT SHOULD DISCOUNT LAW BE?
In this Part, I take  up the policy  questions that discounts  raise:  What
should the rule on discounts  be?  Should the rule  exclude discounts  in set-
ting fair value, as Delaware purports to do (a "no-discount rule"), or should
the  rule  include  discounts,  as  is  done  in  other jurisdictions  (a  "discount
rule")?  Should the rule be a binding rule or an avoidable rule?
191  See, e.g., CLARK, supra  note 80, at 443-58 (omitting a discussion of discounts in rela-
tion to appraisal rights); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra  note 22,  at 145-61  (same); GILSON
& BLACK, supra  note 73,  at 698-702, 1268,  1305 (same).
192 See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra  note 82, at 59-62, 113-25 (failing to discuss mi-
nority  discounts  in a section detailing  the valuation  of stocks and  a section on  discounting
generally).
193  See inffra Appendix A.  Even courts that agree on discounts disagree on the underlying
analysis.  Compare  Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hamett,  564 A.2d  1137,  1144-45  (Del.  1989) (re-
jecting minority  discounts on the basis of the pro rata value  doctrine),  with Brown v. Allied
Corrugated Box Co.,  154 Cal. Rptr. 170,  176 (Cal.  1979) (rejecting  minority discounts on  the
rationale that minority shares  in closely held corporations  are not necessarily worth less to a
controlling shareholder).  Courts in different states that have modeled their corporate codes on
one another  have disagreed  on the issue of discounts.  Compare Friedman v. Beway  Realty
Corp.,  661 N.E.2d  972, 977 (N.Y.  1995)  (holding that discounting  dissenting  shareholders'
shares based on their minority  status would conflict with principles of corporate  governance
because it would deprive those shareholders of  their interests  in the going concern),  with At-
lantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers,  314 S.E.2d 245, 248, 250-51  (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (con-
sidering minority discounts as a valid factor in weighing a stock's value and noting that Geor-
gia's statute is modeled on the New York Business Corporation Law).
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Legal policy questions can be answered only by reference (explicitly or
implicitly) to one or more criteria for evaluating and choosing among possi-
ble rules.  I first take up the policy questions raised by discounts,  primarily
by using efficiency  as a criterion.  In spite of claims that efficiency  has tri-
umphed as  a criterion in  law generally  or in corporate  law specifically,
194
courts  and  commentators  that  have  addressed  discounts  have  most  fre-
quently used (by implication) two types of criteria not directly related to ef-
ficiency:  (1) rules  should  be fair,  and (2)  rules  should be feasible  to en-
force. 195   Although  I  conclude  that  neither  of the  non-efficiency  based
arguments adds to the analysis, I will examine them in turn.
Throughout the discussion, I  assume that whatever rule is  chosen will
be mandatory  and binding because,  consistent with my analysis  in Part II,
the costs of contracting  around the rule would be less  than the benefits  of
contracting  for  an alternative  rule.196   I  also  assume,  consistent  with  my
analysis  in  Part  I.D,  that  the  distinction  between  minority  discounts  and
control premiums  can and will be made-that is, that courts in setting fair
value  do not face the dilemma of, on the one hand, including (full) control
premiums  or, on the other hand, including minority discounts.  Throughout
this Part,  I  also  assume that  other aspects of law and practice  relevant to
conflict  transactions  remain  unchanged,  such  as  the  practical  difficulties
with  appraisal, the role of courts in determining fair value, the language of
the DGCL, the costs associated with varying from default rules of corporate
law, and the relative efficiency of the securities markets.
My  conclusion,  though  tentative,  is  that  a rule  against  discounts  is
best.197  The theoretical analysis concludes that discounts have complicated,
offsetting effects on social welfare, and that neither a no-discount rule nor a
194 See EASTRBROOK  & FISCHFL, supra  note 22, at vii (noting that "corporate  law has
economic structure...  [and]  increases the wealth of all");  RICHARD A. POsNER,  ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS  OF LAW  10-12  (2d ed.  1977) (discussing  the efficiency criterion  in  the economic
approach to law).
195  Others argue that fairness considerations often serve as proxies for efficiency analysis.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare Economics  in Normative
Analysis of Law (Apr. 21,  1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with  author) (arguing that
some aggregation of individual  welfare  should  be considered  in  legal policy  analysis rather
than any reliance on fairness considerations).
196  This assumption is relaxed infra Part IV.G.
197  For a rule against discounts to be meaningful, the process by which shareholders  ob-
tain fair value must work.  At present, the appraisal remedy in Delaware presents shareholders
with  a host of deterrents  in addition  to an unpredictable  discount law, such as  unpredictable
interest  awards,  but these  problems  are  beyond  the  scope  of this  Article.  See  Barry M.
Wertheimer,  The Shareholders'Appraisal  Remedy and  How Courts  Determine Fair Value, 47
DUKE L.J. 613,  702-10  (1998) (discussing  flaws  in appraisal  statutes  and proposing various
changes  in existing  appraisal  statutes to  better achieve  the purpose  of protecting  minority
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discount  rule is  clearly better.  In the face  of ambiguous  theoretical  argu-
ments for and against discounts, I review the empirical evidence.  Although
limited, the  existing evidence supports a no-discount  rule.  Next, I  briefly
consider  whether my conclusions  as to what the  discount  rule  should be
would change  if the rule  on discounts were  a nonbinding default rule, and
conclude that such a variation would only add to the arguments in favor of a
rule excluding discounts.  Finally, I consider arguments that the rule on dis-
counts should be converted from an avoidable rule (as under current law) to
a binding rule.  I conclude  that whatever discount rule is  chosen,  it should
remain a nonbinding rule.
A.  What Are the Costs of  Conflict Transactions?
All things equal,  a discount  rule will increase the  number of conflict
transactions.  If discounts are permitted, a given conflict transaction such as
a freeze-out will be more  attractive to control shareholders, and vice versa.
Moreover, evidence  cited in Part I suggests that discounts can have a large
marginal  effect on the  prices paid  in conflict transactions-up  to  35%  or
more of the total  price  paid 9  -which  in turn suggests  that any  rule will
have a large marginal impact on the number of conflict transactions under-
taken.  As a result, policy analysis of discount law will track closely analy-
sis of the law on conflict transactions.  A brief survey of the literature  on
freeze-outs  and MBOs,  illustrated by a stylized example  drawn from  real-
world transactions,  indicates  that conflict transactions  can  impose  signifi-
cant costs on society.  I extend and update that literature with an application
of economic  analysis of asymmetric  information that  identifies  previously
unrecognized  social  costs  of  conflict  transactions.  Finally,  I  consider
whether either discount rule would have any other significant effects on ef-
ficiency.
1. Traditional Social Costs:  Rent-Seeking
The traditional  literature  on freeze-outs  and MBOs begins  by focusing
on ways fiduciaries  can, in  anticipation of a conflict transaction,  alter (1)
apparent firm value  ("value distortions")  and (2) actual firm  value ("value-
reducing  actions").  Doing so  enables  fiduciaries  to  transfer  wealth  from
minority shareholders  to themselves.  Where firm value  is only  apparently
reduced prior to a freeze-out, the transfer  is immediate  because the freeze-
out takes place at a price below the  price  at  which investors  expected  ex
198  See supra  note  39 and accompanying  text (noting the typical  range of discount per-
centage vaues).
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ante freeze-outs could occur (and thus below the price that investors used to
determine  the price at which they  would invest  in the firm).  Where  firm
value  is actually  reduced,  fiduciaries  directly  share the loss  with minority
shareholders,  but may indirectly benefit in at least three ways:  (1) by bene-
fiting in some capacity  other than  as shareholder from the value-reduction,
(2) by reducing firm  value in a way that harms minority shareholders  more
than it harms fiduciaries, or (3)  by reversing the value loss after the freeze-
out.  Again, minority shareholders  invest ex ante on the expectation that fi-
duciaries will act so as to increase firm value and (except in ways that are
fully  disclosed  and  understood  ex  ante) to  share  in  the  firm's  gains  and
losses.  With either value distortions or value  reductions, the net effect of a
freeze-out is to transfer value from minority shareholders to fiduciaries.
Fiduciaries may reduce apparent firm  value by distorting the  informa-
tion about the firm or its prospects that is available to minority shareholders,
to markets, or to courts.  Such distortions can be legal or illegal and can in-
volve  blocking the  flow of positive  material information  or the release of
false  or misleading  negative  material  information. 99  Illegal  value  distor-
tions can  occur because  legal mechanisms  to detect  and punish  (and thus
deter) deception by control persons are far from perfect.200  Because there is
often no public market for a target company's securities following a freeze-
out, the market will often not provide a useful measurement  device for test-
ing whether a freeze-out was unfairly profitable to control persons.
201
199  See supra note 80 (discussing examples of lawful and unlawful blockages of informa-
tion).-0
200  Cf Mark  Hirschey,  Mergers, Buyouts and Fakeouts, 76  AM.  EcON.  REV.  317,  318
(1986)  ("Outside detection of managerial..  self-dealing  is made difficult by the fact that the
same forces that provide incentives for...  fraud in  the management of a firm's assets provide
incentives for self-dealing in the management of information."); Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient
Market Hypothesis, in THE  NEW PALGRAVE:  THE WORLD  OF ECONOMICs  211,  215  (John
Eatwell et al. eds.,  1991)  ("[Ilnsiders trading  on such  information  can  clearly profit prior to
making the announcement, as has been documented....").
20F In a recent article advocating setting fair value in buyouts of large companies equal to
market price, Benjamin Hermalin and Alan Schwartz assume that market price will equal pro
rata value, such that minority discounts do not exist, an assumption contradicted  by empirical
evidence  and common sense.  See supra note 38.  They also  claim that value distortions  and
value-reducing actions  are prohibited by law and unlikely to occur because post-buyout  mar-
ket prices will reflect gains by control persons in the buyout.  See Benjamin Hermalin & Alan
Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. LEGAL  STuD. 351,  366 (1996)  (discussing how
the appraisal price should be established).  Both claims are false.  Hermalin and Schwartz also
claim that their analysis is based on the semi-strong  form of EMH;  however, except  in rare
instances, the groups most likely to possess  material  nonpublic information  are management
and controlling  shareholders,  and,  if, as Hermalin  and  Schwartz  claim,  fiduciaries  will  dis-
close  any such  information, market prices should  generally  reflect all information  known to
any market participant, which is the strong form of the EMH.  See Malkiel, supra  note 200, at
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Because  of what may  be viewed  as  flaws  in  the securities  disclosure
laws,  control persons may have information that is "material,"  in the sense
that  disclosure  would  affect price,  but which  nonetheless  has  often  been
deemed  not material  by the courts  as  a matter of law,  such as  projections
and  other  "soft"  information.202   Control persons  may, but  need not, af-
firmatively mislead the market-they can simply possess material nonpublic
information  about the current value of the firm.203  An example  would be
the expected benefits of advertising, something notoriously difficult to value
in many instances, yet which can reduce dramatically  current period  earn-
ings and cash flows.  As Robert Clark pointed  out almost a decade ago, in-
siders may also possess information that, on an individual item-by-item  ba-
sis, is not material, yet which is collectively material.2 0 4  Even if discovered,
it would be difficult for law enforcers  to prove that individually immaterial
items of information were intentionally withheld.205
202  See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp.,  [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH)  94,858,  at 94,656 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that the defendant's  acceptance  of
a price set by an independent investment banker was not a breach of fiduciary duty to the mi-
nority shareholder); Coyne v. MSL Indus., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)  95,451,  at 99,284 (N.D.
Il1.  1976) (noting that the  SEC guidelines do not require issuers of securities to disclose their
projections); see also JAMES D. COX  E"  AL.,  SECURTES REGULAnON 75 (1991)  ("IThere is
no duty to  disclose  soft information,  even ...  [if] material.").  Neither  the proxy rules  nor
Rule 13e-3  contain line items requiring disclosure of projections.  Cf.  Going Private Transac-
tions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates,  Securities Act Release No. 33-6101,  17 SEC
Docket 1471  (Aug. 14, 1979) (proposing a projection disclosure  requirement, a proposal that
never was adopted).
203  Although  withholding material  nonpublic  information under Rules  lOb-5,  14a-9, or
13e-3 in connection with  insider trading  is just as illegal  as making an affirmative  misrepre-
sentation  ("disclose or abstain"), passive deception through  nondisclosure  is harder to detect
and punish.
04 See CLARK, supra note 80,  at 507-08 (noting that insiders may have exposure to bits
of information  that individually  are not  important enough  to be  material but  which can be
valuable when aggregated).
205  Congress and the courts have altered dramatically private litigation sanctions in recent
years.  Although it may be too early to say for certain, the provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation  Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation  Uniform  Standards Act of 1998
together appear to reduce the threat of shareholder suits as a means of detecting and punishing
deceptions.  See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Living with Securities Litigation Reform:  Lessons from
the Initial Litigation  (client memorandum  Oct. 31, 1996) (on file with author) (explaining the
implications of the Private Securities Litigation  Reform Act for the process of litigating  pri-
vate claims under the federal securities laws); Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Securities Liti-
gation  Uniform  Standards  Act of 1998  (client  memorandum,  Nov.  17,  1998)  (on  file  with
author) (discussing the key provisions of the  Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act and
the reason Congress enacted the law).  Likewise, class  action settlement procedures that en-
able corporate defendants  to pay off class counsel  in exchange for a global settlement of secu-
rities claims make detection even less  likely.  See Marcel  Kahan & Linda Silberman,  Matsu-
shita and Beyond:  The Role of State Courts in Class  Actions Involving Exclusive Federal
Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.  219, 247-48  (discussing the benefits of global settlement of secu-
rities claims).
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Fiduciaries  may  reduce  actual  firm  value  in  numerous  ways without
fear of legal penalty.  For  example,  they  may underinvest  in  net present
value projects  such as  information systems,  research  and development,  or
acquisitions;  they may  invest  in value-destroying  projects;  and  they  may
simply  shirk  ordinary  managerial  responsibilities.2 0 6   Although  value-
reducing actions in theory should give rise to liability under standard fiduci-
ary principles  embedded  in corporate law, the business judgment rule pro-
tects fiduciaries from judicial  second-guessing  of nearly any ordinary busi-
ness decision, short of gross negligence or apparent conflict of interest.2°7  It
is true  that value-reducing actions  will also reduce the value of the fiduci-
ary's stake in the firm.  Value-reducing transactions, however, may produce
both direct and indirect offsetting gains to fiduciaries.
Direct  benefits  result  from  repeated  small  instances  of self-dealing,
perks, or above-market  compensation,  which although theoretically  subject
to a strict fiduciary standard and close judicial scrutiny, nevertheless  can be
undertaken with impunity if kept small and hidden.  Further direct benefits
result from the simple shirking of managerial  responsibilities, which reduce
firm value but free up fiduciaries to focus on profitable activities outside the
partially  owned  firm,  directly  for  themselves  or through  a  100%-owned
venture.
Indirect benefits result from value-reducing actions if the profit realized
by the control  person following the freeze-out  is reduced  by less than the
fiduciary's proportionate  share of the pre-freeze-out value reduction.208  In
206  Hermalin and Schwartz claim that value-reducing actions must be reversible  to bene-
fit control  shareholders,  but this argument  is flawed because it assumes  that the post-buyout
value will be affected equally by the pre-buyout value reduction, and because it assumes that
the value-reducing  action cannot produce any immediate, offsetting gain to the fiduciary.  See
supra  note 201.  Both assumptions  are unwarranted,  as detailed in the text.  See infra text ac-
com1,anying notes 208-10.
07  See BLOCK ET AL., supra  note 24, at 3-4 (explaining the business judgment rule).
208  Assume  the frum  (a subsidiary) is worth  $100;  the parent company has a 50% stake
worth $50, and  could earn $60 by  freezing  out minority shareholders  for $50, for a profit of
$10.  (To motivate this assumption, suppose that the parent and the subsidiary operate sepa-
rate computer systems, and eliminating the subsidiary's system will cut operating costs with a
present value of $10.)  Now assume the parent can reduce  subsidiary value  by  $10,  to $90.
(Suppose the present value to the subsidiary of the subsidiary's system on a stand-alone basis
is  $15,  but the parent  causes the subsidiary to sell it to a third party for $5, in  anticipation of
combining  the two  finns'  systems.)  Finally,  assume  this  reduction  only reduces  expected
earnings to the control person from the freeze-out by $4 to $56.  (Suppose the parent's system
can be reconfigured to handle all operations for both the parent and the subsidiary at a cost of
$4.)  Now the freeze-out would require payment to minority shareholders of $45  ($90 less the
parent's stake of 50% x $90 = $45), producing a net profit of  $11.
Nonproportional  effects  could be expected whenever synergy value  exceeds feasible an-
ticipatory value destruction.  Companies with underemployed assets such as natural resources
might produce large profits relative to firm value.  Suppose a subsidiary has underutilized for-MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
fact, a nonlinear relationship between firm value and the value of the control
person's proportionate share of the firm may be expected whenever the as-
sets controlled by the firm are  more valuable to the control  person than in
the next-highest-valued use-in other words, where synergy value exists.  A
parent firm  and its controlled,  but partially publicly  held, subsidiary  may
have  made  firm-specific  investments  that  are  most valuable  in  combina-
tion.209  The parent company could reduce the value of the controlled  sub-
sidiary in ways that do not impact the value of the firm-specific investments
or the composite  rents they create.  This would reduce the value of the con-
trolled subsidiary without proportionately reducing the value of the parent's
controlling stake in the subsidiary.
Finally, some value-reducing actions may be reversible, permitting a fi-
duciary to recapture any pre-freeze-out loss after the freeze-out.  For exam-
ple, a firm could retain excess cash flow and hold it in liquid, low-returning
securities;  delay collection of accounts receivable;  or underinvest in capital
equipment.  If the market understood these actions  as temporary, reversible
actions, market prices for the firm would not fall because the market would
anticipate the reversal and restoration  of the firm to full  value.  But if the
control  person's actions  created the expectation that the actions  would not
be reversed  or would  be  exacerbated,  market  prices  for the  firm's  stock
would fall.  The control person could then engage in a freeze-out at a lower
price, reverse the value-reducing action, and realize a net gain.210
est assets worth $100; the parent can better use the forests in its lumber operations,  for syner-
gies of  $10;  pre-freeze-out,  the parent causes a subsidiary to buy vehicles to transport logs to
the  parent's  sawmills;  the trucks  destroy  $10  of value  at the subsidiary  level,  where  they
mostly sit idle; but once used by the parent represent a net cost to the combined company of
only $4 (by reducing out-sourcing costs).
209  In other words, there exist "composite  rents."  See Armen A.  Alchian, Rent, in THE
NEW PALGRAvE:  THE WORLD  OF ECONOMICs,  supra  note 200, at 591,  593.  A stylized but
real-world example of such a parent/subsidiary  relationship is discussed below.  See infra Part
IV.A.2.
210  Even Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, who generally favor control transactions
whether or not they involve a conflict of  interest, acknowledge  the possibility that looting oc-
curs and that insiders may use inside  information to pursue conflict transactions  at  less than
pro rata value.  They too, however, claim that the risk has been "exaggerated"  and that doing
so is "hard."  EASTERBROOK  & FiSCHEL, supra  note 22, at 115-16,  129-31,  138.  To  support
their claim, they argue that freeze-outs "almost always require the shareholders to vote."  Id.
at 138.  This argument is simply  inaccurate:  numerous  freeze-outs have  been accomplished
by short-form merger preceded by control acquisitions,  all without a shareholder vote.  See I
LIPTON  & STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 9.03(2), at 9-13.  Fleet Financial  Group's  1994 ac-
quisition of Fleet Mortgage was such a transaction.  See Fleet Financial  Group, Inc., Offer to
Purchase  (Jan. 30, 1995), supra note 19.  The largest conflict transaction in  1996-the Levi
Strauss buyout-did not require  a shareholder vote.  See Levi  Strauss Assocs.  Inc., Schedule
13E-3 (Feb.  14,  1996), supra  note 1. Easterbrook and Fischel also claim that conflict transac-
tions frequently trigger competing bids and an auction, driving up prices and preventing  con-
trol persons from pushing through a "sweetheart"  deal.  See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra
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2.  Wealth Transfers:  A Real-World Example
Value distortions and value-reducing actions often work in tandem,  and
can  be  subtle  and  hard  to  discover  in the  real  world of uncertainty  and
asymmetric information, notwithstanding the federal securities laws.  To il-
lustrate wealth transfers  in the conflict transaction setting, a hypothetical-
stylized  for  exposition but  based on several  different,  real-world  transac-
tions-is useful, illustrated in Figure  1.
note 22, at 138 (commenting that the delay in effecting a freeze-out often allows any "inside"
information to be revealed,  thus eliminating any advantage the insiders had and often resulting
in higher bids  for the  firm).  Although this analysis may be true of many MBOs, it does not
apply to parent/subsidiary  freeze-outs, or going private transactions sponsored by a controlling
family shareholder group (like the Levi Strauss  deal), where a preexisting control block will
deter  competitors from making  more than nominal  efforts to bust up  the deal.  See Chazen,
supra  note 33,  at 1443-59  (discussing acquisitions  by controlling shareholders  and how they
may eliminate competing bids by refusing to sell their shares).9MINORITY DISCOUNTS
Figure 1.
Pre-Merger
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Old Shareholders of
Firm
Post-Merger
Old Shareholders of
Sub 2
I  Y%
100%
Firm A
100% 49%
Sub 1 Sub 2
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Firm A  is a large public  company.  Firm A  owns  100%  of Sub  1 and
51%  of Sub 2, with the minority interest held  by the public.  Firms  Sub  1
and Sub 2 are middle-market  firms in Industry X.  Sub  1 and Sub 2 might
operate  in different  geographic  areas,  or might be managed  by teams  en-
gaged in a parent-sponsored "tournament" for promotion designed to reduce
monitoring costs.
211
Firm A underinvests  in Sub 1, which is then forced to underinvest in a
technology that is increasingly  important for providing value-added services
to customers in Industry X.  Sub 2 is permitted to use free cash flow to make
net  present  value  investments  in  such technology.  Over time, the  actual
value of Sub 1 erodes relative to Sub 2 because of Sub l's underinvestment
in technology.  Public investors are unable to detect the erosion of value  in
Sub  1, because Sub 1 has no direct financial reporting obligations and repre-
sents an immaterial portion of Firm A's assets, so that Firm A does not (and
is not required to) break out separate information  about Sub  1 in Firm A's
own financial reports.
Ongoing changes in Industry X lead Firm A to anticipate-two years in
advance-that  merging  Subs  1 and 2 will result  in synergies, for example,
from the shared creation and use of information technologies,  or from fed-
eral deregulation that can be expected to create a nationwide  market in In-
dustry X.  Firm A begins to take a hard look at Sub 2's financial statements
in  advance  of their  quarterly  publication.  Accounting  rules  permit  some
flexibility when certain types of revenues (and related earnings)  in Industry
X  are reported, and Firm A causes Sub 2's reported earnings during the pre-
merger period to erode relative to industry peers and to Sub 1, but this ero-
sion  is based  solely on  changes  in  accounting  policies  that are  not suffi-
ciently material to clearly require  separate  disclosure. 22  Firm A  also uses
its control over Sub 2 to veto net present value projects that Sub 2 proposes,
with a view toward implementing those projects after the merger.
Firm A now causes Sub 2 to acquire Sub 1, using Sub 2 stock as consid-
eration.  Firm A  is  able to transfer value from  Sub 2 minority shareholders
to itself in the merger in two ways:  (1) by setting an exchange ratio that
211  For  a  discussion  of tournament  theory,  see  generally  HAROLD  DEMSETZ,  THE
EcoNoMIcs OF TE BusINEss FIRM 110-36 (1995).
212  See  HowARD M. ScHILIT,  FINANCIAL  SHENANIGANS  6  (1993)  ("[U]t is surprisingly
easy  for  managers  to  use  accounting  gimmicks  to  manipulate  financial  state-
ments...  [because]  (1) [t]here  is substantial  flexibility  in interpreting  [Generally  Accepted
Accounting Principles  ("GAAP")],  (2)  GAAP can be applied to boost a company's reported
profits, and (3) changes to GAAP by the Financial Accounting  Standards Board...  often oc-
cur  long  after  a deficiency  in  financial  reporting  becomes  evident.");  see also Kinney  &
Trezevant, supra note  80,  at 45.48 (discussing  how studies of accounting  data suggest that
firms use discretion afforded under accounting rules to "manage" earnings).MINORITYDISCOUNTS
overvalues  Sub 1, and (2) by setting an exchange ratio that undervalues  Sub
2.  Under Delaware  law and SEC rules, Sub 2 shareholders would be pro-
vided with  historic  and pro forma financial  information  about both Sub  1
and Sub 2 (but not necessarily projections of synergies), but Firm A can ef-
fectively overvalue Sub  1 by affirmatively overstating  its historic earnings,
by presenting  its  historical data on an apples-to-apples  basis with Sub 2's
historic data, and by omitting to  disclose  Sub l's past underinvestment  in
technology.  Because  of these value  distortions,  outside  investors  would
value Sub I by applying a similar multiple to the earnings (or cash flows) as
applied to Sub 2,  despite the relative actual  lower quality of Sub l's pros-
pects.  Firm A could also undervalue  Sub 2 by failing to disclose the recent
accounting  policy  changes  and  delayed  investments  in  net present  value
projects.
After the merger, Firm A will be able to reverse the effects of Sub 2's
accounting  policy  changes and  (most of) the  effect of Sub 2's delayed  in-
vestments  ("reversal  benefits"), and offset any residual loss with the syner-
gies of combining  Sub 1 and Sub 2.  In a stock merger of Sub 1 and Sub 2,
the reversal  benefits and synergies would be shared, of course, with minor-
ity shareholders of Sub 2,  due to their ongoing interest in Sub 2, but the mi-
nority shareholders'  share of the synergies would  be reduced  by the  other
value  transfers  built into the merger.  Moreover, the  presence of synergy
values would  disguise the capture  of the reversal benefits,  and reduce the
already low likelihood of effective minority shareholder litigation challenge.
If the conflict transaction were a simple cash freeze-out of Sub 2 sharehold-
ers,  the size  of the transfers  and the unlikelihood  of an effective  litigation
challenge would be even more pronounced, for there would be no sharing of
reversal  benefits  or synergies,  and  there would  be  no ongoing  public  re-
porting at the level of the combined  Sub 1 to provide outside investors with
information to suggest that the freeze-out had occurred at an unfair price.
3.  Conflict Transactions Are Nonconsensual and Largely Unconstrained
Economic  theory  often presumes  that,  absent  market  failure,  private
transactions  are  socially optimal because they are  consensual.  In many if
not most conflict transactions,  however, shareholders  do not "consent"  in
any  sense, theoretical  or practical,  to the transaction.  In the hypothetical
above, for example, minority shareholders  of Sub 2 would have no practical
ability to  veto the transaction.  As  a result, the standard  inference  drawn
about market transactions-that  they are Pareto  improvements  because the
parties  to  the transaction  value  what they  get more than  what they  have
given up-cannot be made.  Even in those transactions in which sharehold-
ers are given the right to veto a transaction, well known free-rider problems
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undermine any inference  that widely  dispersed shareholders  place a higher
value on the consideration received than the stock given up.213
It is true that, as described in Part I, shareholders have a right to have a
court review a conflict transaction to make sure that minority shareholders
receive fair value in the transaction.  In the hypothetical above, for example,
minority shareholders of Sub 2 would have the right to challenge  the entire
fairness  of the  merger  as  a  conflict  transaction. 2 14   The  same  free-rider
problems that undermine the usefulness of a shareholder vote, however, also
undermine  the practicality of  judicial  policing of conflict transactions.  Ap-
praisal rights, in particular, suffer from numerous procedural problems, per-
haps the most significant of which is that plaintiff-shareholders  cannot count
on receiving a market rate of interest 215  during the pendency of cases that
can take  over ten years to litigate.216  Even when shareholders pursue judi-
cial remedies, and even when rules on discounts are clear and respected, it is
far from certain that fiduciaries will not be able to convince a court to accept
a proposed firm value that is well below true firm value, however measured.
At best,  shareholders'  threat  of legal  protection  prevents  wealth transfers
from exceeding fairly generous bounds.
Likewise,  reputation at best will constrain controlling shareholders  and
managers only from extreme forms of expropriation in conflict transactions,
and  only  when future  participation  in  the capital  or labor markets  is  ex-
pected.  Reputation, too, is crucially dependent on the effectiveness of legal
remedies:  to the degree those remedies fail, outside investors will anticipate
that fiduciaries  will  benefit more  from  a given  wealth transfer  than  from
having a good  reputation,  which accordingly  will  reduce  the  benefit that
otherwise  might  have flowed from  a good reputation.  Finally,  and ironi-
cally,  in some situations  a fiduciary's  good  reputation  may have the per-
verse effect of discouraging the investigation of or legal challenge to a given
213  See Gordon, supra  note  123, at 1575-77 (discussing rational apathy  in  the shareholder
voting context).
214  Minority shareholders  would not have appraisal rights in a stock merger of Sub 1 and
Sub 2, but would have appraisal rights  in a cash freeze-out of Sub  1 shareholders.  See DEL.
CODE ANN.  tit. 8, § 262(a),  (b),  (d)  (1991  & Supp.  1996) ("Any  stockholder...  who holds
shares of stock on the date of the making of a demand pursuant to [a merger or consolidation
other  than a stock merger  pursuant to  § 251(g)]  ...  who has neither voted  in favor  of the
merger or consolidation nor consented thereto ...  shall be entitled to an appraisal by the Court
of Chancery of the fair value of  [the stockholder's]  shares of stock ... ).
215  See, e.g., Rapid-American  Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 808 (Del. 1992) (upholding
the trial court's grant of  simple interest, and refusing to adopt guidelines for when trial courts
should award market rates of interest).
216  See,  e.g., Cede  & Co. v. Technicolor,  Inc.,  684 A.2d 289, 290-91  (Del.  1996)  (re-
counting the  12-year procedural history of the litigation).MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
conflict transaction,  even if the transaction  involves a clear wealth transfer
from minority shareholders.
4.  Ex Post Social Costs of Pure Wealth Transfers
Conflict transactions allow fiduciaries to transfer wealth to themselves
from minority shareholders.  From some perspectives,  that may be enough
to suggest that they are not socially optimal and should be discouraged.  No
conflict  transaction  that  involves  a  wealth  transfer  of the  sort  described
above could be expected to be Pareto optimal,  because minority sharehold-
ers were better off prior to the transaction  (and prior to the value-reducing
actions that the transaction induced) than afterwards.217
But from other perspectives, social welfare is not thought to be directly
affected by pure wealth transfers.  Under the Kaldor-Hicks definition of "ef-
ficiency,"  social welfare is deemed improved if a transaction results in a net
increase  in utility, with  wealth functioning  as the usual proxy for utility.2 18
A  pure transfer  from minority  shareholders to  fiduciaries would  be irrele-
vant to social  welfare from this perspective.  Presumably, investors  would
either reduce ex ante share prices  sufficiently to compensate  for the trans-
fers, or decline to invest altogether.  A firm that engages  in a freeze-out  at
some  point after  it  issues stock to the  public  will,  all  other things  being
equal, provide a lower return to "frozen out" investors than a firm that does
not.  This is because  shareholders who were frozen-out  cease to earn a re-
turn on their  shares after  a fixed period  of time,  whereas  shareholders  of
firms that do not engage  in freeze-outs  continue to  earn above-market  re-
turns.219  But in  a world of perfect  information  and  certainty,  a firm that
later would engage in a freeze-out would, at the time of stock issuance, sim-
ply pay a higher price for its equity capital than other firms.  The difference
exactly matches the correspondingly  lower return to equity  investors.  Al-
ternatively,  as Frank Easterbrook  and Daniel Fischel have argued,  conflict
transactions are  like lotteries, and wealth transfers  from investors to fiduci-
217  See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,  LAW AND EcONOMIcs  12 (2d ed. 1997) (dis-
cussin,  Pareto efficiency).
See POSNER,  supra note  194,  at 10-14  (addressing the shortcomings of the  Paretian
tradition of economic analysis); cf.  COOTER & ULEN,  supra note 217, at 41-42 (contrasting
Pareto efficiency with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
219  To the extent that a publicly held  finn earns below-market returns, it is a matter of
indifference to investors that the firm never engages in a freeze-out, because investors in such
firms can always  sell their shares on the market, thereby  obtaining the same  liquidity  that a
freeze-out by such a firn  would provide.
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aries are of little concern  because investors  will gain as  often  as they will
lose.2
20
Given that at least some conflict transactions  are  socially beneficial,  as
discussed  in Part IV.B  below, the  initial  implication  of the  Kaldor-Hicks
view of efficiency (and of the lottery  analogy)  is that conflict transactions
should  be  encouraged.  Even  from  a Kaldor-Hicks  perspective,  however,
conflict transactions nevertheless may reduce social welfare ex post in two
ways.  First, the  value taken  from minority  shareholders  may  exceed the
value received by the fiduciaries because of differences  in valuation,  due to
heterogeneous  information  or  preferences. 2 1  Second,  and  more straight-
forwardly, the value taken from minority shareholders may exceed the value
received by the fiduciaries even where shareholders value stock equally, be-
cause  conflict  transactions  necessarily  entail  transaction  costs.  Conflict
transactions in this traditional view are simply a costly form of rent-seeking.
For  example,  freeze-outs  inevitably  give  rise to  legal  and  investment
banker  fees, printing, mailing, and other procedural  expenses, and the loss
of sunk accounting  and systems costs.  Even for arm's-length transactions,
such costs can be significant.  Moreover, fees in conflict transactions  (as a
percentage of the total deal value) exceed those in arm's-length transactions,
because  of the  litigation and  reputation  risks associated  with transactions
that  by  definition  involve  conflicts  of interest.  For  a typical  $1  billion
freeze-out,  legal  and investment  banking  fees  alone  can  exceed $20  mil-
lion.222  Although  not as  large,  mailing and printing  costs associated with
proxy  or  information  statements  and  shareholder  notices  often  exceed
$100,000. 223  Freeze-outs  also  impose  other  costs  directly  on  minority
shareholders-taxes  can  be  a significant expense,  and  aggregate  reinvest-
ment expenses may not be trivial.22 4
In addition to out-of-pocket costs,  conflict transactions  involve  oppor-
tunity  costs.  In the  above hypothetical,  for  example,  management  of all
three firms-Firm A,  Sub  1,  and Sub 2-would need to invest substantial
220  See EAsTERBROOK  & FIscHEL, supra  note 22, at 122,  121-23 ("IThere is a strongly
negative correlation  among the risks [in a conflict transaction].  An investor with a reasonably
diversified portfolio would be on the winning side of  some transactions  and the losing side of
others.").
21 See CLARK, supra  note 80, at 505-06 (discussing the possibility of different subjective
valuations);  Stout, supra  note 74, at 1245,  1244-52 ("The assumption of homogeneous beliefs
is at odds with a reality in which investors and analysts differ sharply in their predictions for
particular corporations, industries, and the general economy.").
?" See, e.g., QVC Programming  Holdings, Inc., Offer to Purchase, supra  note 2 (noting
legal and banker fees of $20 million).
2Z See, e.g., id  at 50 (noting printing and mailing fees of $200,000).
22A See Toms, supra note  85,  at 569 (discussing  the tax costs  of freeze-outs);  see also
CLARK, supra  note  80, at 504-05  (discussing both taxes and reinvestment expenses).9MINORITY DISCOUNTS
amounts of time to plan and implement the merger of Sub I and Sub 2.  Ex-
perience  reveals  that directors  and  senior management  will spend a mini-
mum of 100 hours each, and often much more, on a major conflict transac-
tion,  and  each  such  transaction  will  involve  upwards  of a  dozen  senior
managers and directors.  Although that may not sound that large,  consider
that certain senior executives in recent years have been receiving  compen-
sation that would value that time in the millions of dollars for each execu-
tive.  Presumably,  that time  otherwise  could be put to  socially productive
use.
In sum, because conflict transactions may involve pure wealth transfers
that do not increase social wealth and involve significant ex post transaction
costs,  they  may  reduce  social  welfare,  even  under  a Kaldor-Hicks  crite-
rion.
2 n
5.  Ex Ante Social Costs of Conflict Transactions
In  addition  to  the  ex  post  social  costs  of conflict  transactions,  such
transactions can be expected to have ex ante social costs.  In a world of un-
certainty and asymmetric information, the ability of controlling shareholders
to  engage  in conflict  transactions  creates  a distortion  in the  allocation  of
capital.  Permitting conflict transactions to be completed with minority dis-
counts included in setting fair value will increase that distortion,  and so re-
duce social welfare.
To see this, imagine that firms issuing stock in the public capital  mar-
kets for the first time are of two types:  firms that will engage in a freeze-out
at some future date ("freeze-out firms") and those that will not ("non-freeze-
out firms").  Assume that investors are rational and risk neutral, and that the
The focus of the text is on allocational  efficiency.  Pure wealth transfers might also
implicate distributional concerns.  As a general matter, minority shareholders as a group will
include a greater percentage of small investors with proportionately less wealth than either of
the groups  that benefit  from transfers  in conflict  transactions  (controlling shareholders  and
managers).  "Small investor"  in this context, however, is an unclear term.  High net worth in-
dividual investors, for example, comprise a significant  portion of shareholders  who hold  the
smallest amount of assets, relative  to institutional  shareholders.  Likewise, widows  and or-
phans dependent on capital invested through trusts, traditionally thought to need the protection
of the securities laws the most, often  fall into the richest one percent of the U.S. population.
By  contrast,  mutual  funds and  pension  fumds  are  large  investors  in the ordinary  sense  of
things, yet represent indirectly  (and  imperfectly)  the interests  of individuals  who lack suffi-
cient wealth to invest directly in the stock market.  Even if  the concept of small investor corre-
sponded  in some general  way with  relatively  impoverished individuals,  small  investors  are
increasingly likely to hold a diversified portfolio of investments, and may to that extent bene-
fit from conflict transactions, as suggested by Easterbrook and Fischel's lottery analogy.  See
supra  note 220 and accompanying text.  In the hypothetical above, for example, Firm A could
be expected to have a large number of  shareholders who. directly or indirectly, represent small
investors as well as large investors.
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capital markets are semi-strong efficient, but that investors are unable to tell
226 whether a given firm is a freeze-out firm or a non-freeze-out firm.  Firms
of both types will face the same cost of capital, which will reflect the aver-
age  probability of a freeze-out  across  all firms.  Because  freeze-out  firms
will, ceteris  paribus,  provide lower returns to investors than non-freeze-out
firms, non-freeze-out firms will, in effect, subsidize freeze-out firms.  Such
a cross-subsidy  represents  a distortion in the allocation  of capital,  and re-
duces social welfare.
To the extent that minority discounts are permitted in freeze-outs, they
only will increase the effect of this subsidy, for two reasons.  First, minority
discounts will reduce the average returns to investors in all firms by reduc-
ing the price paid in freeze-outs; and second, minority discounts will reduce
the average  returns  to  investors  in all  firms  by increasing  the number  of
freeze-outs  that occur-a minority discount increases the attractiveness  of a
freeze-out to a controlling shareholder, ceteris paribus.
This  cross-subsidy  may  be exacerbated  by an adverse selection  prob-
lem,  depending on the  relationship  at any  given time between the  cost of
capital  in the public and private capital  markets.  For some subset of non-
freeze-out firms, at various points in time, the cost of capital  in the private
capital market may fall below the average cost of capital for all firms in the
public capital  market, causing such non-freeze-out firms to  exit the public
capital market altogether.  This will cause the remaining firms raising capi-
tal  in the public  markets that  are  freeze-out  firms to  increase,  thereby  in-
creasing the average cost of capital for firms continuing to raise funds in the
public capital markets.  It is  true that the costs of capital  in the public  and
private  equity capital  markets are related; if the spread between  public and
private  equity capital costs sufficiently widens to cover transaction costs, an
arbitrage opportunity will be created and exploited, eventually reducing the
spread.  Still,  transaction  costs  of arbitrage  between  public  and  private
capital markets  are  never zero,  and the persistent cyclicality  of the merger
and IPO markets  suggests that disparities  necessary for the sort of adverse
selection problem described to exist may occur with some regularity.
Whether or not this adverse selection problem occurs, it is clear that the
cost of capital for non-freeze-out firms will increase, both as the number of
freeze-outs  increases  and the price  paid in  freeze-outs  decreases.  As  the
226  This is a reasonable  assumption given that the  attractiveness  of a freeze-out  at any
moment in time depends  upon a range of factors, many of which are in constant fluctuation,
including  the relative  cost of capital  in the  public  and private  capital  markets.  In practice,
even the firms themselves rarely will know their own type with any degree of certainty at the
time of stock issuance  and so  will have neither an obligation to disclose nor a likelihood of
disclosing their type to potential investors.MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
cost of capital increases,  fewer firms will be able to raise capital, and fewer
projects requiring capital investment will be undertaken.
The  cross-subsidy  effects  may be viewed from  the perspective  of the
investor as well.  If the average return to investors of all firms falls below a
certain  level,  a subset of investors may  withdraw from  the equity markets
altogether.  In either case,  gains from trade are lost.  Without  an offsetting
benefit, freeze-outs  and other conflict transactions can be expected to reduce
social welfare, not only because  of the ex post transaction costs associated
with  pure  wealth  transfers,  but  also  because  of the  ex ante  effects  such
transactions cause in a world of uncertainty and asymmetric information.
B.  Why Permit  Conflict Transactions  at  All?
Given the distortion  caused  by conflict transactions,  why not prohibit
conflict transactions  altogether?  The  literature  on freeze-outs  and MBOs
provides  several  answers. 2 27  Conflict  transactions  can  be expected to  en-
hance  social  welfare  by  encouraging  entrepreneurs  to  search  for  value-
increasing transactions, by reducing the incentives to "lock-in" minority in-
vestments, and by eliminating the risk of hold-ups by minority shareholders
that would enhance the market for corporate control.  Including discounts in
fair  value  will,  on the  margin,  increase  the  number of such  transactions
without reducing the related benefits and so enhance social welfare.
The most common rationale offered for freeze-outs  is that they permit
the  capture  of synergies  that  otherwise  would  be  unavailable.  As  noted
above,  the combination  of two assets in the hands of a single owner may
create  "synergistic"  value 228  Freeze-outs permit a controlling shareholder
who owns 100%  of one such asset but only a controlling stake in a second
asset to capture  all of the synergies  from the combination by first eliminat-
ing the minority owners of the second asset.229  Without freeze-outs, a con-
trolling shareholder might use the  100%  owned asset without seeking such
synergies  if the benefits  of doing  so would  exceed the  controlling  share-
holder's proportionate share in the combined assets.  Lost synergies reduce
social welfare to the extent that they exceed losses that the freeze-out would
create.
227  See  CLARK, supra  note 80,  at 510-12 (discussing motives for freeze-outs);  1 LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra  note 2, § 9.01,  at 9-3 to 9-7 (same).
228 See discussion supra  Part I.D.2.a (explaining the nature of synergy value  and how it
a  See example discussed supra  Part IV.A.2 (illustrating how this type of deal creates a
wealth transfer).
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In a recent article,  Benjamin Hermalin  and  Alan  Schwartz  advance  a
second, related rationale for freeze-outs.  They note that freeze-outs  provide
controlling shareholders with the incentive to exert socially optimal effort in
pursuing new investment projects.23°  They note that controlling sharehold-
ers will, on the margin, refrain from exerting  above-normal  effort (for ex-
ample, to pursue a new project or line of business) as  long as the fiduciary
must bear the entire  cost of effort  that could  be exerted  on behalf of the
firm, but be entitled to only part of the gain.23  In such situations, one way
to  induce  the fiduciary  to  exert  the socially  optimal effort  is to  permit  a
freeze-out  at pro rata value.  Thus, conflict transactions  may provide  con-
trolling shareholders with an incentive to exert optimal effort.
A  third rationale for permitting  freeze-outs  and other conflict transac-
tions is simply that such a transaction may represent the best exit strategy
for minority shareholders,  even given the risks that such transactions  pres-
ent.  This  point is  clearest in the  close corporation  context,  but has  some
traction even for public companies.  In a close corporation,  a freeze-out or
other conflict transaction  may be the  only way  minority  shareholders  can
hope to liquidate, or for firms that are not paying  current dividends, to real-
ize any return on their investment.  Ex ante, better exit strategies can be de-
vised for minority shareholders, such as buy-sell agreements,  mandatory re-
demption  provisions,  and  registration  rights  agreements.  Crafting  and
embodying such strategies in legal documents, however, is costly and rarely
done.  In such situations, minority shareholders  may well be pleased to ac-
cept a freeze-out price,  even one below the nominal pro rata value of their
shares.  In  such  a situation,  the  nonconsensual  aspects  of the freeze-out
serve to eliminate hold-ups by one or more minority shareholders seeking to
extract gains from other shareholders.
A  fourth rationale  for permitting freeze-outs  is that they are  necessary
to the  functioning of the market for corporate  control.  Hostile takeovers,
MBOs,  and related  merger  and acquisition  activity  usually  provide target
shareholders  with  substantial  premiums  above  market  price.  As  noted
by  Easterbrook  and  Fischel,  second-step  freeze-outs  in  two-step  take-
overs  benefit  minority  shareholders  to  the  extent  that  they  include  a
230 See Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 201,  at 358 ("If  the majority  could not freeze-
out the minority, it would invest a suboptimal level of effort.").
231  See id. at 359 ("mhe majority will not invest optimally if it has to share value  with
the minority.").MINORITYDISCOUNTS
price that is a premium to pre-takeover market prices-even if the second-
step freeze-out price is less than the first-step tender offer price23
2
A final rationale  against a rule banning  freeze-outs  is that such a rule
would be difficult to make either binding or effective.  Where private bene-
fits to a control person of a freeze-out  or MBO were large, the control per-
son  could be  expected  to  expend  resources  to  avoid  the rule,  such  as by
combining a tender offer with a merger or asset purchase or sale with a third
party  and/or a liquidation.  Where  private  benefits to  a control  person  or
MBO were not large enough to warrant such a maneuver, the control person
would be tempted to engage in or increase the number of smaller, less visi-
ble conflict transactions to  expropriate wealth  from minority shareholders.
Although a ban on freeze-outs might reduce total  expropriation value, addi-
tional transaction costs associated with the substitute forms of self-dealing
(either  one  large  or  many  small  transactions)  would  reduce  social  gains
from the  ban.  Thus, it is not clear that a ban  on freeze-outs  would  have
much, if any, effect on social welfare.
C.  How Do the Costs and  Benefits of Conflict Transactions  Compare?
In sum, it is unclear at the level of theory whether the benefits of con-
flict transactions dominate their costs.  David Charny is  likely  correct that
"predominant  noninstrumental  theories of contract are  in large  measure  in-
determinate as to the question of default rules."233  But, at least in this con-
text, instrumental theories are  equally indeterminate  at the level of theory.
Such a result is hardly surprising, given the inevitable complexity  and intri-
cacy  of the real-world  effects of any rule of corporate  law,  potentially af-
fecting hundreds if not thousands of transactions,  large and small,  involving
public companies and close corporations, start-ups and venerable  multi-line
businesses  alike.  Any  attempt to  weigh the costs and benefits  of conflict
transactions themselves would necessarily  involve at least three sets of un-
explored or disputed empirical questions.
First, it is far from clear how much more frequently  freeze-outs  would
occur if discounts  were permitted than if they were not.  The motives,  de-
terminants, and effects of mergers and acquisitions generally are understood
poorly, and the sensitivity of merger and acquisition activity to stock prices
232 See EASTERBROOK & FIscHEL, supra  note 22, at 137-38 (arguing  that "[a]  freezeout
price above the current market price is no less beneficial to shareholders because the price was
once higher").
233  David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains:  The Normative Structure of Contract  Inter-
pretation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1818 (1991).
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is a poorly understood relationship.234  Even more basically,  there has been
surprisingly little attention given to how often freeze-outs  and other conflict
transactions occur.235  Even less studied is the effect that the possibility of a
freeze-out has on share price at the time of an IPO, and thus how significant
the effect of such a transaction may be on share price.!36  Given that inves-
tors could  be expected to  price shares differently for freeze-out  firms and
non-freeze-out  firms,  the  seriousness  of the  cross-subsidy  is still  specula-
tive,  as  is the degree  to which it would  be exacerbated  by permitting  dis-
counts.
Second, commentators  have widely varying intuitions about how often
fiduciaries engage  in value distortions and value-reducing transactions,  and
about the significance  of such behavior.237  Few have attempted to measure
such practices empirically.238  Moreover, even if  value-reducing transactions
are common, some would take place regardless of whether freeze-outs were
permitted.  In addition,  it is  possible that more  might take place  if freeze-
outs were barred than if  they were not.  Any reduction in expropriation pro-
duced by a ban on freeze-outs would thus be offset.
234 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra  note 82, at 817-18 (arguing that the causes of mergers
and merger waves are an unsolved problem in finance theory); Devra L. Golbe & Lawrence J.
White,  A  Time-Series Analysis  of Mergers and Acquisitions in  the  U.S.  Economy,  in
CORPORATE  TAKEOVERS:  CAUSES  AND  CONSEQUENCES  (Alan J. Auerbach  ed., 1988)  (not-
ing the puzzling relationship between Tobin's Q and merger activity).
235  A review of data from MERGERSTAT REVIEW  1997, supra  note 13,  and data from  Se-
curities Data Co. (on  file with  author) shows that, of the companies  in  the Fortune  500  in
1985,  about  1% (n=6) were  involved  in  freeze-outs  during  the  ten-year  period  surveyed.
When the universe of companies surveyed is expanded to include the smaller companies  in the
Russell 2000 index, the percentage  of companies  involved  in freeze-outs during the ten-year
period remains relatively small,  at less than 5%  (n-=80).  These  data do not seem to cut one
way  or another  on  the  social  welfare  effects  of conflict  transactions,  because  infrequent
freeze-outs produce both small costs and small benefits.
236  As a first rough cut, consider an IPO of a $1 billion  company.  If the company has a
.005% chance per year of engaging in a freeze-out over the next 20 years (an assumption con-
sistent with the data described supra note 235), then the expected cost to investors (and thus
the increase  in the firm's cost of capital) from a 35% discount in the freeze-out price, in pres-
ent value terms (using a 10% discount rate and a terminal value of  zero after 20 years for sim-
plicity), would be approximately  1.36% of  the offer price, or $13.6  million-not large in pro-
portion to  the offer price,  but still  large enough  to matter to the  firm's agents,  who  might
capture some of that cost if they could devise an effective strategy for avoiding it.  Systemi-
cally, of course,  1.36% of all IPOs is a huge number.  In  1997 alone there were 508 IPOs in-
volving $26 billion in new equity.  See FORBES, Year in Review, Feb.  1998.
Compare Brudney & Chirelstein,  supra  note  2, at  1354 (noting that litigation in  this
area  has  become  more  active),  with  EASTERBROOK  &  FISCHEL,  supra note  22,  at  134-39
(countering arguments that freeze-outs distort value over the long term).
238  See Andrei  Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A  Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 759 (1997)  (noting the "small number" of papers measuring the extent to which ex-
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Third, commentators  also have widely varying  intuitions about the sig-
nificance of merger synergies generally, and freeze-out-related  synergies  in
particular.239  Similarly, although Hermalin and Schwartz's model of the ef-
fects on the efforts of controlling persons is logically consistent,24 0 it is un-
clear whether the distortions on effort exerted by fiduciaries  in the absence
of complete  ownership  are  serious  or trivial.241  The  liquidity  and wealth
constraints facing a typical  minority shareholder (and thus her need to rely
on freeze-outs  to liquidate  minority investments)  are  also unexplored.  Fi-
nally, remaining debates  from the  1980s, such  as those over the net social
welfare effects of takeovers242 and the importance of freeze-outs to the mar-
ket for corporate control, are far from resolved.243
Needless to say, the foregoing empirical  questions are unlikely to have
clear answers in the near future.  Fortunately, there is another, less compre-
hensive but more accessible,  empirical question  that can serve as  a proxy:
What  do  actual  bargains  between  market  participants  suggest  about  the
relative efficiency of including or excluding discounts?
Before turning to the evidence on actual bargains, however, it is worth
considering whether discount law is likely to have significant efficiency ef-
fects apart from its impact on the number and terms of conflict transactions.
One  possibility  is  that discount  law  might affect information  costs  facing
investors when they value firms or securities.  Initially, it might seem that a
rule  allowing discounts  would  reduce  information  costs  by reducing  the
number of variables  that actual  or potential  minority investors  would need
to  consider  in valuing  minority shares.  By  eliminating speculation  about
fair value, a discount rule seems simpler and cheaper than a rule barring dis-
counts.
This would be true, however, only if fair value were determined  entirely
by the market price of minority  shares.  One difficulty with such a rule is
that stocks of many companies  do not trade in liquid markets.  As a result,
different rules would be needed for widely traded public companies,  on the
239  See Coffee, supra  note 77, at 412-20 (considering which situations  warrant allocation
of synergistic gains between management and the corporation).
240  See generally  Hermalin & Schwartz, supra  note 201 (offering a model and accompa-
nying commentary on freeze-outs and their investment implications).
41  Cf. Coffee, supra  note 77, at 408-10 (critiquing the  Hermalin and Schwartz model as
unrealistic).
242  See generally  KNIGHTS,  RAIDERS,  AND  TARGETS  (John  C.  Coffee,  Jr. et al.  eds.,
1988) (providing a collection of articles  on takeovers reflecting  diverse views on their social
welfare effects).
243  Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra  note 22,  at 134-39 (arguing that freeze-outs en-
able value-enhancing  transactions, but not offering  any views or evidence on the size or sig-
nificance of the enabled transactions).
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one hand,  and  public  companies  with  limited  or thin "public  floats"  and
closely held companies,  on the other.  Although not impossible, such a dif-
ferentiation  would  run  roughshod  over  current  Delaware  statutory  law,
which distinguishes in DGCL section 342 between ordinary business corpo-
rations  and  nonpublic  companies  with  fewer  than  thirty  record  holders.
Thus, such a distinction would in all likelihood require legislative action.
A more  serious theoretical  difficulty  derives  from the discussion con-
cerning pure wealth transfers---control  persons may be able to distort mar-
ket prices in anticipation of a freeze-out.  Minority shareholders  would thus
have  a continuing  need to  assess  (at some  cost) the value  of their shares
without the distortions in order to bring lawsuits under the state and federal
laws governing disclosure  and manipulation.  That effort would  be no dif-
ferent in kind than an effort to assess fair value determined on some basis
other than minority share market prices.  Thus, the information cost advan-
tage of a rule allowing discounts is much smaller than it might first appear,
if it exists at all.
D.  What Do Actual Bargains  Say About Discounts?
In the  face  of ambiguous,  theoretical  arguments  for  and against  dis-
counts,  I  review  the empirical  evidence  on discounts.  Although this  evi-
dence is limited, what does  exist supports a no-discount  rule, but the evi-
dence  also  supports  continuing to  permit  conflict transactions  generally.
Three sources of empirical evidence  exist on discounts:  (1) private agree-
ments that address  discounts,  (2)  prices  paid  in freeze-outs,  and  (3)  state
laws on discounts.
The bulk of publicly  available  charter  provisions and private  buy/sell
agreements do not address freeze-out pricing, and of those that do, most do
not address discounts.244  The few agreements that do address the question,
however, show that private parties generally  agree to exclude discounts and
distinguish  discounts from premiums,  while permitting (or even requiring)
244  See infra note 245 (discussing and  analyzing available data); see also PRATr ET AL.,
supra  note 4, at 669-76  (lamenting the lack of detail  in buy/sell agreements,  and noting that
"often...  the provision  for valuation...  [m]  a  buy-sell  agreement...  is neglected  or done
hastily,"  that parties  are often surprised  to learn that minority discounts  may be appropriate
depending  on the  language  used,  and  that buy/sell  agreements  range  from  specifying  no-
discount to a 50%  discount); cf Christopher Stoneman & Willemien Dingemans Miller, Es-
tate Planning for Owners of Closely Held Business Interests, BNA Tax Management Portfolio
No. 809 (1994),  at A-5  to A-6 & B-101  to B-103 (describing  customary buy/sell agreement
pricing terms without addressing discounts, and giving an example of a model agreement that
fails to address  discounts);  PETER C.  KOsTANT,  BusINEss  ORGANIzATiONs  141-42  (1996)
(same).19  NORITYDISCOUNTS
245
freeze-outs to occur.  For example, when McCaw Cellular acquired LIN
Broadcasting Corporation ("LIN"), the transaction contemplated an eventual
buyout of the  remaining  LIN shareholders,  and  the transaction  agreement
dealt  with  the  issue  of how  to  choose  a  price  for the  buyout.246   The
McCaw/LIN  agreement  described the minority  share buyout  price as  "the
private market price per Share (including a control premium) that an unre-
lated third party would pay... to acquire  all outstanding [common stock of
LIN] ...  in an arm's-length transaction, assuming [LIN] was being sold in a
manner  designed  to  attract  all  possible  participants...  and  to  maximize
stockholder value."
247
A second source of evidence regarding actual  agreements are the prices
paid in going private transactions and tender offers involving controlled tar-
gets.  Such transactions almost always provide for payment of a premium to
market  prices,  which  reflect  a  minority  discount,  and  announcements  of
such transactions  are  almost always  followed  by an  immediate  rise  in the
market  price of the target shares.  Specifically,  data from  Securities  Data
Co. on  all conflict transactions  (n=1604)  during the ten-year  period from
1985 to 1996 show an average premium-to-market  price of 45%,  shown in
Figure 2 below.  In all freeze-outs248 during the same period (n=154),  90%
245  1  completed  the  following search  in the  Compny/Filing  file  in  the LEXIS database
(which contains all filings  through SEC-Online,  dating back to 1986):  "(buy/sell or put/call)
pre/1 agreement and minority w/5  discount."  The search returned  seven agreements (as well
as numerous descriptions of  and references to agreements),  of which five expressly prohibited
inclusion of  minority discounts in determining the price at which one of the parties could pur-
chase the stock of  another party upon specified  events (one expressly permitted a marketabil-
ity discount), and two expressly required inclusion of  discounts.
The  filings  that  included  agreements  barTing  discounts  were:  Capital  Trust,  Schedule
13D,  Exh. 99 (Dec.  19,  1997); McCaw International  Ltd., Form S-4, Exh. 10 (July 18,  1997);
United Oklahoma Bankshares Inc., Schedule 13e3,  Exh. 4 (June 9,  1997); Physician Partners
Inc., Form S-4 (Nov. 6, 1996); and Minnesota Power & Light Co., Form  10-K, Exh. 10 (Mar.
30, 1996).  The filings that included agreements requiring discounts were:  Realnetworks Inc.,
Form S-I, Exh. 10 (Oct. 1, 1997) and Pierce Leahy Corp., Form S-4, Exh. 10 (Oct. 4, 1996).
When  the  search  is expanded  to all  put/call  and  buy/sell  agreements,  i.e.  "(buy/sell  or
put/call) pre/l  agreement," by contrast, over 350 agreements  are returned,  confirming that the
vast majority of  agreements do not expressly specify treatment of discounts.
These findings are consistent with my own experience that private buy/sell agreements are
in the substantial majority of  cases either silent on the question of discounts or specify that the
buyout price will represent a pro rata share of firm value, with no discounts applied.
246  See Wasserstein  Perella  Letter Setting Forth  Determination  of  LIN Broadcasting  Pri-
vate Market Value, Bus. WIRE  (Mar. 6,  1995) (publishing a letter from the  appraiser desig-
nated to resolve the dispute between  independent directors of LIN and LIN's parent company
describing the pre-agreed upon formula for fixing the minority share buyout price).
247 Id.
248  For this purpose, I define "freeze-out" to include any cashout of  minority shareholders
by another shareholder  with more  than 30% of the relevant shares.  If the definition  is ex-
panded to include management buyouts, the numbers do not change materially.
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of the transactions involved a premium-to-market of more than 5%, and the
average  premium  was  40%.  These  results  are  confirmed  by  data  from
Mergerstat Review, which shows  that the average  premium  paid  in going
private  transactions  in each  year during the ten-year  period  surveyed  was
greater than 30%.249
Table 2.
1987-1991  1992-1996  1987-1996
Conflict Transactions  in All  49%  43%  45%
Regimes (n=1604)
Freeze-outs  in All Regimes  43%-  30%  40%
(n=154)
Conflict Transactions  in  41%  43%  42%
Discount Regimes (n=29)
Freeze-outs in Discount Regimes  51%  47%  49%
(n=7)
Some  portion  of these premiums  are  presumably  paid to  deter  entire
fairness litigation and appraisal  cases.  Even in jurisdictions  that permit dis-
counts,  such as Ohio, however, sponsors of conflict transactions  almost  al-
ways pay  premiums  over market  price to  minority  shareholders.  Admit-
tedly,  sample  sizes  are  small,  but  a t-test  of means  does  not reject  the
hypothesis that the premiums paid in all regimes and in discount regimes are
the  same  at  a  10%  significance  level.  Further,  in  discount  regimes,  all
freeze-outs (n=7) during the ten years from 1987 to 1996 were at premiums
of greater than 5%, and the average premium paid in conflict transactions  in
discount regimes  (n=29) was 43%.  The uniformity of such premiums sug-
gests that an  extra-legal "norm"  exists and that discounts should not be im-
posed in conflict transactions such that even where a controlling shareholder
may be legally permitted to  impose discounts, they refrain  from doing so,
possibly out of reputation concerns.  Such a norm provides further evidence
that a rule excluding discounts is efficient.
250
249  See  MERGERSTAT  REVIEW  1997, supra note  13,  at 42  (listing the statistics  showing
the average premium paid in going private transactions  over the ten-year period from  1987 to
1996).
250  On occasion, reasons may exist for not enforcing  extra-legal norms:  secular shifts in
given  markets may render a norm outmoded;  strategic interests of a set of participants  in  a
given market may  lead to the creation of norms that inefficiently favor those participants; and
distributional  concerns  may outweigh  efficiency  reasons  for enforcing  a given  norm.  See
David Charny, Illusions of  a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual  Relationships,  144MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
A final source of evidence about what the majority of contracting par-
ties would choose is that a majority of issuing firms are located in jurisdic-
tions with rules excluding discounts (at least in theory),  and because such
firms can contract  around  such rules  but choose not to it appears possible
that a rule excluding discounts is tacitly chosen by a majority of contracting
parties.
Because state corporate law comes  as a package-a corporation gener-
ally cannot choose to rely on Delaware law regarding takeover defenses but
Ohio law regarding fair value determinations-one can only  infer so much
from  the fact that Delaware's  rule  regarding  discounts  has not deterred  a
majority  of public  corporations  from  continuing  to  incorporate  in  Dela-
ware.  252 But the fact that corporations have not used their ability to contract
around the law of fair value determinations  by issuing redeemable shares,253
while continuing to remain subject to the remaining provisions of Delaware
law,  does provide  some  evidence  about the  merit  of a rule  rejecting  dis-
254 counts.  As Roberta Romano  put it, "[I]f firms routinely choose clause y
U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1841,  1854  (1996)  (noting that  "commentators  have  long  argued  that  the
norms that ordinarily govern  commercial  life  should not be  incorporated into the legal stan-
dards for contract enforcement");  Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and  Inefficient Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REV.  1697, 1727 (1996)  (noting that "rapid economic or technological change may
suggest that unchanged norms have become inefficient"  and that "highly unequal endowments
of group members  may be  evidence of inefficient  norms").  I am unaware of any  evidence
suggesting such a counterindication  exists here.
A  majority ofjurisdictions,  including Delaware,  California,  and New  York, at least
purport to have rejected minority discounts.  Admittedly,  clear judicial rejection of minority
discounts in fair value  determinations  is relatively  recent.  Only in  the last  15  years has the
issue been defined in a sufficiently sharp way for issuing corporations and investors to under-
stand how courts will resolve the issue.  As shown in Part  , Delaware  decisions  continue to
suggest that minority discounts might be accepted if  valuations are cleverly framed so that the
discounts are implicit rather than explicit, and appear at the "corporate level" rather than at the
"shareholder level."  See supra  Part I.  The lack of viable policy analysis behind Delaware's
pro rata value doctrine  has caused confusion  in the markets regarding  the strength, certainty,
and durability of the rejection.
252  See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven  for Incorporation?,  20 DEL. J.
CoRP.  L. 965,  1010 (1995)  (surveying new incorporations and reincorporations  of companies
traded  over-the-counter  or listed  on  the  New York  Stock  Exchange,  and  concluding  that
"Delaware  remains the preeminent state for incorporation").
253 See  supra Part II  (describing  ways  of contracting  to include  or exclude  discounts
available to Delaware corporations).
254 An immediate  objection to this reasoning  is that there is no evidence of corporations
using redeemable  shares (or some other method)  in Ohio (or other states permitting discounts
to be  included) to contract  around the rule applicable  to them that requires  inclusion of dis-
counts.  Hence,  the evidence  from  observing  firm  behavior is inconclusive.  There  is  some
merit to this objection--the evidence adduced in this Section is not, in fact, conclusive.
Two responses, however, can be made, which together argue that the evidence of firm be-
havior remains persuasive (if not conclusive) that a default rule rejecting discounts is optimal.
First, a far greater number of corporations that participate in the public markets incorporate in
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over clause  x, then  we know  from their revealed  preference  of picking  y
when they could have chosen x, that clause x is suboptimal. 2 5 s
E.  Which Discount  Rule Is Fairer?
Most courts in addressing the question of discounts have not principally
used efficiency-based  rationales  to decide  cases.  Instead, they  have either
claimed  that stare  decisis applies, 256 or crafted rationales  that appear to be
based on either fairness or feasibility  criteria.  Fairness-based rationales  for
upholding or rejecting discounts fall into either of two categories:  claims of
unfair  surprise or claims  of unequal treatment.257  These  rationales  fail to
states rejecting discounts than in states  accepting discounts.  Second,  any rule regarding dis-
counts is a special type of  rule that for convenience  may be called a "conflict  rule."  A conflict
rule  is one that regulates  conflict  transactions,  and  therefore will,  ex  post, benefit or harm
control persons at the expense or gain of minority investors.  Evidence that corporations have
not contracted  around a conflict rule  that ex post benefits  control persons  is less suggestive
than evidence that corporations have not contracted around a conflict rule that ex post harms
control  persons  for the  simple reason  that control  persons have  the power to  contractually
eliminate the harm.  To put it differently, redeemable shares would benefit control persons in
states  like  Delaware,  where the  rule  regarding  discounts  harms  control  persons,  but  they
would harm  control persons,  at least ex post,  in states like  Ohio.  Because  control  persons
make the decision of  whether to issue redeemable  shares,  one would expect to see more dis-
count contracts in states like Delaware than one would in states like Ohio.
255 Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question:  The Tenuous Case  for Mandatory
Corporate  Laws, 89 COLUM.  L. REV. 1599,  1604 (1989).
256  As noted supra Part I.D, Delaware's principal  (and erroneous)  rationale for rejecting
minority discounts when it first faced the issue in the Cavalier  Oil case was that the issue had
already  been decided and only applied to valuations at the corporate level.  See Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137,  1144 (Del.  1989).  Courts  in other states, as well as com-
mentators, have  also appealed  to legislative  history in rejecting discounts,  claiming  that be-
cause appraisal  procedures and entire  fairness cases  are meant to protect minority  sharehold-
ers, minority discounts should be excluded because they would reduce  recoveries by minority
shareholders.  See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra 197, at 643-44 (noting that the "primary  source of
the appraisal  remedy  today is  to protect  minority shareholders  from wrongful  conduce'  and
concluding that "[i]f this  purpose is to be fulfilled, the dissenting shareholder must receive  a
pro rata share  of the  value of the  corporation").  Although  it is no doubt correct  that such
judicial  remedies  were  developed  primarily  to  protect  minority  shareholders,  see
1 AMERICAN  LAW INSTITUTE,  PRINCIPLES  OF CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE:  ANALYSIS  AND
RECOMMENDATIONS  ch. 4 (1994)  (discussing the history and purpose of appraisal),  it is also
true that such remedies were not meant to transfer an unlimited  amount of value from control
persons to minority  shareholders.  It is possible to accept  minority discounts and still believe
that appraisal rights should protect minority  shareholders-by  affording  them a right to re-
ceive a minority share price for their shares.  The relevant question  is:  How should fair value
determinations protect minority  shareholders?  Legislative history is silent on that question.
See id.
257 Courts have articulated even less persuasive "fairness"  arguments.  One court argues
that rejecting  discounts  would  afford  minority  shareholders  an  unjustifiable  windfall  and
would impose a penalty on control persons.  See Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.,  513 N.E.2d
776, 788 (Ohio 1987) (contending that rejecting discounts clearly should "not give dissentingMINORITYDISCOUNTS
provide any strong reason for Delaware courts to either reject or accept dis-
counts, and each is briefly described and critiqued.
1. Unfair Surprise
Fairness arguments  in the discount context are often premised on loose
notions  of shareholder  expectations.  Minority  shareholders  expect  to  be
given less than controlling shareholders, because they know minority shares
are worth less than  control  shares.  Failing to  include  a minority  discount
would unfairly surprise the controlling shareholder.  Conversely, sharehold-
ers  expect  to  receive  an equal  share  of the  firm,  despite  being minority
shareholders,  because each share of stock has the  same legal  rights at the
time of investment.  Therefore, to permit a freeze-out at a minority discount
would constitute unfair surprise, because most freeze-outs  are at a premium
to market."'  The "flippability" of the unfair surprise argument is an imme-
diate strike against it, from either perspective.  Expectations arguments  can
plausibly  be made from  either point of view, precisely  because the parties
did not have specific expectations based on clear disclosure or express bar-
gaining.  The argument is also vulnerable to the objection that if the choice
of discount rule is clearly known at the time of investment, neither rule pre-
sents any question of unfair surprise.  Finally, although surprise may indi-
cate  unfairness,  lack of surprise  does  not indicate  fairness.  One  expects
crime, for example, but that is hardly a reason to repeal laws against theft.
shareholders any  element of value  attributable to the  transaction  from which they have  dis-
sented").  Delaware  courts have  made  exactly the opposite arguments  in favor of rejecting
discounts---that accepting  discounts affords control persons an unjustifiable windfall  and im-
poses a penalty on minority shareholders.  See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d  at 1145 ("Mo fall to
accord to a minority  shareholder the full  proportionate value of his shares imposes  a penalty
for lack of control,  and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders  who may reap a windfall
from the appraisal process by  cashing out a dissenting  shareholder.");  see also Wertheimer,
supra note  197,  at 644  n.143  (quoting  Cavalier Oil approvingly  on  this  point).  Because
whether a discount should be termed a "penalty" or a "windfall"  is decided by the same court
that decides whether or not to accept or reject the discount, such terms are post hoc surplus
and provide no basis for deciding one way or the other.  Cf.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
684  A.2d  289,  299  (Del.  1996)  (adopting  the "penalty"  and  "windfall"  phraseology  from
Cavalier  Oil).
258  This argument should be distinguished from the argument made supra  Part IV.C that
the fact that premiums are routinely paid in freeze-outs, even in jurisdictions where doing so is
not required,  is evidence that a no-discount rule is efficient.  The argument here is based sim-
ply on shareholder expectations, regardless of  whether the expectations are in line with an ef-
ficient result.  The argument made supra  Part IV.C does not depend on any given shareholder
expecting a premium, but only on the inference drawn from their being paid that an efficient,
consensual norm to exclude discounts exists.
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The surprise argument for including discounts is also subject to the ob-
jection that it confuses  financial discounts  and legal discounts. 21  The two
are conceptually distinct.  Although  discounts in the marketplace  do consti-
tute evidence of the value of shares, courts should at least inquire as to why
those  discounts  exist before  accepting their  existence  as a reason  for  im-
posing a discount in a fair value determination.  Minority  discounts  in the
financial  markets  are  caused  in part by expropriation  value,  and,  as  such,
simply reflect the risk, or the absence of that risk, that control persons may
be able to successfully  steal, defraud, or breach fiduciary  duties owed to the
corporation.  To include  discounts  in freeze-outs  because they exist in the
markets  would, as cogently stated by Victor Brudney, permit the "very ex-
istence  of [a control  person]  and its  capacity  to exploit unlawfully  [to]  le-
gitimize the fact of such exploitation."
2 6 0
2.  Unequal Treatment
Unequal treatment rationales  for rejecting minority  discounts  come  in
both a  simple and a subtle form.  The simple form is reflected in a recent
New York decision in which the court reasoned that, because all shares have
equal rights, fair value should represent an equal share of total firm value.261
Because including minority discounts implies that minority shares are worth
less than  control  shares,  minority  discounts violate the "mandate  of equal
,,262 treatment.  Unfortunately,  this  argument  begs  the  policy  question.  If
shares must be treated equally in a determination of fair value, then by defi-
nition no minority discounts  apply.  Simply noting that minority  discounts
result  in unequal treatment  does not provide  a good policy  reason for  re-
jecting them.  In addition, it is a general principle of Delaware law263 (and in
259  See supra Part I.C.1  (discussing the roles of and distinctions between  legal and finan-
cial discounts).
260  Brudney, supra  note 80, at 70 n.36.
261  See Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 976 (N.Y. 1995)  ("[I]n fixing
fair value,  courts  should determine  the  minority  shareholders'  proportionate  interest in  the
going concern value of the corporation as a whole.").
262 Id. at 977.  The trial court in Beway Realty distinguished marketability discounts from
minority discounts on the ground that all shares of a close  corporation  are equally unmarket-
able,  and therefore  a majority does not derive an unequal benefit from discounting minority
shares to reflect this fact.  See id. This argument is weak because, as an empirical matter, it is
clear that all shares of a corporation are  not equally unmarketable-at least for closely held
companies, minority shares are less liquid than control shares.  See PRATT  ET AL., supra note
4, at 301 (Exhibit 14-1,  note) ("Control shares in a privately held company may also be sub-
ject to some discount for  lack of marketability,  but usually not nearly  as much  as minority
shares.").
263  See Bershad  v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840  (Del. 1987)  (upholding a sale of
control by a controlling shareholder under Delaware law).  See generally  Einer Elhauge, TheMINORITY DISCOUNTS
all likelihood of New York law as well 64) that control shareholders  are en-
titled to  sell  their  control  shares  at a  premium  to  market  without  either
sharing that premium with minority shareholders  or structuring a transaction
to ensure  equal treatment  of minority  shareholders  in the  sale.265  Finally,
literally  applied,  equal  treatment  would  appear  to  require  that  minority
shareholders  receive  a control  premium,  including  synergy value and pure
control value, something contrary to both Delaware and New York law.266
The more subtle version of the unequal treatment rationale for rejecting
discounts  is found  in California  case  law.  California courts have reasoned
that fair value should represent the value of minority  shares to the control
person pursuing the transaction, because  in a freeze-out  it is effectively the
control  person that  is acquiring  the minority  shares.
267  Because  minority
Triggering  Function of  Sale of  Control  Doctrine,  59 U. CHI. L. REV.  1465 (1992)  (discussing
differing views on the duties of controlling shareholders to pay part of a premium from a sale
to minority shareholders).
264  See Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, 48 N.Y.2d 684, 685 (1979)  (upholding a sale of con-
trol b  a controlling shareholder under New York law).
24 See Bershad, 535 A.2d at 841-42 (rejecting the contention that a majority shareholder
owes  the minority  shareholders  a  fiduciary  duty to sell  its stock to the  highest bidder);  cf
William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's  Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of  Shares, 78
HARV. L. REV. 505, 506 (1965)  (proposing a rule requiring minority shareholders to be given
the right to "tag along" with control shareholders in a sale of control).
266See In re Fleischer, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274-75 (App.  Div. 1985) (finding that the ac-
quisition premium is not appropriate to consider  in determining  fair value); see also supra
Part I.D.2 (discussing Delaware law on control premiums).  The  equal treatment rationale is
also inconsistent with the fact that conflict transactions by definition provide control  persons
with aform of benefit not shared with all shareholders equally.  Freeze-outs  force cash on mi-
nority shareholders while control persons retain equity in the firm; minority shareholders need
not receive  the same form of consideration,  the same tax treatment,  or literally equal  value,
and no subsequent valuation is required to "settle  up" if the stock obtained by a controlling
shareholder turns out to have been worth more than the cash payment to minority shareholders
in the freeze-out.  See Toms, supra note  85, at 548-50 (describing disparate tax and transaction
cost impacts of freeze-outs and proposing that minority shareholders be compensated  for ob-
jectively  ascertainable  costs caused by  freeze-outs,  such as tax and reinvestment  transaction
costs).  Yet freeze-outs  are generally legal  in Delaware  and New York.  See Weinberger  v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983)  (holding that freeze-outs are not only legal, but re-
quire no business purpose);  Alpert v. 28  Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d  19,  24 (N.Y.  1984)
(upholding a freeze-out merger).
267  See, e.g.,  Brown v. Allied  Corrugated Box  Co.,  154  Cal. Rptr.  170,  176  (Ct. App.
1979)  (asserting  that the value  of minority  shares should reflect  their value  to the person
seeking to purchase them).  The Brown case arose not in an appraisal proceeding per se, but in
an  analogous  court-supervised  buyout  proceeding  under  California  law.  See  CAL.  CORP.
CODE  § 2000 (West  1991)  (providing dissolution  action procedures).  Many  states such  as
California and New York, see N.Y. Bus.  CORP. LAW  §§  1104,  1118 (McKinney  1986), pro-
vide minority shareholders in a close corporation with the right to dissolve the corporation on
various  grounds,  including  "oppression,"  "waste,"  or,  in jurisdictions  such  as  California,
"deadlock";  and if the corporation wishes  to avoid dissolution it may buy  out the minority
shareholders at "fair value," which again has generally been found to be the same "fair value"
1999] 13391340  UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA  LAWREVIEW  [Vol.  147:1251
shares  cease to  be minority shares in the hands of the control person, they
should no longer be valued as if they were subject to the risk of expropria-
tion-a control person will not expropriate wealth from himself.  Thus,  in
the hands  of the  control person,  minority shares  should be valued equally
with all other shares.
An internal  difficulty  with this  logic  is that once a control  person has
obtained control, additional minority shares do not convey control.  As a re-
sult, the value to  a control  person of additional  minority  shares  generally
will  be  lower than  the  value  of control  shares.  Minority  shares  will  be
worth less to a control person than control shares for two reasons.  First, mi-
nority shares do  not bring  with them  additional  pure  control value,  which
the controlling shareholder already  has obtained.268   Second, acquisition of
minority shares eliminates  expropriation value, which depends  on minority
shareholders  for its existence.  Although  there may be good reasons to ig-
nore the  difference  in  setting fair value,  it is  clear that the difference  ex-
ists.269  Finally, as with New York's version of the unequal rationale,  Cali-
fomia's  reasoning  would  seem  to  require  that  fair value  include  a  full
control premium  including shared merger synergies,  a result that has  con-
sistently been rejected in Delaware, although not in Califomia
° 0
As with unfair surprise,  both forms of unequal treatment rationale  fail,
in the end, to offer anything more than window dressing on a conclusion al-
ready  reached.  New  York law straightforwardly  and Califomia  law indi-
rectly beg the question.  Why should minority shareholders always  be enti-
tled to the same value as controlling  shareholders?  One is  immediately led
that arises in appraisal  proceedings.  See, e.g.,  Brown, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 176; Beway Realty
Corp., 661 N.E.2d at 975-76.
268  See  Sporborg  v.  City  Specialty  Stores,  Inc.,  123  A.2d  121,  124  (Del.  Ch.  1956)
(holding that a controlling shareholder's purchase of shares at a given price is not sufficient to
establish  a market  price  to  consider  in determining  fair  value  using the  Delaware  block
method, and taking "judicial notice" of the fact that majority shareholders  often pay  a "pre-
mium" for minority shares).
269  A survey of public company acquisitions announced during  1994 and  1995, based on
data provided by Securities Data Co. Inc.  (on file with author),  shows that premiums paid in
cash-out  transactions  involving  independent  targets  averaged 39%  over the target's  market
price four weeks prior to the announcement, compared to an average of only 33% for cash-out
transactions involving controlled targets (that is,  where the acquiror owned a 30+% stake prior
to the transaction).  When the universe of transactions is expanded  to include all  cash tender
offers  for public companies  announced  during  1994  and  1995  (regardless of whether  they
were  100%  cash-out transactions),  the average  premium paid over market price  four weeks
prior to the announcement  increased to  53%  for independent  targets,  compared  to 35%  for
controlled targets.  See generally  PRATT ET AL, supra  note 4.
270  See supra  Part I.D (discussing Delaware law's rejection of minority discounts and its
use solely of  the going  concern value to determine  fair value); cf Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson &
Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal.  1969) (finding that the control shareholder must share the control
premium with minority shareholders).MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
to ponder what wonderful  effects equal treatment would have.  How would
those effects  compare to the harmful  effects that the  rule would  produce:
reduced synergies, distorted effort effects, lock-in of minority shareholders,
and impairment of the market for corporate  control?  This leads back to ef-
ficiency analysis.
F.  Which Discount  Rule Is More Feasible?
One final category of rationales for accepting or rejecting discounts  is
that one rule or the other would be easier to implement from  a procedural
point of view.  Indeed, this type of argument  was made by both the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Cavalier  Oil 271  and by the American Law Institute
in the Principles of Corporate Governance.72  Once  again, however,  the
identical argument  can be, and has been, advanced  on behalf of a rule per-
mitting discounts. 273  Neither view is persuasive as a general matter because
estimating discounts is required  under either rule.  If fair value is based on
minority share market prices,  a rule excluding  discounts  would require  es-
timating the discount so as to exclude it, with attendant procedural difficul-
ties.  If fair value is based on a DCF valuation, however, as  is sometimes
necessary (as when market prices have been affected by takeover rumors), a
rule including discounts would require fixing a discount to include the DCF
valuation, thereby increasing procedural complexity.274
Using market prices as the exclusive basis for valuation would exclude
a discount  for  private  companies,  but  include  one  for public  companies
(unless they  were  the  subject  of takeover  speculation,  in  which  case the
valuation would be at a premium).  Such a rule would necessarily produce
not only inconsistent rules but also perverse incentives.  Private firms-pre-
cisely  those  companies  whose  synergy-driven  mergers  are  more  common
and  whose  freeze-outs  should be  encouraged  to  enhance  minority  share-
holder liquidity-would  be discouraged  from  undertaking  freeze-outs,  be-
271  See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hamett, 564 A.2d  1137,  1146-47 (Del.  1989) (finding  the
no-discount rule easier to implement).
272  See 2 PRINCIPLES  OF CORPORATE  GOvERNANCE  324 (1994)  ("Any ...  rule [includ-
ing discounts] would require the  court to undertake a complicated and ultimately speculative
inqu.  ...  ?)
See, e.g.,  Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.,  513 N.E.2d  776, 788-91  (1987)  (finding
that a discount rule  is "a less complicated valuation  proceeding").  Hermalin  and Schwartz
make such an argument on behalf of  using market prices  as "fair value"  in buyouts; however,
because their analysis assumes  that minority discounts do not exist, their argument really  fa-
vors using a market-price-based  rule, regardless of what value that produces.  See Hermalin &
Schwartz, supra  note 201,  at 344, 367-69.
274  See supra  notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing valuation methods in entire
fairness cases).
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cause they  would be required  to  pay nondiscounted  prices.  Large  public
firms-precisely  those  companies  whose  incentive  to take  value-reducing
actions or to block the flow of valuation information to the market is great-
est because the potential gains are larger-would be encouraged to under-
take  freeze-outs  because  they  would  be  required  to  pay  only  discounted
prices.  In addition,  such a rule would allow a company to reduce  its own
"fair value" by selling a modest number of shares to the public and thus cre-
ating a market for its minority shares.  Finally, such a rule is very unlikely
to  be  adopted  without  legislative  action  because  neither  the  DGCL  nor
Delaware case law has distinguished between public and private  companies
in determining fair value.
275
A final feasibility  argument for including discounts is that doing other-
wise would give minority shareholders  an incentive to pursue  "fair value"
through  litigation  rather  than  by  selling at market  value  in the  securities
markets.276  Again,  this  argument  only  applies  to  public  firms;  minority
shareholders of private firms have no market sale option and will, by neces-
sity, bargain  with controlling  shareholders  over a  freeze-out  price  in the
shadow of case law on fair value.  Even as applied to public companies, this
argument  assumes that  control  shareholders  will  seek to  set  a freeze-out
price at a discounted price and thus induce litigation.  But if discount law
clearly rejected discounts (both explicit and implicit), freeze-out proponents
would be more likely to set a freeze-out price  in line with this law precisely
to avoid litigation.  Indeed,  freeze-out  proponents already  appear to be do-
ing so.
2 77  Finally, as is recognized,  appraisal and entire fairness litigation is
sufficiently unattractive to minority shareholders  as a procedural matter that
without other dramatic changes in appraisal law, defining "fair value" to ex-
clude discounts is unlikely to create a large drain on judicial resources.
In sum,  there is  no reason to  expect a no-discount  rule to be more  in-
tractable for courts to apply than its opposite, nor is there any reason to ex-
pect more litigation with a no-discount rule.
275 See DEL.  CODE ANN.  tit. 8,  § 262 (1991)  (providing appraisal rights  for shareholders
without  differentiating  between  public and private corporations,  and  stating  that the special
provisions  governing closely  held corporations  do not affect  fair value determinations);  see
also Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at  1142-45  (discussing  a  fair value  determination  for a private
company); Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., No. CIV.A.8395,  1990 WL 84218, at *48 (Del. Ch.
June  19,  1990) (citing and  following Cavalier Oil in a fair value  determination  for a public
company).
76  See  John  D.  Emory,  Jr.,  Comment,  The  Role of Discounts in Determining "Fair
Value" Under Wisconsin's Dissenters  'Rights Statutes:  The Case  for  Discounts, 1995 Wis. L.
REV.  1155, 1173 (arguing that the failure to discount shares would encourage  appraisal litiga-
tion and "strain limited judicial resources").
277 See supra Part IV.D  (discussing  the  empirical  evidence  that  reflects  this  trend  in
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G.  Does the Default  Nature of  Discount  Law Affect the Choice of  Rule?
The foregoing policy analysis has implicitly assumed that whatever dis-
count rule is adopted will govern all firms in a mandatory, binding fashion.
As demonstrated in Part II, however, current  law allows  firms to vary dis-
count law by private contract, through redeemable  common stock, through
buy/sell agreements,  or via other contracting mechanisms.  Before  address-
ing the policy question of whether discount law should remain nonbinding,
consideration  should be given to  whether the fact that discount law is and
perhaps  should be nonbinding affects the policy  choice of which discount
rule should be the default rule.
Analysis here again  supports a no-discount rule.  As between two po-
tential default rules, the potential costs of contracting around whichever rule
is  chosen should be considered.  Lucian Bebchuk has argued that where  a
nonbinding  default  rule  is to  be chosen  from  two  alternatives,  neither  of
which  is clearly superior, preference should be given to the rule that is less
favorable to control persons, because such a rule has a better chance of be-
ing corrected  over time should the rule prove inefficient.  The "least cost"
approach, then, also favors a default rule excluding discounts.  Corporations
are currently able to contract around rules regarding discounts by amending
their charters  or reincorporating.  In addition,  corporate managers and con-
trolling stockholders  choose the terms of the  initial  corporate  charter  and
occupy the best position to effect changes in state law.  If courts accept the
conclusion of Part IV.H  below and leave intact the largely nonbinding na-
ture  of the rule,  corporate  managers  and controlling  shareholders  will  be
best positioned to avoid the effects of a poorly chosen rule.  Thus, the rule
chosen  should  benefit  the  party  least  able  to  resort  to  mechanisms  for
avoiding the  rule,  the minority  shareholders,  supporting the  exclusion of
minority discounts.
H. Should Discount  Law Be Nonmandatory?
Before concluding, some consideration  should be given to whether dis-
count law  should remain mandatory but nonbinding, whether it should be
made nonmandatory, or whether it should impose constraints on the ability
of firms to contract around whichever discount rule is chosen.
Firms  compete  for capital,  and the  price  of capital  generally  reflects
governance  structures,  including  rules  of corporate  law  as well  as  charter
278  See Bebchuk,  supra  note  157, at 26-43 (implying  that value-increasing  amendments
unfavorable to managers are unlikely to be proposed by managers or shareholders).
1999] 13431344  UNIVERS1TY  OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW  [Vol. 147:1251
and  bylaw  provisions. 2 79   Over  time,  structures  that  maximize  investor
wealth reduce the cost of capital and are  naturally selected from a diverse
array of structural experiments.28  Except where structural terms create ex-
ternalities or are both unpriced and systematically suboptimal, corporate law
should not impose mandatory  rules that constrain this competitive  process,
but  instead  should  consist  of only  nonmandatory  default rules  and  allow
firms and investors  (prior to  investment) to negotiate terms that vary from
default rules.281  The  same  logic  weighs  against  imposing  mandatory  but
nonbinding rules, as with current discount law.
279  See  generally R.A.  BREALEY,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  RISK  AND  RETURN  FROM
COMMON  STOcKs 25-46, 53-61  (2d ed.  1983)  (describing the relationship  between  risk and
return for common stocks); EASTEREROOK & FISCHEL, supra  note 22, at 1-39 (describing the
purpose of  the corporate  contract); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,  The Mechanisms
of  Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.  549, 565-92 (1984)  (describing capital  market mecha-
nisms that potentially explain market efficiency);  Symposium,  The Structure and Governance
of  Enterprise,  27 J. FIN. ECoN. 1 (1990)  (examining changes occurring in the structure, man-
agement,  and  governance  of business  enterprises).  The  EMH,  which  in its  "strong"  and
"semi-strong"  forms  is  crucial to the view that corporate structures  are priced  efficiently, is
not a consensus  view.  See supra note  190 (questioning  the efficiency of capital markets).
Few would dispute, however, the notion that capital market pricing generally reflects govern-
ance structures, particularly at the stage of initial public offerings  for large companies.  See
Gordon, supra  note  123, at  1557-61  (arguing that initial public offering prices  are  generally
efficient);  cf  Steven  L.  Jones  &  Jeffry  M.  Netter,  Efficient  Capital Markets,  in
ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF ECONOMICs  569, 569-73  (David  R.  Henderson  ed.,  1993)  (noting  that
"initial stock price response to new information is at least in the correct direction").
280  See  EASTERBROOK  &  FIsCHEL,  supra note 22, at 4-7  (arguing  that "self-interested
entrepreneurs  and managers...  are  driven to  find the  devices most  likely to  maximize  net
profits");  Fred  S. McChesney,  Economics, Law and Science in the Corporate  Field: A  Cri-
tique of  Eisenberg,  89  COLUM.  L. REV.  1530,  1534-38  (1989)  (arguing in favor of the eco-
nomic or contractarian view of the function of corporate  law); Ralph K.  Winter, The  "Race
for the Top Revisited". A  Comment on Eisenberg,  89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526,  1526-29  (1989)
(rebutting Eisenberg's argument that capital  markets fail to discipline management).  But see
Eisenberg, supra note 123,  at 1500-05  (arguing that capital markets do not sufficiently con-
strain firms to have a significant disciplinary impact on governance structures).
In addition to capital markets, other markets play a role in aligning the structure of a firm
with the interests of investors.  These markets include the market for corporate  charters among
the states, the market for corporate control,  and the managerial  labor market  See  ROMANO,
supra  note 47, at 32-51  (describing and assessing evidence for the impact of a market for cor-
porate  charters); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.  POL.
ECON.  288, 290-95  (1980)  (describing  the  market for corporate  control  and  the  managerial
labor market).  But see Black, supra  note  123,  at 571  (arguing that  small IPOs  may not be
priced efficiently  and that post-IPO discipline by the  capital markets, labor markets, product
markets, and market for corporate control is inefficient).
281 See EASTERBROOK  & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 35 (arguing  that "[tihere  is no rea-
son why [the law] should be used to impose a term that defeats actual bargains");  Lucian Arye
Bebchuk,  The Debate on Contractual  Freedom in Corporate  Law, 89 COLUM.  L. REv. 1395,
1404-08 (1989)  (summarizing  arguments against mandatory  corporate  governance  structures
at the initial charter stage  and noting exceptions  for externalities  and systematic mispricing);
David D. Haddock et al., Property  Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA.MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
If corporate  structures  are  efficiently  priced,  variations  are  at worst
neutral from a shareholder perspective  because investors  will only pay for
what they receive.  Innovations can thus benefit the firms and investors in-
volved in a new structure by permitting them their structure of choice.  In-
novations may also benefit the public generally because efficient  structural
innovations are a matter of public record  and can be copied, leading to spill-
over effects if useful.
Part III.D  raised  the possibility  of systematic  mispricing  of minority
share prices based  on a general  misunderstanding regarding  the Delaware
rule on discounts as a possible  answer to the discount puzzle.212  As noted,
however, such  an answer conflicts  with the  EMH,  and the  hypothesis re-
mains  unproven.  More to the point, the  simple "fix"  to the possibility  of
overpayment  would be for Delaware  courts to  adopt  a predictable  default
rule rather than imposing an unpredictable mandatory rule.  Parts III.B  and
III.C provide  independent,  plausible answers  to the discount  puzzle.  Nei-
ther transaction costs nor network externalities  in themselves  provide sepa-
rate reasons for imposing a mandatory discount rule on firms and investors,
and the possibility of innovation  externalities-if anything-favors permit-
ting or encouraging greater latitude for innovation to help partially offset the
possibility  of less-than-optimal  innovation  caused  by  innovation  external-
ities.
Absent a compelling reason to do otherwise,  and given that nothing in
DGCL section 262 or its legislative  history suggests  that Delaware  courts
should do  otherwise, Delaware  courts should abandon  the blanket,  manda-
tory rule rejecting all "shareholder  level"  discounts  formulated  in Cavalier
Oil.284  Rather,  courts should generally reject  discounts  for the policy rea-
sons discussed earlier in this Part, but permit discounts when clear evidence
establishes that a particular firm and its investors reasonably expected a dis-
count to be applied, on the basis of ex ante bargaining in the form of price-
setting or actual negotiations.  28  That the efficiency arguments in Part IV.A
L. REV.  701,  733-36 (1987)  (arguing  in favor  of nonmandatory  default rules); McChesney,
supra  note 280, at 1534-38 (same).
282 See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text (discussing the overpayment hypothe-
sis as an explanation for the discount puzzle).
283  See Marcel  Kahan,  The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw.
U. L. REV. 565, 599-600 (1995)  (discussing the phenomenon of innovation externalities).
284  Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d  1137, 1144 (Del. 1989).
285  This argument should be distinguished from the arguments made supra  Part IV.E that
shareholder  expectations  should not alone  be determinative  of which default rule should be
chosen on discounts.  In those arguments, expectations were ambiguous because both the firm
and investors were silent about freeze-out pricing.  See supra  Part IV.E.  Here, by contrast, a
firm would be required to clearly specify an alternative rule for it to be upheld.
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are  uncertain  at  best, and  that  either  rule  represents  a trade-off between
competing efficiency  interests,  also suggests that whichever rule is chosen
should remain nonmandatory.  Permitting the inclusion of discounts  in ap-
propriate  cases  will  continue  to  protect minority  shareholders,  but protect
them  in an appropriate  way by satisfying their  reasonable  investment  ex-
pectations,  and it will provide corporations  and investors with the flexibility
to vary from this norm if they wish to do so.  In any instance where  a rule
including  discounts  would  be applied, full  disclosure  of the effects  of the
rule,  together with  appropriate  charter provisions to  put subsequent  inves-
tors on notice, should of course be required.
To decide whether shareholder expectations  are clearly evidenced, con-
sider how a firm could contract  around a default rule  on discounts.  Rules
affecting minority discounts may arise at the time of initial issuance and in
"midstream  changes" through charter or bylaw amendments.  A midstream
change can occur in either a setting where no controlling shareholder exists,
so that "control"  is  dispersed  in the public market  among  minority share-
holders, or where a controlling shareholder or parent company exists.
A firm-specific  rule including  discounts  resulting from an  initial  issu-
ance would  appear to provide the best case for applying a rule  permitting
discounts.
286  Where minority shares  are  issued in a public offering  or pri-
vate placement, the issuing firm  should have the flexibility to contract with
its shareholders in such a way that, should it pursue a transaction triggering
With respect to discounts other than minority discounts, shareholders  investing in certain
types of stock, upon full disclosure,  will form investment expectations regarding  the value of
the stock  that warrants  consideration  in fair value  determinations.  In the context of initial
share issuances, the presumption  is that such investors have consented to a rule including dis-
counts (or premiums, where appropriate) that takes  into account  the special characteristics  of
such stock:
(1) shares issued with lesser or greater voting rights (which should not be valued identi-
cally with  shares having  normal voting rights,  despite  (in theory) having  the  same  pro rata
residual claim in liquidation);
(2) shares subject to an otherwise unobjectionable  written  agreement among shareholders
(or between a company  and particular shareholders)  restricting share transfers  (for example,
buy/sell agreements,  agreements  granting the  corporation  a right of first refusal,  and  agree-
ments prohibiting  transfer to  a particular  class  of potential investors),  or altering  the rights
upon transfer of shares (for example, time-phased  voting shares,  which have differing voting
rights depending upon how long they have been held by the shareholder and which should not
be valued identically with freely transferable shares); and
(3) shares of  privately held companies (which should not be valued identically with shares
of  an identical company-in other words, marketability discounts are valid).
Where  investors are aware of such  unique attributes at the  time of investment, discounts
or premiums  to reflect the  unique attributes  of such shares  should be included to satisfy the
reasonable investment expectations of both the issuing firm and the investors.
286  See Gordon, supra  note 123, at 1556-64 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to
IPOs generally).MINORITYDISCOUNTS
a fair value determination, fair value would include a discount to reflect the
minority status of such shares.  Inclusion of discounts in such circumstances
would not appear to create any identifiable externality, nor would discounts
appear to present any special  capital  market pricing difficulty.87  All  other
things  being  equal,  expanding  structural  choices  for  firms  and  investors
seems sensible  on  its face,2 88  and permitting corporate  law to  include  dis-
counts,  if consistent with investors'  reasonable  expectations,  would  allow
the capital markets to correct for any default rule inefficiencies.2 89
In a midstream change where a controlling shareholder exists, there will
be  little basis  for  concluding  that  minority  shareholders  consented  to the
change.  Disclosure relating to the  change  and technical  board  and share-
holder  approval  requirements  will  not  prevent  a  controlling  shareholder
from  effecting  a midstream  change  that  represents  a pure  wealth  transfer
from  minority  shareholders.  Absent judicial  restraint,  controlling  share-
holders, by  definition, have the ability to force  approval  of charter amend-
ments that transfer value  from minority  shareholders  to  controlling  share-
holders.  Permitting such midstream changes would, in effect, be permitting
value diversion by controlling shareholders and could be expected to reduce
ex ante share value.2 9 0  Even in a situation  in which minority shareholders
bought their shares expecting that a controlling shareholder would  exist, as
in "partial  carve-outs,"  or IPOs of minority stakes, minority investors do not
expect that controlling  shareholders will be unconstrained  in their technical
ability to propose and implement midstream  changes.291  A  charter amend-
287  As discussed in Part IV.F, supra, where market prices are available, basing fair value
determinations on such prices, which reflect an implied minority discount, would appear to be
easier for both judges to determine  and  capital markets to price.  Cf Hermalin & Schwartz,
supra  note  201,  at 366-67  (arguing for a default rule including discounts  on the ground that
market prices are verifiable).
288  See Charles L Goetz &  Robert E. Scott, The Limits of  Expanded  Choice: An Analysis
of  the Interactions  Between Express and Implied Contract  Terms, 73 CAL.  L. REV. 261,  262
(1985)  (describing  the "Expanded  Choice  postulate");  Gordon,  supra note  123,  at  1553
(same).
289  A third argument for permitting firms and investors to vary default rules is that doing
so protects them  from the  risk that mandatory government regulation serving  some end  not
endorsed by  firms or  investors will be  imposed  through corporate  law.  See Gordon, supra
note  123, at 1553  n.15 (explaining that the "opt out" principle protects parties against legisla-
tive  regulation  or delay);  see also ROMANO,  supra note 47,  at 42-44  (describing  ways  in
which Delaware "bonds" to firms and investors by making it difficult for the Delaware  legis-
lature  to "renege"  on  implicit  promises  of adopting corporate  laws  that maximize  investor
wealth).
290  See supra Part IV.A.5  (explaining that uncertainty  and  asymmetric  information will
increase capital cost and decrease share value).
291  The  Delaware  Supreme  Court's recent  split decision  in  Williams v.  Geier demon-
strates that Delaware's  highest court  has,  for the moment,  decided  that such  coerced  share-
holder votes do not present any per se problem.  See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d  1368,  1376-
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ment permitting the majority to freeze out the minority at a discounted price
(less than  "fair value") would appear to be a classic  instance in which the
entire  fairness test  should  apply, regardless  of whether  the amendment  is
technically  approved by the  requisite  majority.  It is difficult  to  imagine
from either an ex ante or an ex post perspective how to defend a midstream
charter  amendment that  simply  lowers the  fair  price that  control  persons
would need to pay in future conflict transactions.
That leaves one final,  difficult case:  midstream  changes  approved  by
minority shareholders  in situations  not involving  controlling  shareholders.
Specifically, should a rule including discounts be permitted to be added to a
charter after a company is already a public company, whether isolated from,
or  in anticipation  of, a shareholder-approved  control  acquisition?  Recent
academic  commentary  has  suggested  that  approval  of midstream  charter
changes may be coerced by management through agenda control and "bun-
dling"  a charter change with a "sweetener"  such as a special  dividend, even
absent a controlling shareholder.29 2  Moreover, collective action problems  of
the sort that make tender offers potentially coercive may impair a fully con-
sensual shareholder vote. 293  Because management of a public company that
lacks a controlling shareholder  is often in a position to propose and imple-
ment a type of conflict transaction (an MBO) that raises  precisely the same
types of issues  as conflict transactions sponsored by  controlling sharehold-
ers,  midstream changes  sponsored  by management  should also be  suspect.
77 (Del. 1996) (upholding stockholder approval of an amendment in the  absence of unilateral
board action or disenfranchisement).  In Geier,  however,  the majority opinion  acknowledged
that the "entire fairness"  standard might apply to certain types of charter amendments.  See id.
at  1378  (giving  various  reasons  why  shareholder-approved  charter  amendments  might  be
subject to entire fairness  review  and asserting  that those reasons  were not applicable  in the
case at hand); see also id. at 1386-88 (Hartnett, J., dissenting) (arguing strenuously that "entire
fairness" review was appropriate in the instant case).
292  See Gordon, supra  note  123, at  1573-80  (discussing the risk of opportunistic charter
amendments);  see also Lucian Arye  Bebchuk,  Limiting Contractual  Freedom in Corporate
Law:  The Desirable Constraints  on Charter  Amendments, 102 HARv.  L. REv. 1820,  1823-25
(1989)  (arguing  for  substantial  limits  on midstream  changes  in  governance  structures  and
identifying issues which  def'me those limits).  But see Romano,  supra note 130,  at  1606-13
(disputing that risks of  opportunistic charter amendments are serious).
293  See Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079,  [1984 Trans-
fer Binder]  Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)  83,637, at 86,916  (June 21,  1984) (noting that share-
holders often act against their beliefs due to uncertainty and the desire to minimize the risk of
change);  Lucian  Arye Bebchuk,  The Pressure  to Tender:  An Analysis and a Proposed  Rem-
edy, 12 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 911,924 (1987)  (explaining that rational shareholders may make less
efficient  tender  decisions  because  they  "cannot  coordinate  their  actions");  Lucian  Arye
Bebchuk,  Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in  Corporate Takeovers, 98
HARV. L.  REV.  1693,  1729-31  (1985)  (explaining  that shareholders'  inability  to coordinate
action  is among the causes  of tender decision distortion);  Michael  Bradley, Interfirm Tender
Offers and the Market  for Corporate Control,  53 J. Bus. 345, 349-56 (1980)  (explaining the
"prisoners'  dilemma" facing shareholders in an interfirm  tender offer).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
MBOs  concededly  face  market and  legal  hurdles that  freeze-outs  do not:
the Revlon doctrine generally  applies to MBOs, effectively  requiring some
form  of market check  or auction before  an MBO can be closed.294  None-
theless,  a rule  permitting  discounts  would  present  a paradigm  case  of a
charter  change that poses  a conflict between control  persons and minority
shareholders,  similar to the dual class recapitalizations  that enjoyed a surge
of popularity  in  the mid-1980s.  Although the  question  is not  free  from
doubt,  and the debate over midstream  changes  is too  lengthy to review  in
detail here, concerns about midstream changes combine with concerns about
freeze-outs  themselves to suggest that, on balance, companies  should not be
permitted to adopt rules to include discounts at any time other than at initial
issuance.
CONCLUSION
Having concluded  in Part IV that Delaware  courts should  continue to
reject minority discounts,  it may be worthwhile to end by briefly consider-
ing how courts might go about the difficult business of attempting to differ-
entiate between minority discounts and control premiums, and consequently
how they might avoid  making the same  mistakes  that have confused  past
Delaware decisions on fair value.
As noted  in Part  I,  control  premiums  and minority  discounts  are inti-
mately related-either they are used synonymously,  or they are used to rep-
resent distinct but overlapping concepts. 9s  As argued in Part I, some Dela-
ware  courts  have  taken  the  pro  rata  value  doctrine  to  prohibit  explicit
"second-stage"  adjustments  of any kind,  whether  premiums  or  discounts.
As a result, those courts have produced fair value determinations that reflect
implicit  discounts,  notwithstanding that  the pro rata value  doctrine  nomi-
nally prohibits  discounts.296  Other Delaware  courts  have recognized  that
control premiums and minority  discounts are  distinct in principle and have
attempted to exclude  some portion of a control premium without imposing
what those  courts viewed  as a minority  discount.297  Unfortunately,  those
294  See Revlon,  Inc. v. MacAndrews  & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,  506 A.2d  173,  185 (Del.
1985)  (announcing the Revlon doctrine); see also Mills Acquisition  Co. v. Macmillan,  Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261,  1280-88 (Del.  1988) (applying Revlon to MBOs).
295  See supra  Part I.D.2 (discussing the concepts of control  premiums and minority dis-
counts).
296  See supra  Parts I.D.1-.2 (explaining how implicit discounts have been granted despite
the fair value doctrine); Part I.D.3 (discussing cases granting implicit discounts).
297  See supra  Part I.D.2.b (explaining the distinction); Part I.D.3 (analyzing case law con-
fusion with respect to the distinction); see also Coffee, supra  note  77 (making the same point
by distinguishing expropriation value  from synergy value in the context of sales of control by
controlling shareholders).
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courts have provided  only  general  guidance  regarding how to  calculate  or
even understand what portion of the control premium must be excluded,  and
what portion must be included to eliminate the implicit minority discount.29 8
As  an  initial  matter, Delaware  law  on fair value  would  be  improved
simply by reformulating the pro rata value doctrine,  at least as  it has been
applied  to  date.  Of course,  a fair value  determination  should  include  a
valuation  of the corporation as  a whole  (where feasible, such as through  a
DCF analysis).  Courts should recognize  that various valuation techniques,
such as market-price-based valuations, already impound minority discounts,
whereas  other techniques,  such as valuations  based  on control  acquisition
prices, impound full  control premiums,  including synergy value specific to
the future transactions,  as well as  pure control value.  A  more  flexible ap-
proach-more  in keeping with  the spirit of Weinberger v.  UOP, Inc.299 -
would  not reject  the  valuation  methodologies  which  impose  full  control
premiums,  but  neither  would  it  prohibit  "adjusting"  reference  values
produced by such methodologies to eliminate nonincludable elements.
Nevertheless, a court making a fair value  determination needs a reliable
method for choosing the appropriate adjustments.  Recall what gives control
shares  greater  value  than  minority  shares:  expropriation  value,  synergy
value, and pure control value.3 00  As a doctrinal matter, DGCL section 262
appears  to prohibit inclusion  of synergy value because, by definition,  such
value  arises out of the transaction triggering the appraisal.3 °1  It is true that
in  Weinberger, and more recently  in  Technicolor, the Delaware  Supreme
Court has interpreted the statutory exclusion narrowly.3°2  Nevertheless, the
synergies included in fair value determinations  in those two cases were lim-
ited to synergies  that both  were "known"  as of the date of the merger and
were  related  to  steps  that had  previously  been  taken  by the  controlling
shareholder, so that the synergies were plausibly "part of' the company be-
298  See supra Part I.D.3  (explaining  case law  confusion  with  respect  to the distinction
between minority discounts and control premiums).
299  457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
300  See supra  Part I.D.2.a (defining these terms and illustrating their conceptual bases).
301  See DEL.  CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262  (1991  & Supp. IV  1996) (directing courts to deter-
mine fair value  "exclusive of any element of value arising  from the accomplishment  or ex-
pectation of the merger").
302  See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,  457 A.2d  701, 713-14 (Del.  1983)  (interpreting DGCL
section 262 as barring only speculative elements of future value); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129,  1990 WL 161084,  at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct.  19,  1990) (interpreting DGCL
section 262 and  Weinberger as barring synergy value), rev'd, 684 A.2d 289, 298-300  (Del.
1996) (instructing the lower court on remand that synergies must be included in fair value if,
during the period between  tender offer and freeze-out merger in a two-step takeover, the ac-
quiror takes sufficient steps so that synergies are "known" and not "speculative"  and are part
of  the company being valued).MINORITY DISCOUNTS
ing valued.  It is unclear how far Delaware courts will push this reasoning in
the face  of the statutory  exclusion-however  narrow it may be said to be.
Even  if Delaware  courts were  prepared to  reject  a rigid application of the
pro rata value doctrine, the inclusion of synergies that were still in the early
planning  stage, and so were speculative  even if probable, would  appear to
be contrary to the appraisal statute.
3 0 3
The remaining elements of a control premium,  expropriation value and
pure control value, by contrast,  appear to be elements that could be consid-
ered by a court under Weinberger. 3 0 4  For reasons discussed in Part IV, ex-
propriation value should not be included in fair value.  Pure control value is
the most difficult element.  It represents,  so to speak, the value of pure con-
trol in a world of upright, law-abiding  citizens,  in which no expropriation
value existed, and where no transaction-specific  synergies were foreseeable.
The efficiency arguments reviewed in Part IV suggest that, at least as a pre-
liminary  matter,  such  value  should  be included,  and  therefore,  whenever
minority share prices  are adjusted upward to eliminate the impact of minor-
ity discount, the adjustment made should include  all elements  of a control
premium except synergy values.
As a practical matter, courts are ill-equipped to distinguish between in-
cludable  and excludable elements  of a control  premium,  regardless  of the
resolution  of the theoretical  problems 05   Moreover,  as  noted  by  several
Delaware  courts, judges generally are not empowered  or well-positioned to
act  as investigators  and must instead depend upon  litigants to brief the is-
sues  and  provide factual  data.
306  Rather than  attempting  the impractical,
therefore,  courts  might  adopt  the  following procedural  rule  to  guide  fair
value determinations:  Where an adjustment to a reference value is proposed
to  eliminate  elements of a control  premium  or minority  discount  in a fair
value  determination,  the  transaction  sponsor  will  bear  the  burden  of ex-
plaining why the adjustment is being made and how reliably it can be meas-
ured.  Failure to meet this  burden will result  in acceptance  of upward  ad-
justments and rejection of downward adjustments.
303  See DEL.  CODE ANN. tit. 8,  § 262(h) (requiring consideration of "all relevant factors"
but excluding  consideration of value based on the accomplishment or expectation of  merger);
cf 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.  § 13.01(3)  (1997)  (permitting the inclusion of increased
or decreased post-merger value where it would be inequitable not to do so).
304 See  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713  (excluding  from  fair value  only "speculative  ele-
ments" arising from the 'accomplishment  or expectation'  of the merger").
305  See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No. 11107,  1995 WL 376911,  at
*4 (Del. Ch. June  15, 1995) (noting the possibility of  arbitrariness  in adjusting  for a minority
discount).
306 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., Civ. A. No. 8080,  1990 WL 201390,  at *5
(Del. Ch. Dec.  11,  1990) (noting that the parties, not the judge, have the responsibility to find
and present proof).
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Such a procedural  rule would  be consistent with traditional  Delaware
law in entire fairness litigation that places the burden of proving entire fair-
ness  on the transaction  sponsors.307  It would permit control  persons,  at a
minimum, to exclude  the impact of synergy value if they could propose a
reliable  estimate  of such  synergies,  based,  for  example,  on a comparable
transaction analysis.  Such a rule also fits nicely with existing requirements
of the duty of candor.308  Temptations  to exaggerate  the size of estimated
synergy value would be tempered not only by the litigation process, but also
by the securities laws, at least for control persons that have their own public
shareholders who would be able to sue if the control persons knowingly dis-
closed higher than reasonably expected synergy values.  Practitioners  would
develop  and refine techniques for arriving at appropriate adjustments, and a
body of case law would develop to assist practitioners in this process.  Over
time, Delaware corporate law would begin to reflect in practice what it pur-
ports to do in theory, and what appears to be most efficient-to exclude mi-
nority discounts in conflict transactions.
307  See Weinberger,  457 A.2d  at 703 (agreeing with  the lower court's holding that "the
ultimate  burden of proof is  on the majority  shareholder  to show...  that  the transaction  is
See Lynch v. Vickers  Energy  Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281  (Del.  1977) (enunciating the
duty of  candor).MINORITY DISCO  UNTS
Appendix A
Table of  Cases
Cases Applying or Rejecting Minority Discounts, Marketability
Discounts, or Control Premiums in Appraisal, Liquidation,
Statutory Buyout, and Entire Fairness Cases,
through January  1999
Case  Law  Discount/Premium
Holding
Ronald v. 4-C's Elec. Packaging,  Inc.,  CA  Rejects  minority  dis-
168  Cal.  App.  3d 290,  214  Cal.  Rptr.  counts
225 (Ct. App. 1985).
Brown  v.  Allied Corrugated Box  Co.,  CA  Rejects  minority  dis-
154 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Ct. App. 1979).  counts
Walter  S.  Cheesman  Realty  Co.  v.  CO  Rejects  minority  dis-
Moore,  770  P.2d  1308  (Colo.  App.  counts
1988).
Hintmann v.  Fred Weber,  Inc.,  1998  DE  Applies  20%  control
Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (1998).  premium
LeBeau v. M.  G.  Bancorporation  Inc.,  DE  Rejects  methodology  re-
1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (1998).  flecting implicit  minority
discount;  accepts  meth-
odology  that  includes
"control  premium"  aris-
ing  from  elements  of
value  other  than  syner-
gies
Metropolitan Life Ins.  Co. v. Aramark  DE  Rejects  minority discount
Corp., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 (1998).  in  entire  fairness  case
triggered by reverse stock
split freeze-out
Connector Serv. Corp. v.  Briggs, 1998  DE  An Illinois court applying
U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  18864  (N.D.  Ill.  Delaware  law rejects  mi-
1998).  nority  discount  in  entire
fairness  case triggered  by
reverse stock split freeze-
out
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Case  Law  Discount/Premium
Holding
Cede  & Co.  v.  Technicolor, Inc.,  684  DE  Holds  that  control  pre-
A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).  mium  (including  synergy
value) must be included if
synergies  are  "part  of'
company on merger  date;
affirms  rejection  of  mi-
nority discount
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp.,  DE  Adjusts  market  value
1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (1995).  upward  to  eliminate  im-
plicit  minority  discount;
refuses  to  include  syn-
ergy value
Cooper v. Pabst  Brewing  Co.,  1993 Del.  DE  Attempts  to reject minor-
Ch. LEXIS 91 (1993).  ity  discount  and  to  ex-
clude  synergy  value  by
using  "blended  price"  of
two-tier offer
Hodas  v.  Spectrum  Technology  Inc.,  DE  Rejects  minority  and
1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52 (1992).  marketability discounts
Rapid-American Corp. v.  Harris, 603  DE  Applies  control  premium
A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).  at "corporate  level"
Salomon Brothers  Inc. v. Interstate  Bak-  DE  Rejects  minority discount
eries Corp.,  1992 Del.  Ch. LEXIS  100  but also declines to adjust
(1992).  market  value  upward  to
eliminate  implicit  dis-
count
In re Radiology Assocs.,  Inc. Litig.,  611  DE  Rejects  upward  adjust-
A.2d 485 (Del. Ch.  1991).  ment to eliminate implicit
discount;  rejects  control
premium
In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.,  1990  DE  Rejects  minority  dis-
Del. Ch. LEXIS  199 (1990).  count,  but  uses  market
value  (and  thus  implicit
discount) in part
Cavalier Oil Co. v. Harnett, 564  A.2d  DE  Rejects  minority  and
1137 (Del. 1989).  marketability discountsMINORITY DISCOUNTS
Case  Law  Discount/Premium
Holding
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413  A.2d  DE  Rejects  third-party  sale
137 (Del. Ch. 1980).  value  (and  thus  control
premium)
In  re  Olivetti  Underwood Corp.,  246  DE  Rejects  third-party  sale
A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968).  value  (and  thus  control
premium); uses Delaware
block method
Felder  v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159  DE  Applies  10%  marketabil-
A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1968).  ity discount
Application of Del. Racing Assoc.,  213  DE  Rejects  third-party  sale
A.2d 203 (Del. 1965).  value  (and  thus  control
premium); uses Delaware
block method
Sporborg v.  City Speciality Stores, 123  DE  Rejects  control  premium
A.2d 121  (Del. Ch.  1956).  in  determining  market
pricing  using  Delaware
block method
Sterling v.  Mayflower Hotel Corp.,  93  DE  Rejects  control  premium
A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).  in  determining  market
pricing  using  Delaware
block method
Tri-Continental  Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d  DE  Applies  25%  minority
71 (Del.  1950).  discount  at  "corporate
level"
Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers,  GA  Applies minority discount
314 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).  and  marketability  dis-
count,  but  cautions
against double-counting
Weigel Broad.  Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d  IL  Refuses to overturn lower
745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).  court's  application  of
50%  combined  minority/
marketability  discount;
fair  value  determination
vested in trier of fact
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Case  Law  Discount/Premium
Holding
Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Lab.,  IL  Refuses to overturn lower
Inc., 972 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1992).  court's  rejection  of  mi-
nority discount; fair value
determination  vested  in
trier of fact
Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chicago,  IL  Refuses to overturn lower
581 N.E.2d 678 (Ill.  1991).  court's acceptance of 5%
minority  discount;  fair
value  determination
vested in trier of fact
Institutional Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v.  IL  Rejects  both  20%  mar-
Hughes, 562  N.E.2d  662  (2d  Dist.  Ill.  ketability  discount  and
1990).  30%  control  premium  as
a factual  (not legal) mat-
ter
Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 545  IL  Applies  20%  minority
N.E.2d 111(1 st Dist. Ili.  1988).  discount
Johnson v. Hickory Creek Nursery, 521  IL  Rejects minority discount
N.E.2d 236 (3d Dist. Ill. 1988).
Stewart v.  D.J. Stewart  &  Co.,  346  IL  Finds  discount  not  inap-
N.E.2d 475 (2d Dist. Ill. 1976).  propriate  as  a  matter  of
law
Ahlenius  v.  Bunn  & Humphreys, Inc.,  IL  Includes  discount  in  list
192 N.E. 824 (2d Dist. Ill. 1934).  of  permissible  valuation
factors
Perlman v.  Permonite Mfg.  Co.,  734  IN  Applies  15%  minority
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983).  discount
Richardson v. Palmer Broad. Co.,  353  IA  Rejects minority discount
N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1984).
Woodward v.  Quigley, 133  N.W.2d  38  IA  Rejects minority discount
(Iowa 1965).
Moore v.  New Ammest,  Inc.,  630  P.2d  KA  Applies  20%  minority
167 (Kan. App. 1981).  discountMINORITY DISCOUNTS
Case  Law  Discount/Premium
Holding
Ford v.  Courier-Journal  Job Printing  KY  Rejects  minority  dis-
Co.,  639  S.W.2d  553  (Ky.  Ct.  App.  count;  applies  market-
1982).  ability discount
In  re  Valuation of Common Stock  of  ME  Rejects minority discount
McLoon  Oil Co.,  565  A.2d  997  (Me.
1989).
American Gen. Corp. v.  Camp, 190 A.  MD  Rejects minority discount
225 (Md. 1937).
BNE Mass. Corp. v.  Sims,  588 N.E.2d  MA  Rejects  minority  dis-
14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).  count;  applies  control
premium
Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co.,  163  MA  Rejects  implicit  minority
N.E.2d 9 (Mass.  1959).  1  discount
Pooley v.  Makato Iron & Metal, Inc.,  MN  Rejects minority discount
513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).  _
Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774 (8th Cir.  MN  Rejects minority discount
1993).
Spinnaker Software Corp. v. Nicholson,  MN  Applies minority discount
495 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).  1
MT Properties,  Inc. v. CMC Real Estate  MN  Rejects minority discount
Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
Hernando Bank v. Huff, 796  F.2d  803  MS  Applies minority discount
(5th Cir. 1985).
Hunter v.  Mitek  Indus.,  Inc.,  721  F.  MO  Rejects  minority  and
Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1989).  marketability  discounts;
states  that  fair  value  de-
termination vested in trier
of fact
King v. FTJ,  Inc., 765  S.W.2d 301  (Mo.  MO  Applies  15%  minority
Ct. App. 1988).  discount;  states  that  fair
value  determination
vested in trier of fact
Dreiseszun v.  FLM Indus.,  Inc.,  577  MO  Rejects minority discount
S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
Rigel  Corp. v.  Cutchall, 511  N.W.2d  NE  Rejects minority discount
519 (Neb. 1994).  1  1  1
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Case  Law  Discount/Premium
Holding
Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff,  5 F.  Supp.  NV  Rejects  explicit  minority
2d 1117 (D. Nev. 1998).  discount;  rejects  control
premium;  applies implicit
discount  by using market
value;  applies  25%  mar-
ketability discount
Lawson Mardon Wheaton v. Smith, 315  NJ  Rejects  marketability  dis-
N.J. Super. 32 (1998).  count;  rejects  attempt  to
apply  upward  adjustment
to  eliminate  implicit  mi-
I  nority discount
McCauley v.  Tom  McCauley &  Sons,  NM  Applies  25%  minority
Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. App. 1986).  discount,  states  that  fair
value  determination  vest-
ed in trier of fact
Friedman v.  Beway  Realty  Corp.,  661  NY  Rejects  minority  dis-
N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1995).  count;  applies  25%  mar-
, ketability discount
Raskin  v.  Walter  Karl,  Inc.,  514  NY  Rejects minority discount
N.Y.S.2d  120 (2d Dept. 1987).
Blake  v.  Blake  Agency,  Inc.,  486  NY  Rejects  minority  dis-
N.Y.S.2d 341  (2d Dept. 1985).  count;  applies  10%  mar-
I  ketability discount
Jones v. Healy, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Spec.  NY  Applies minority discount
Term 1945).
Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc.,  185  ND  Rejects  control  premium
N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1971).  in  "reconstructing"  mar-
, ket price
Armstrong v.  Marathon Oil  Co.,  513  OH  Applies implicit  minority
N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1987).  discount
Woolf  v. Universal  Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,  OK  Rejects minority discount
849 P.2d 1093 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
Columbia  Management Co. v. Wyss,  765  OR  Rejects  minority  dis-
P.2d 207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).  count;  applies  33%  mar-
, ketability discount
Charland v.  County  View  Golf Club,  RI  Rejects  minority  and
Inc., 588 A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991).  marketability discounts1999] MINORITY DISCO  UNTS 1359
Case  Law  Discount/Premium
Holding
In re 75,629 Shares of Common Stock of  VT  Applies  30%  control
Trapp  Family  Lodge,  Inc.,  1999  Vt.  premium
LEXIS 5 (Vt. 1999).  1  1  1
Robblee  v.  Robblee,  841  P.2d  1289  WA  Rejects minority discount
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992).  1*  *  *  *  *  *